Re: [OAUTH-WG] Draft -07 (major rewrite)

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Mon, 14 June 2010 18:23 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 11:23:26 -0700
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Draft -07 (major rewrite)
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On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 9:18 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
> Adding a verification code to the user-agent flow was suggested on this list
> and received nothing but support. It was suggested as a solution to a
> Twitter use case. Once that is added in, the two flows only differ in how
> the response is delivered and the presence of an access token in the
> response (which currently is a MUST NOT for web-server but I don’t know if
> this restriction is need).

Yeah, this matters.  If you return an access token on the web-server
flow, several things break:
- you can no longer rely on the client secret to authenticate the callback URL.
- you lose all hope of getting to LOA 2 with this protocol, because
the access token is visible to the client.
- you lose the clarity of how the web server flow is supposed to work.

Bike-shed painting:

The use-cases for web server and user-agent flow are also different.
I'd prefer to have the spec call out different profiles for different
use-cases, because it makes it much easier to figure out what a given
application should be doing.

During the WRAP work I argued that we didn't need a type parameter,
and after looking at WRAP implementations I've changed my mind.
Please leave it in.

Cheers,
Brian