Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

[Antonio Sanso <[e-mail]>]

On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:22 PM, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Registration requiring a valid email address is not sufficient to stop a "bad" person from registering a client that appears to be perfectly legitimate but is later used as a redirect.

totally agree!

> 
> So it is a bit slippery to differentiate good from bad.
> 
> In general clearing the referrer and fragment from incoming requests is a good practice on redirects to prevent leakage of information across the redirect.

+1

> 
> The other concern is using the redirect as part of a phishing attack to make the target site look more legitimate.
> That is a more complicated problem unless you validate every client by looking at them to make sure they are not bad in some way.

and here it comes the "error 400"  or the "always show the consent screen” approach

regards

antonio

> 
> John B.
> 
> 
> On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:09 PM, Hans Zandbelt <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>> Maybe just to clarify my point: where did the client_id in the example that you gave come from?
>> 
>> Hans.
>> 
>> On 9/4/14, 1:58 PM, Hans Zandbelt wrote:
>>> yes, you are right about the unrestricted client use case; I just got
>>> caught by the fact that you were talking about *unrestricted* client
>>> registration all the time (standards-based or not) which deserves extra
>>> caution whereas Google (and the spec) also provides *restricted* client
>>> registration the deviation or caution is not needed
>>> 
>>> Hans.
>>> 
>>> On 9/4/14, 1:44 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote:
>>>> hi Hans
>>>> 
>>>> On Sep 4, 2014, at 10:58 AM, Hans Zandbelt
>>>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Agreed, I see you point about the big providers using exactly the
>>>>> unrestricted flow for which the trust model (by definition) is out of
>>>>> scope of the spec. This may be the reason for the implemented
>>>>> behavior indeed and a security consideration is a good idea for other
>>>>> deployments; there's not much more that can be done.
>>>>> 
>>>>> But Google also provides explicit registration for API clients (which
>>>>> is where my mind was):
>>>>> https://developers.google.com/accounts/docs/OAuth2 (step 1)
>>>>> and they would not need to deviate from the spec for that, nor would
>>>>> the spec need to change
>>>> 
>>>> I do really struggle to understand your point here :) (at least the
>>>> "nor would the spec need to change part" :)).
>>>> 
>>>> Probably I need to explain myself better.
>>>> Since Google is “safe” (due the “deviation” from the spec) I would
>>>> take Google as example here (I could point out open redirector in the
>>>> wild to proof my point but I will not do…)
>>>> 
>>>> Let’s start from scratch…
>>>> 
>>>> If Google would have something like
>>>> http://www.google.com?goto=attacker.com this is without any doubt an
>>>> open redirector… see  also OWASP 10 [0].
>>>> 
>>>> Now if Google would have implemented the spec rfc6749 verbatim
>>>> something like
>>>> 
>>>> https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?response_type=code&client_id=788732372078.apps.googleusercontent.com&scope=WRONG_SCOPE&redirect_uri=http://attacker.com
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> would have redirect to http://attacker.com.
>>>> 
>>>> So why this is not an open redirect ? :)
>>>> 
>>>> Now maybe we are saying the same thing but I felt like better explain
>>>> my point :)
>>>> 
>>>> regards
>>>> 
>>>> antonio
>>>> 
>>>> [0]
>>>> https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2010-A10-Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 9/4/14, 9:50 AM, Antonio Sanso wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Hans,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I really fail to see how this can be addressed at registration time
>>>>>> for cases where registration is unrestricted (namely all the big
>>>>>> Providers)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> regards
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> antonio
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Sep 4, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Hans Zandbelt
>>>>>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Classifying like this must also mean that consent should not be
>>>>>>> stored until the client is considered (admin) trusted, and admin
>>>>>>> policy would interfere with user policy.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> IMHO the security consideration would apply only to dynamically
>>>>>>> registered clients where registration is unrestricted; any other
>>>>>>> form would involve some form of admin/user approval at registration
>>>>>>> time, overcoming the concern at authorization time: there's no
>>>>>>> auto-redirect flow possible for unknown clients.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 9/4/14, 9:04 AM, Richer, Justin P. wrote:
>>>>>>>> I think this advice isn't a bad idea, though it's of course up to
>>>>>>>> the AS
>>>>>>>> what an "untrusted" client really is. In practice, this is something
>>>>>>>> that was registered by a non-sysadmin type person, either a
>>>>>>>> dynamically
>>>>>>>> registered client or something available through self-service
>>>>>>>> registration of some type. It's also reasonable that a client, even
>>>>>>>> dynamically registered, would be considered "trusted" if enough
>>>>>>>> time has
>>>>>>>> passed and enough users have used it without things blowing up.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:26 AM, Antonio Sanso <[e-mail]
>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> hi again *,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> after thinking a bit further IMHO an alternative for the untrusted
>>>>>>>>> clients can also be to always present the consent screen (at least
>>>>>>>>> once) before any redirect.
>>>>>>>>> Namely all providers I have seen show the consent screen if all the
>>>>>>>>> request parameters are correct and if the user accepts the redirect
>>>>>>>>> happens.
>>>>>>>>> If one of the parameter  (with the exclusion of the client id and
>>>>>>>>> redirect uri that are handled differently as for spec) is wrong
>>>>>>>>> though
>>>>>>>>> the redirect happens without the consent screen being shown..
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> WDYT?
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> regards
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> antonio
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Sep 3, 2014, at 7:54 PM, Antonio Sanso <[e-mail]
>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Well,
>>>>>>>>>> I do not know if this is only dynamic registration...
>>>>>>>>>> let’s talk about real use cases, namely e.g. Google , Facebook ,
>>>>>>>>>> etc.. is that dynamic client registration? I do not know… :)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Said that what the other guys think?  :)
>>>>>>>>>> Would this deserve some “spec adjustment” ? I mean there is a
>>>>>>>>>> reason
>>>>>>>>>> if Google is by choice “violating” the spec right? (I assume to
>>>>>>>>>> avoid
>>>>>>>>>> open redirect…)
>>>>>>>>>> But other implementers do follow the spec hence they have this open
>>>>>>>>>> redirector… and this is not nice IMHO...
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Sep 3, 2014, at 7:40 PM, Hans Zandbelt
>>>>>>>>>> <[e-mail]
>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On 9/3/14, 7:14 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sep 3, 2014, at 7:10 PM, Hans Zandbelt
>>>>>>>>>>>> <[e-mail]
>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is your concern clients that were registered using dynamic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> client
>>>>>>>>>>>>> registration?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> yes
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> I think your issue is then with the trust model of dynamic client
>>>>>>>>>>> registration; that is left out of scope of the dynreg spec (and
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> concept is not even part of the core spec), but unless you want
>>>>>>>>>>> everything to be open (which typically would not be the case),
>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>> it would involve approval somewhere in the process before the
>>>>>>>>>>> client
>>>>>>>>>>> is registered. Without dynamic client registration that
>>>>>>>>>>> approval is
>>>>>>>>>>> admin based or resource owner based, depending on use case.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Otherwise the positive case is returning a response to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid URL
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that belongs to a client that was registered explicitly by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> resource owner
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> well AFAIK the resource owner doesn’t register clients…
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> roles can collapse in use cases especially when using dynamic
>>>>>>>>>>> client
>>>>>>>>>>> registration
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the negative case is returning an error to that same URL.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the difference is the consent screen… in the positive case you
>>>>>>>>>>>> need
>>>>>>>>>>>> to approve an app.. for the error case no approval is needed,,,
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I fail to see the open redirect.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> why?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> because the client and thus the fixed URL are explicitly
>>>>>>>>>>> approved at
>>>>>>>>>>> some point
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 9/3/14, 6:56 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sep 3, 2014, at 6:51 PM, Hans Zandbelt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me try and approach this from a different angle: why
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> call it an open redirect when an invalid scope is provided and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> call it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct protocol behavior (hopefully) when a valid scope is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> provided?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as specified below in the positive case (namely when the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scope
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is provided) the resource owner MUST approve the app via the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> screen (at least once).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 9/3/14, 6:46 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hi John,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sep 3, 2014, at 6:14 PM, John Bradley <[e-mail]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the example the redirect_uri is vlid for the attacker.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The issue is that the AS may be allowing client
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> registrations with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary redirect_uri.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the spec it is unspecified how a AS validates that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> client
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> controls the redirect_uri it is registering.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think that if anything it may be the registration step
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the security consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (this is the first time :p) but I do disagree with you. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty unpractical to block this at registration time….
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMHO the best approach is the one taken from Google, namely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> returning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 400 with the cause of the error..
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *400.* That’s an error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Error: invalid_scope*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Some requested scopes were invalid. {invalid=[l]}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> said that I hope you all agree this is an issue in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spec so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> far….
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> regards
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> antonio
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> John B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sep 3, 2014, at 12:10 PM, Bill Burke <[e-mail]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't understand.  The redirect uri has to be valid in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> order for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect to happen.  The spec explicitly states this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 9/3/2014 11:43 AM, Antonio Sanso wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hi *,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMHO providers that strictly follow rfc6749 are vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to open
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me explain, reading [0]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mismatching
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invalid,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> owner of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user-agent to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invalid redirection URI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the resource owner denies the access request or if the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirection URI,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the authorization server informs the client by adding the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> parameters to the query component of the redirection URI
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, perAppendix B
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B>:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Now let’s assume this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am registering a new client to thevictim.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://thevictim.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://victim.com/><http://victim.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://victim.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://victim.com/>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://victim.com <http://victim.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://victim.com/>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> provider.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I register redirect uriattacker.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://uriattacker.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/><http://attacker.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com <http://attacker.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/>>.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> According to [0] if I pass e.g. the wrong scope I am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirected
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> back to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attacker.com <http://attacker.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/><http://attacker.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/>> <http://attacker.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/>>.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Namely I prepare a url that is in this form:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://victim.com/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=bc88FitX1298KPj2WS259BBMa9_KCfL3&scope=WRONG_SCOPE&redirect_uri=http://attacker.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and this is works as an open redirector.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course in the positive case if all the parameters are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fine this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn’t apply since the resource owner MUST approve the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> app
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> via the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consent screen (at least once).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A solution would be to return error 400 rather than
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect URI (as some provider e.g. Google do)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WDYT?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> regards
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> antonio
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bill Burke
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://bill.burkecentral.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://bill.burkecentral.com/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]><mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>| Ping
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Identity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> |
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ping Identity
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>|
>>>>>>>>>>> Ping
>>>>>>>>>>> Identity
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
>>>>>>> [e-mail] | Ping Identity
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> --
>>>>> Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
>>>>> [e-mail] | Ping Identity
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
>> [e-mail] | Ping Identity
>> 
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