[OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Fri, 13 December 2024 16:59 UTC

Return-Path: <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86280C14F6FB for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:59:49 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.107
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.107 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id u-L5Cn0Llk7T for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:59:48 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-wm1-x336.google.com (mail-wm1-x336.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::336]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E893FC14F6E1 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:59:48 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-wm1-x336.google.com with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-432d86a3085so13481475e9.2 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:59:48 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1734109187; x=1734713987; darn=ietf.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=WL6OA3sf8qsNUZFXoc9t3e6T0xNWo1vts7jQhjHWSRE=; b=mq8g4jh/1120Ms7TCKTSJdcUaDe4q9rtaEV/WPIQn2eDBoBW6lik9ygx+vQLBxC3o0 IHjtkwvRwOc7CgYVpo+PuDgdPBTcZ+LuIPt1zj+imozHwahhHFPjmYoTVQ/XCP/olvhE Pvx+ZR2TWeICpqJH5cLiaMr2orqUG4Gj/0T+a5JD7IyXJH6pLYSwI0Cg9Nzk+1C4jqjo invIlECNtR0g+Qxo+QLTEEAffn6QwzYhtBj9Dx1arF0F40qddKEP2HLhWYVG6jXFjH7S 2JSO+nMstv72uQs0sRsl7XM1hPTkB04aY95AgDuYQGTy4JSjG/agNKAcD6ng77cLY30O DcDg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1734109187; x=1734713987; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=WL6OA3sf8qsNUZFXoc9t3e6T0xNWo1vts7jQhjHWSRE=; b=mzJb6zZ8nIsytr/4tj8oC1p/A7n4RAMTzL2TbP3ALZMnG+aO+SHrYzjP26USxa1kSD jWJJr2dWDxy8NX+tWvucfuJtsqO7ayG7Cd8W95HX7BRgFgYFTWgyV1n0JM6+IgDWtV0R i4D9A5w0RSophlpxczNn+7oKNbbFxQ89xLirgPYAfDF32jS0LHwcRnIdWD0YEz0nzsMf f80xUcqG3w1PVmn//r8irSYdGaTgwsgKDZPjofW0HpodCPHbWgRIIvO8jsP4qZPclzwj au6P2Wi/9h113mNX74H9VvKg2lgMWv2RL+mPk5kHhTX2X1C66B6jw+56h6nl+L286F+F m0Og==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yzfg3MEcbYrY12lBGY7cqsAfwXLWYfrK99eB1wxc1LqykNUQTgF XcBSgp8ptLrmnjV3KICh/yLUNO0a0b0kM2CPQ2yVVoZMXMrdUDhJQ/hCoIW241RZZtdg6ewmKLL 4gZrzEXtcjXUkImzBcFQdRJQThnWagg==
X-Gm-Gg: ASbGncsYbBX7jMRwK2bqpaGR/rLElvZDOrE7MNHTegVuDeBGVWGgAgNnOEZ3u+6xAkk 0OKNsNAF3WIg4rgFC9rnqK22rZLLv9WILd3+E/8CenO+7Y1QMKfgGDEXQGYeC0625d+N8qu8=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IEZsTYxwAXtPbW7XBp9ERxI21+4C7jfwCR8jm8FCio+U3o3+0r2fJs9kgMkBpsHzu5L5JpdS+zGerVy7hMaxrE=
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6000:188f:b0:386:5b2:a9d9 with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-3888e0c04aemr2346120f8f.53.1734109186826; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:59:46 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CACsn0ckGp4AocD1fQbMCs45P_Z5vjveggzDJw=-Vk5kxinM28Q@mail.gmail.com> <080c5dba-c3af-47d5-a773-ea41f5f720b4@danielfett.de>
In-Reply-To: <080c5dba-c3af-47d5-a773-ea41f5f720b4@danielfett.de>
From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:59:35 -0800
Message-ID: <CACsn0cn3JyzuWDdQuM8N9r+HyE=OhpLY+4ZK6ddoTiCH0aTSvg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Daniel Fett <mail=40danielfett.de@dmarc.ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-ID-Hash: SZVO4XGQIJWQMXCSENUMOOWAVZXH6576
X-Message-ID-Hash: SZVO4XGQIJWQMXCSENUMOOWAVZXH6576
X-MailFrom: watsonbladd@gmail.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-oauth.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/M9ySOPMrSDX3oNKIL422BjcbxSM>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:oauth-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:oauth-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:oauth-leave@ietf.org>

On Fri, Dec 13, 2024, 5:45 AM Daniel Fett
<mail=40danielfett.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Watson,
>
> Thanks for proposing text for SD-JWT. While I agree on the underlying problem, I would propose a different wording drawing a slightly different conclusion.
>
> Your text implies that when identifying information is being sent, this is clear to the user and there will not be an assumption of anonymity on the user's end. I think that ensuring that the user doesn't falsely assume anonymity in the other cases is critical:
>
> "When disclosures include information easily understood to be
> identifying, users intuitive view of what they are revealing largely
> matches the underlying technical reality. In cases where the
> information being disclosed may not appear to be identifying, users
> MUST be informed about the possibility of tracking and identification via
> issuer-verifier linkability or SD-JWT MUST NOT be used. Applications cannot assume Verifiers behave properly (RFC
> 3514) and MUST analyze the consequences for such linkage with each
> credential that could be used."
>
> WDYT?

Telling users does not work. Telling users that they might be tracked
through some mechanism that they have never heard of works even less.
Think about this as a popup that says "Blahdeblah: Do you want to get
your task done?". Of course people will say yes. We learnt this from
the decades of browser cert warning interaction improvements.

Is there a particular application you want to see SD-JWT used in where
my wording would be a problem?

Sincerely,
Watson

> -Daniel
>
>
> Am 12.12.24 um 02:00 schrieb Watson Ladd:
>
> Dear all,
>
> I'd like to propose the following edit to resolve the concerns I have
> around endorsing dangerous applications of SD-JWT:
>
> Delete last two lines of
> https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt/pull/451/files
> in 1338 and 1339
>
> Add new paragraph right before the end of the section.
>
> "When disclosures include information easily understood to be
> identifying, users intuitive view of what they are revealing largely
> matches the underlying technical reality. In cases where the
> information being disclosed is not identifying, SD-JWT
> MUST NOT be used as this confusion leads to users making the wrong
> choices. Applications cannot assume Verifiers behave properly (RFC
> 3514) and MUST analyze the consequences for such linkage with each
> credential that could be used."
>
> I think this agrees with many of the comments made about my initially
> stronger edit, while addressing the core danger.
>
> Also, it seems this section only really treats issuer/verifier despite
> promising more. Do we need to rework it?
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-leave@ietf.org