Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri

Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Fri, 10 January 2020 18:50 UTC

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:50:31 -0800
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To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
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There are many other factors to resiliency than multiple instances.

On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 10:30 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
wrote:

>
>
> > On 10 Jan 2020, at 17:22, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]
> >
> > As to the suggestion of using a JWT-decryption-microservice, another
> goal would be increased resiliency of the components. If the
> JWT-decryption-microservice is unavailable, the whole system is
> unavailable. If there are separate keys, then a failure in one component
> does not fail the entire system.
>
> Well you can run more than one instance - it’s a completely stateless
> service. You can also run a separate instance (or set of instances) per key
> if you like.
>
> Neil