Re: [OAUTH-WG] [jose] preventing confusion of one kind of JWT for another in JWT BCP

Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Thu, 27 July 2017 21:29 UTC

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 22:29:09 +0100
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [jose] preventing confusion of one kind of JWT for another in JWT BCP
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Brian: I did not think that 'crit' processing is required in JWT
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519

We have two goals:

Preventing new JWT profiles from being confused with older JWTs, which
'typ' solves (as does your proposal of 'crit' and 'p', but requires more
bytes)

Preventing existing JWT implementations from being confused with new JWT
profiles. 'crit' can solve that for JOSE JWTs, but not other JWTs.



On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 7:49 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
wrote:

> During the first WG meeting last week
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-99-oauth/> I asked if use of
> the JOSE "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter had been considered as a
> recommendation for preventing confusion of one kind of JWT for another.
> Time was running short in the meeting so there wasn't much discussion and
> it was requested that I take the question to the list. And so here on the
> list is that.
>
> Section 3.9
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01#section-3.9>
> of the JWT BCP draft now recommends explicit typing using the "typ" JWS/JWE
> header parameter but does concede that 'the use of explicit typing may not
> achieve disambiguation from existing kinds of JWTs, as the validation rules
> for existing kinds JWTs often do not use the "typ" header parameter
> value.'  And the recommendations for how to use the Type Header Parameter
> in JWT <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-5.1> strongly suggest
> that it's not currently being used for any validation.
>
> Alternatively using the JWS/JWE "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-4.1.11> to signal the
> type/intent/profile/application of a JWT could achieve disambiguation
> even in validation of existing kinds of JWTs. The critical header lists
> other headers which must be understood and processed by the receiver and
> that the JWS/JWE is invalid if those listed aren't understood. So a new
> type/profile of JWT that uses the "crit" header would produce JWTs that
> would be rejected even by existing applications of JWT validation (that
> actually implement "crit" properly anyway).
>
> The JWT BCP could suggest the use of "crit" in conjunction with a
> profile/application/type specific header. Or it could provide a bit more of
> a framework like defining a registering a new JOSE header "p" (strawman of
> p as a very short name for profile) and create a registry for its values. A
> JWT header using that approach might look like the following where the
> value 1 is registered as some cool new JWT profile/application. The
> consumer of such a JWT would have to understand and process the "p" header,
> which would mean checking that it had the value expected.
>
>      {
>       "alg":"ES256",
>       "crit":["p"],
>       "p":1
>      }
>
> A JOSE compliant JWT validator would reject such a JWT even for an OAuth
> access token or OIDC id_token because the "p" header isn't known or
> understood but is marked as critical.
>
> To me, that seems like an approach to preventing confusion that has more
> teeth than the "typ" header. Which is why I asked about it last week and am
> now bringing it to the list.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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