Return-Path: X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0D35129631 for ; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:32 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.1 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.1 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTTPS_HTTP_MISMATCH=1.989, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM=0.5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=parecki-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bGCHYkpK910j for ; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-it0-x22a.google.com (mail-it0-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4001:c0b::22a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45282129B08 for ; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:30 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-it0-x22a.google.com with SMTP id g67so23404332itb.1 for ; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:30 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=parecki-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=IibxqxLOjBTg6WVyU7qCfmYPT0dO9KuTtkKpaHJmZYQ=; b=F5czkaVoWl9BEFjS+vVPUNuGxQFecgwlLOU1g/aGnuIhI/+LFldyX2eQVgG8ITWKjc 4NnStitZyQD+qltqCodpIGJcCQWyYJSxQTxpxNtkKZKw0l+4Dr1vvVJQANFW6XmZRvKM ErF92RfeZmjaMGjYZZiZrdxZBgEBx3DPUpjhlv/z1e1RCrqzbxfeT9kZSultk/P1xkH1 eBMQsJDwrpd6xq++vtk4XhTrQMIL4+nyKQpRvkyfD6PpcMztTuogy5QY2Cee+T93SUGL MNniNVgYtt+yoJ52oIh6OkpJwrqQ22glfVjPbqKw3UUqiwEAPcBxPCPHzhMBCS7jVeL4 no2w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=IibxqxLOjBTg6WVyU7qCfmYPT0dO9KuTtkKpaHJmZYQ=; b=mMKvAoOdDiDMaDH4t8c6JYX/uxym4tZrt37bPJ9Q/EnTVAQsn5qGPXqvspRks7y9uO z8Sjre6094rH1eI6mqvyqr+WYRpTcdYUmX1aZ+cCoaMtSh0ChfMxS3AWWp24krHYuyFQ vVlDYkcFGrZtE8KS/Qa7rxTvX8/QHdztB5SZgdtgex7xAq+ccfob4kKwG1zOZMrsYz9d 2W0Du6cebuLKezG1jTunvb1ZtPWjXutgjQ2//0OIK6TBgdJbxjswnR5OJgbGTPZQU4Hy irxgflbU5snl8jK1iYgwtV1E7NmQdE15cCc/PCuJocY4MgalRNo/JzhOJntdlqpVNh+p YINg== X-Gm-Message-State: AMke39nenqZcpIA1ns7PrF8oX3KLh/0t9UuKzfvK+Gb6ubTD15pl/aH9016aego6Jej5rw== X-Received: by 10.107.14.78 with SMTP id 75mr7598791ioo.76.1487354729405; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-it0-f47.google.com (mail-it0-f47.google.com. [209.85.214.47]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id o26sm4984579ioi.4.2017.02.17.10.05.28 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:28 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-it0-f47.google.com with SMTP id g67so23403630itb.1 for ; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:28 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.107.200.70 with SMTP id y67mr7929341iof.73.1487354728394; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:28 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.183.81 with HTTP; Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:27 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <1e63222f-1d3b-59cc-a7c3-f9f3aa14e9df@manicode.com> <5d69eb72-b99a-1605-b58b-b7f33bb5db60@redhat.com> <600a2fe3fbc147588baedb557e6e5938@HE105717.emea1.cds.t-internal.com> <9f795a60-5345-61b6-356a-cc871164ba8d@manicode.com> From: Aaron Parecki Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2017 10:05:27 -0800 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: To: Dominick Baier Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c0c0b823dd51f0548bdc256 Archived-At: Cc: OAuth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Google's use of Implicit Grant Flow X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17 Precedence: list List-Id: OAUTH WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2017 18:05:33 -0000 --94eb2c0c0b823dd51f0548bdc256 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Can you describe the aspects that make a JS client library "solid"? This is what I think would be useful to see written up in a document like the Native Apps one. It's interesting to me that so many of you have independently opted to use the auth code flow for Javascript apps. I think that's a sign that it's a better recommendation than the implicit flow for JS apps. ---- Aaron Parecki aaronparecki.com @aaronpk On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 10:02 AM, Dominick Baier wrote: > Given a solid client library for JS, I think implicit flow is OK to use. > > But I agree that there are many =E2=80=9Chome grown=E2=80=9D implementati= on out there that > are not secure - and the necessary JS code to write a good client is not > necessarily the =E2=80=9Cpit of success=E2=80=9D. > > You should give this lib a go (it=E2=80=99s also a certified RP): > > https://github.com/IdentityModel/oidc-client-js > > Many people argue that handling the protocol and crypto pieces in JS is > problematic (and I agree if no proper lib is used for that) - but at then > end of the day the access token will end up in the browser - and a sloppy > developer (e.g. not using CSP) will always write bad code that might lead > to leaking a token. > > ------- > Dominick Baier > > On 17 February 2017 at 18:43:25, Adam Lewis (adam.lewis@motorolasolutions= . > com) wrote: > > +1000 > > We are currently going through internal turmoil over the usage of implici= t > grant for ua-based apps. The webapp case is well understood and the WG h= as > work in progress to define best practices for native apps. Having one fo= r > ua-based apps would be HUGELY beneficial > > > > On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Jim Manico wrote: > >> Thank you to those answering my question on implicit for JS clients. >> >> The responses so far seem to represent what the security world is saying >> about the implicit grant - keep away from it other than for a few OIDC u= se >> cases. >> >> Does anyone think it would be valuable to author a brief RFC to give >> clear OAuth 2 recommendations for JavaScript client developers? >> >> I mean - the OAuth 2 body of work just needs a few more RFC's, right? :) >> >> Aloha, Jim >> >> >> >> On 2/17/17 6:03 AM, Sebastian.Ebling@telekom.de wrote: >> >> Same for Deutsche Telekom. Our javascript clients also use code flow >> with CORS processing and of course redirect_uri validation. >> >> >> >> Best regards >> >> >> >> Sebastian >> >> >> >> * Von:* OAuth [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org ] *= Im >> Auftrag von* Bill Burke >> *Gesendet:* Freitag, 17. Februar 2017 00:14 >> *An:* oauth@ietf.org >> *Betreff:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Google's use of Implicit Grant Flow >> >> >> >> For our IDP [1], our javascript library uses the auth code flow, but >> requires a public client, redirect_uri validation, and also does CORS >> checks and processing. We did not like Implicit Flow because >> >> 1) access tokens would be in the browser history >> >> 2) short lived access tokens (seconds or minutes) would require a browse= r >> redirect >> >> I'd be really curious to hear other's thoughts though. >> >> [1] http://keycloak.org >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 2/16/17 5:44 PM, Jim Manico wrote: >> >> Hello Folks, >> >> I noticed that Google supports the OAuth 2 Implicit flow for third-party >> JavaScript applications. >> >> https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/OAuth2UserAgent >> >> >> Isn't this generally discouraged from a security POV? *Is there a better >> OAuth 2 flow for third party SPA applications?* >> >> Aloha, >> >> -- >> >> Jim Manico >> >> Manicode Security >> >> https://www.manicode.com >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> OAuth mailing list >> >> OAuth@ietf.org >> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oa= uth >> >> >> -- >> Jim Manico >> Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > --94eb2c0c0b823dd51f0548bdc256 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Can you describe the aspects that make a JS client library= "solid"? This is what I think would be useful to see written up = in a document like the Native Apps one.

It's interes= ting to me that so many of you have independently opted to use the auth cod= e flow for Javascript apps. I think that's a sign that it's a bette= r recommendation than the implicit flow for JS apps.

----
Aaron Parecki

On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 10:02 AM, Dominick B= aier <dbaier@leastprivilege.com> wrote:
Given a solid= client library for JS, I think implicit flow is OK to use.=C2=A0
=
But I agree that there are many =E2=80=9Chome grown=E2=80=9D = implementation out there that are not secure - and the necessary JS code to= write a good client is not necessarily the =E2=80=9Cpit of success=E2=80= =9D.

You should give this lib a go (it=E2=80=99s als= o a certified RP):

https://github.com/IdentityModel= /oidc-client-js

Many people argue that handling th= e protocol and crypto pieces in JS is problematic (and I agree if no proper= lib is used for that) - but at then end of the day the access token will e= nd up in the browser - and a sloppy developer (e.g. not using CSP) will alw= ays write bad code that might lead to leaking a token.

-------
Dominick Baier
=

On 17 February 2017 at 18:43:25, Adam Lewis (adam.lewis@motorolasolutions.<= wbr>com) wrote:

+1000

We are currently going through internal turmoil over the usage of implicit grant for ua-based apps.=C2=A0 The webapp case is well understood and the WG has work in progress to define best practices for native apps.=C2=A0 Having one for ua-based apps would be HUGELY beneficial



On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> wrote:

Thank you to those answering my question on implicit for JS clients.

The responses so far seem to represent what the security world is saying=C2=A0 about the implicit grant - keep away from it other than for a few OIDC use cases.

Does anyone think it would be valuable to author a brief RFC to give clear OAuth 2 recommendations for JavaScript client developers?

I mean - the OAuth 2 body of work just needs a few more RFC's, right? :)

Aloha, Jim



O= n 2/17/17 6:03 AM, Seb= astian.Ebling@telekom.de wrote:

Same for Deutsche Telekom. Our javascript clients also use code flow with CORS processing and of course redirect_uri validation.

=C2=A0

Best regar= ds

=C2=A0

Sebastian<= /span>

=C2=A0

Von: OAuth [mailto:o= auth-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von Bill Burke
Gesendet: Freitag, 17. Februar 2017 00:14
An: oauth@iet= f.org
Betreff: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Google's use of Implicit Grant Flow

=C2=A0

For our IDP [1], our javascript library uses the auth code flow, but requires a public client, redirect_uri validation, and also does CORS checks and processing.=C2=A0 We did not like Implicit Flow because

1) access tokens would be in the browser history

2) short lived access tokens (seconds or minutes) would require a browser redirect

I'd be really curious to hear other's thoughts though.

[1] http://keycloak.org

=C2=A0

=C2=A0

=C2=A0

On 2/16/17 5:44 PM, Jim Manico wrote:

Hello Folks,

I noticed that Google supports the OAuth 2 Implicit flow for third-party JavaScript applications.

https://developers.= google.com/identity/protocols/OAuth2UserAgent

Isn't this generally discouraged from a security POV? Is there a better OAuth 2 flow for third party SPA applications?

Aloha,

-- 
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
https://www.manicode.com




_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org=

https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/oauth

=C2=A0



_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
oauth


-- =20
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
https://www.manicode.com

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


--94eb2c0c0b823dd51f0548bdc256--