Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered redirect_uri
George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com> Fri, 11 June 2010 18:47 UTC
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Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2010 14:46:38 -0400
From: George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered redirect_uri
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On 6/11/10 2:09 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote: > On Fri, Jun 11, 2010 at 10:07 AM, George Fletcher<gffletch@aol.com> wrote: > >> On 6/11/10 12:34 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Jun 11, 2010 at 9:25 AM, George Fletcher<gffletch@aol.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> On 6/11/10 12:07 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Jun 11, 2010 at 8:59 AM, David Recordon<recordond@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> That sounds like a security consideration to me! :) >>>>>> >>>>>> I imagine that authorization servers will verify ownership in >>>>>> different manners depending on their tolerance of risk. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Instead of POSTing a JSON with all the details, dynamic binding could >>>>> send only a host name. The authz server would then do discovery on >>>>> this host and get a pointer to this JSON from host-meta. >>>>> >>>>> Marius >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I think most all of this could be described in the host-meta XRD directly >>>> to >>>> save yet another round trip. And I believe there are some security >>>> advantages to using this approach, but it does require the "client" to be >>>> a >>>> web-server. This might not always be the case (rich desktop app). For >>>> native/desktop apps, it seems that posting some set of parameters >>>> (equivalent security-wise to a browser user-agent) makes sense and keeps >>>> the >>>> protocol simple. >>>> >>>> >>> Yes, but in this case (desktop app) the "url" and "icon" parameters >>> don't work and what is left is "name" and "description". I think that >>> the suggested "client_name" parameter does exactly the same thing, >>> much simpler. Is there any value in this case in a client_secret? >>> >>> Marius >>> >>> >> Well... given this is a POST and structured data... it would be possible for >> the desktop app to post the raw icon data (though I suppose it could also >> POST a URL to the web server of the company the produces the app). In which >> case your previous suggestion would work (parameters discovered via the >> URL). >> >> I do believe the client_secret is valuable in this case because the AS is >> returning both the client_id and the client_secret. This then becomes a way >> for provisioning a unique client_id and client_secret to every instance of >> the app. A lot more for the AS to keep track of, but also makes it more >> difficult for an attacker to compromise a client. The attacker could >> impersonate the POST'd client description data (just like user-agent strings >> can be impersonated), but then the attacker just has a client_id and >> client_secret for it's instance. >> >> This should force the attacker to get explicit user consent from the user to >> authorize that unique client_id. I wouldn't recommend for the AS to track >> authorization against the POST'd client description but rather the >> client_id. >> > An attacker can also dynamically register a very similar client > name/description and trick the user. > True... but the user will see another consent form. This might be a minor hurdle but at least it's not totally seamless. I think that is an advantage. > The authz server is issuing a unique refresh token for each client, > and I still don't see how an extra client_secret helps in this case. > Good point. With SSL and bearer tokens the client_secret doesn't do much good. Now if we signed the requests with the unique client_secret from the desktop app... :) > For a web client the client secret helps if the refresh token is > compromised. The web client most likely will store many refresh > tokens, one for each user, in the database, with SQL injection all of > these can be compromised, but the client secret (if it was not in the > same database) makes them useless. This could be a reason why dynamic > registration for web clients is a bad idea, the client secret will end > up in the database, instead of a config file. > The web site could store client_secrets in a different database that is not exposed to the same SQL Injection attacks. Where the data is stored doesn't seem like it affects it's ability to be compromised or protected. If the web server is not well protected, getting the config file with the client_secret might be easier than getting data out of the database. I think the security of where the web app stores the data is orthogonal to the security of the protocol. > For a desktop client, this is not the case. > > Marius > I suppose this also depends on which flow the desktop app is following. If using the web-user flow (by launching the default browser, then the client_secret (v2-06) is required. If following the device flow... then it's not (though it seems this flow is still being defined). So maybe the solution is that if the authorization server doesn't think the client_secret is useful, it doesn't return it. Or it always returns it and the client can throw it away as it knows it won't use it. However, it seems like the rest of the registration flow still holds. Thanks, George
- [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered red… Andrew Arnott
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Andrew Arnott
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Chuck Mortimore
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Chuck Mortimore
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Andrew Arnott
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Andrew Arnott
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Thomas Hardjono
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Andrew Arnott
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Christian Scholz
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… David Recordon
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] User-agent flow and pre-registered… Eran Hammer-Lahav