Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Sun, 09 May 2010 21:56 UTC

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Date: Sun, 09 May 2010 23:56:33 +0200
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: "OAuth WG \(oauth@ietf.org\)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
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Hi Eran,

I cannot find this text in -02 or -03. Would you please refer my to the 
respective page/section?

regads,
Torsten.

Am 09.05.2010 19:56, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav:
> Draft -02 made this possible already.
>
> I added the following text:
>
>          The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token in which case the client MUST NOT
>          use the previous refresh token and replace it with the newly issued refresh token.
>
> EHL
>
>    
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>> Of Torsten Lodderstedt
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2010 12:28 PM
>> To: Marius Scurtescu
>> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
>>
>> Am 04.05.2010 21:44, schrieb Marius Scurtescu:
>>      
>>> On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 11:32 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
>>> <torsten@lodderstedt.net>   wrote:
>>>
>>>        
>>>> Am 03.05.2010 18:55, schrieb Allen Tom:
>>>>
>>>>          
>>>>> Invalidating the Refresh Token (and presumably also invalidating any
>>>>> outstanding Access Tokens) would make sense as an option for
>>>>> applications that require a high level of security. However, I do
>>>>> not think that invalidating the Refresh Token on every Refresh
>>>>> request should be required in the spec - it should be an implementation
>>>>>            
>> specific detail.
>>      
>>>>>
>>>>>            
>>>> It could be an optional feature of the spec (as many other features).
>>>>
>>>>          
>>> Torsten, can you please have a look a the "explicit request for
>>> refresh token" thread?
>>>
>>> Would a "refresh_token_type=single" parameter solve the above?
>>>
>>>
>>> Marius
>>>
>>>        
>> Hi Marius,
>>
>> I expected the authorization server to decide which kind of token to use.
>> Your proposal makes sense as well.
>> So the client can act according to its security requirements. If the
>> authorization server would like to enforce its own policy, it can detect any
>> mismatch during token issuance.
>>
>> Nevertheless, support for the optional "refresh_token" response parameter
>> of the "refresh" request is the prerequisite.
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>>
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