Re: [OAUTH-WG] BCP: Client collaborative attacks

[Denis <[e-mail]>]

Hi Daniel,

OK. The good news is that the BCP document will now address this issue. 
Let us wait to see which text you will propose.

Yesterday, I wrote: "Since OAuth 2.0 does not mandate the use of 
cryptographic devices, this kind of attack cannot be countered in the 
general case".

James Manger replied: "Even crypto devices aren’t a full solution. Alice 
can share her authorization with Bob & Chris by signing-in with their 
crypto devices".

James is right. I should have use the term "secure element". When using 
secure elements /with specific properties/, it is possible to counter 
the Alice & Bob Collusion attack.

A conversation took place on the OAuth mailing list on February 6, 2017. 
The following statements were made:

    "Sharing bearer tokens is a well known attack surface and there's
    really no way to stop that.
       Even PoP-style tokens can be shared since nothing stops Bob and
    Alice from sharing their secrets with each other".

The same email also states:

    "There's literally nothing in the world that can prevent that level
    of collusion -- PoP, token binding, DRM... nothing".

So at this time, it seemed that one belief was "nothing can be done 
anyway". However, at least two solutions, using secure elements /with 
different specific properties/, exist.

At the OAuth workshop in in Zürich in 2017, I presented a paper 
explaining how this could be done. It is still available at:
https://zisc.ethz.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/pinkas_privacy-by-design-eID-scheme-supporting-Attribute-based-Access-Control.pdf

For this workshop, I also proposed another paper (4 pages) with the 
following abstract, but only the first paper had been accepted:

    OAuth 2.0 was originally intended to be used for delegation but can
    also be used for access
    control. OAuth 2.0 is currently unable to defeat collusion attacks
    between clients, even if a secure element
    is being used to protect the corresponding private key or shared
    secret that is bound to the access token.
    This does not mean that OAuth 2.0 cannot be used any more, but that
    its applicability, in the field of access
    control, will be reduced to Identity-based Access Control (IBAC)
    which means that access tokens must
    contain a set of attributes that allows to unambiguously identify
    the token holder, otherwise a specific kind of
    attack, named the "Alice and Bob Collusion attack" is possible.

I will create a new thread to discuss the end of my email from yesterday 
(/which has been deleted in this thread ... as well as the original 
message/):

    *Comment on section 4: "Validating JWT Access Tokens"
    *
    The JWT profile for OAuth 2.0 access tokens
    [draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt] mandates to include a "sub"
    claim into an access token.
    However, this section does not mandate the RS to verify that claims
    allowing for the RS to uniquely identify the holder of the access token
    are indeed be present inside an access token.

    It might be useful to add it, so that the above text can refer to it.

Denis

> Thanks Neil, this very much sums up my thoughts on this topic.
>
> Since this has been mentioned in yesterday's call, I'll be happy to 
> clarify in the attacker model that web attackers can collaborate to 
> reach a common goal. I think we can also mention that 
> sender-constraining does not prevent collaborating entities to share 
> their tokens with each other.
>
> -Daniel
>
> Am 27.10.20 um 07:26 schrieb Neil Madden:
>> It sounds like we’re trying to redefine cooperation/delegation as an 
>> “attack”. People delegate and you can’t generally prevent it without 
>> incarceration. Anything Bob could do with Alice’s access token he 
>> could also do by asking Alice to do it on his behalf. In other words, 
>> any credential/token sharing can be replaced by proxying: If Alice 
>> wants to help underage Bob buy liquor she doesn’t have to share her 
>> access token, she can just buy it herself and give it to him.
>>
>> If the RS cares about accountability then the token (or some other 
>> means) should identify the user - perhaps pseudonymously like OIDC 
>> pairwise identifiers - and this should be logged for audit. But this 
>> can only discourage, not prevent, delegation. OAuth is after all a 
>> delegation protocol.
>>
>> (In the post-shame world we now live in, the idea that you can 
>> enforce norms through identification seems almost quaint, but I’m not 
>> sure I’m ready to be that cynical).
>>
>> If the RS allows anonymous requests then there is obviously no 
>> accountability. Does that need to be explicitly mentioned?
>>
>> — Neil
>>
>>> On 27 Oct 2020, at 01:04, Manger, James 
>>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> 
>>>
>>> It is worth mentioning “client collaborative attacks” or 
>>> “authorization sharing attacks” because OAuth can make them easier 
>>> (by packaging authority into an access token), compared to the 
>>> alternative of user’s signing-in to an RS directly. But it is tricky 
>>> to describe; none of the suggestions are quite right; and the 
>>> “right” solution heavily depends on the context.
>>>
>>> >> If access tokens are used to identify individuals, and such 
>>> identifying information (ideally user IDs) is stored with access 
>>> logs for auditing purposes, then this reduces this attack to an 
>>> authentication sharing attack.
>>>
>>> While this text from Seán may be true, it is bad advice. It implies 
>>> we should make access tokens as dangerous as possible (conveying all 
>>> a person’s authority) just to discourage sharing.
>>>
>>> > Since OAuth 2.0 does not mandate the use of cryptographic devices, 
>>> this kind of attack cannot be countered in the general case.
>>>
>>> Even crypto devices aren’t a full solution. Alice can share her 
>>> authorization with Bob & Chris by signing-in with their crypto devices.
>>>
>>> > an access token … only stating that the holder … is over 21 … should 
>>> not be accepted by the RS
>>>
>>> While this may generally be true for an “over 21” claim, it will not 
>>> always be true for other claims. In some situations the privacy risk 
>>> of being personally identified is far more important than any risk 
>>> of client collaboration. Staff accessing a company’s whistle-blower 
>>> service could be an example: need a {staff:true} claim to combat 
>>> spam/gossip; but definitely don’t want to include a staff id.
>>>
>>> A handful of partial strategies appropriate in various circumstances 
>>> (but all with downsides) could include:
>>>
>>> 1. The AS ensures there is only 1 valid access token (or just a few) 
>>> at any point in time for a specific claim of a given user.
>>>
>>> 2. Access token bound to a crypto key locked to one device.
>>>
>>> 3. Each access token is unique (eg includes a "jti" claim) so an RS 
>>> can notice if the same token is presented in different contexts.
>>>
>>> 4. Access token with "sub" (or provides "sub" via token 
>>> introspection) to aid accountability (even if only in a later 
>>> audit/investigation).
>>>
>>> 5. Frequent token replacement.
>>>
>>> 6. Nothing (beyond minimal necessary claims) – to maximize privacy.
>>>
>>> What is applicable widely enough to mention in a BCP?
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> James Manger
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> [e-mail]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
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>>
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>
> -- 
> https://danielfett.de
>
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