Re: [OAUTH-WG] Rechartering

[Dave Rochwerger <[e-mail]>]

Is separating this out into 2 different tokens, really the best way to solve
your use case?

It sounds to me that you simply want to track/log the two types of accesses
differently, which can be done entirely outside of the oauth2 process.
Just bucket your operations into two piles internally and track
appropriately (which you would have to do anyway with scopes).

Scopes are the specific access that the end user grants to a 3rd party to
access their protected resources.

When an application, to use your example, asks for the scope "protected
confidential", they are providing those two levels of access to the 3rd
party application. If the user says "allow", then that application has all
the access that those two scopes provides.

Rather than getting applications to then further choose between two tokens
to simply delineate two sets of operations seems like the wrong place to be
doing this.
i.e., why does the 3rd party application have to choose which token to use
for each set of operations? - the user has already granted both. The
resource server can do whatever tracking/logging it wants based on the
actual operations requested - using the single token in this case.

Regards,
Dave

On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 3:36 PM, Dan Taflin <[e-mail]>wrote:

> I would like to second Torsten's pitch for the ability to return multiple
> access tokens with a single authorization process. The use case for my
> company is to segment operations into two main categories: protected and
> confidential. (A possible third category, public, would not require any
> authorization at all). Protected operations would be user-specific
> operations that don't involve the passing of any sensitive information, such
> as image search results tagged with information about whether each image is
> available for download by that user. Confidential operations would involve
> passing user data, like user registration or e-commerce. We would like to
> protect each category of operations with distinct tokens: a general-use
> token for protected operations, and a secure token for confidential
> operations.
>
> We could use the scope parameter to specify either "protected" or
> "confidential". Currently the oauth spec allows a Refresh token to request a
> new token with reduced scope from the one originally issued, but there is no
> way to obtain a new token with a completely different scope without doing
> the full oauth dance a second time.
>
> Dan
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 3:57 PM
> To: Hannes Tschofenig
> Cc: OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Rechartering
>
> Hi all,
>
> my prioritization is driven by the goal to make OAuth the
> authorization framework of choice for any internet standard protocol,
> such as WebDAV, IMAP, SMTP or SIP. So let me first explain what is
> missing from my point of view and explain some thoughts how to fill
> the gaps.
>
> A standard protocol is defined in terms of resource types and messages
> by a body (e.g. IETF, OIDF, OMA), (hopefully) implemented in many
> places, and used by different but deployment-independent clients.
> OAuth-based protocol specifications must also define scope values
> (e.g. read, write, send) and their relation to the resource types and
> messages. The different deployments expose the standard protocol on
> different resource server endpoints. In my opinion, it is fundamental
> to clearly distinguish scope values (standardized, static) and
> resource server addresses (deployment specific) and to manage their
> relationships. The current scope definition is much to weak and
> insufficient. Probably, the UMA concepts of hosts, resources sets, and
> corresponding scopes could be adopted for that purpose.
>
> OAuth today requires clients to register with the service provider
> before they are deployed. Would you really expect IMAP clients, e.g.
> Thunderbird, to register with any a-Mail services upfront? So clients
> should be given a way to register dynamically to the authorization
> servers. This should also allow us to cover "client instance" aspects.
> It is interesting to note, that such a mechanism would allow us to get
> rid of secret-less clients and the one-time usage requirement for
> authorization codes.
>
> We also assume the client to know the URLs of the resource server and
> the corresponding authorization server and to use HTTPS server
> authentication to verify the resource server's authenticity. This is
> impossible in the standard scenario. Clients must be able to discover
> the authorization server a particular resource server relies on at
> runtime. The discovery mechanism could be specified by the OAuth WG,
> but could also be part of an application protocols specification. But
> we MUST find another way to prevent token phishing by counterfeit
> resource servers.
>
> As one approach, the client could pass the (previously HTTPS
> validated) resource server's URL with the authorization request. The
> authorization server should then refuse such requests for any unknown
> (counterfeit) resource servers. Such an additional parameter could
> also serve as namespace for scope values and enable service providers
> to run multiple instances of the same service within a single
> deployment.
>
> If the additional data enlarges the request payload to much, we could
> consider to adopt the "request by reference" proposal.
>
> Let's now assume, OAuth is successful in the world of standard
> protocols and we will see plenty of deployments with a bunch of
> different OAuth protected resource servers. Shall this servers all be
> accessible with a single token? In my opinion, this would cause
> security, privacy and/or scalability/performance problems. To give
> just the most obvious example, the target audience of such a token
> cannot be restricted enough, which may allow a resource server (or an
> attacker in control of it) to abuse the token on other servers. But
> the current design of the code grant type forces deployments to use
> the same token for all services. What is needed from my point of view
> is a way to request and issue multiple server-specific access tokens
> with a single authorization process.
>
> I've been advocating this topic for a long time now and I'm still
> convinced this is required to really complete the core design. We at
> Deutsche Telekom needed and implemented this function on top of the
> existing core. In my opinion, a core enhancement would be easier to
> handle and more powerful. If others support this topic, I would be
> willed to submit an I-D describing a possible solution.
>
> If we take standards really seriously, then service providers should
> be given the opportunity to implement their service by utilizing
> standard server implementations. This creates the challenge to find a
> standardized protocol between authorization server and resource server
> to exchange authorization data. Depending on the token design
> (self-contained vs. handle) this could be solved by either
> standardizing a token format (JWT) or an authorization API.
>
> Based on the rationale given above, my list is as follows (topics w/o
> I-D are marked with *):
>
> - Revocation (low hanging fruit since I-D is ready and implemented in
> some places)
> - Resource server notion*
> - Multiple access tokens*
> - Dynamic client registration
>  1) Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
>  4) Client Instance Extension
> - Discovery
>  (10) Simple Web Discovery, probably other specs as well
> - (6) JSON Web Token
> - (7) JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Profile
> - 8) User Experience Extension
> - Device flow
> - 9) Request by Reference
>  (depending resource server notion and multiple access tokens)
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
> Zitat von Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > in preparation of the upcoming IETF meeting Barry and I would like
> > to start a re-chartering discussion.  We both are currently
> > attending the Internet Identity Workshop and so we had the chance to
> > solicit input from the participants. This should serve as a
> > discussion starter.
> >
> > Potential future OAuth charter items (in random order):
> >
> > ----------------
> >
> > 1) Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardjono-oauth-dynreg/
> >
> > 2) Token Revocation
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-revocation/
> >
> > 3) UMA
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardjono-oauth-umacore/
> >
> > 4) Client Instance Extension
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-richer-oauth-instance-00.txt
> >
> > 5) XML Encoding
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-richer-oauth-xml-00.txt
> >
> > 6) JSON Web Token
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-json-web-token-05
> >
> > 7) JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Profile
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-oauth-jwt-bearer-00
> >
> > 8) User Experience Extension
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-recordon-oauth-v2-ux-00
> >
> > 9) Request by Reference
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-requrl-00
> >
> > 10) Simple Web Discovery
> >
> > Available document:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-simple-web-discovery-00
> >
> > ----------------
> >
> > We have the following questions:
> >
> > a) Are you interested in any of the above-listed items? (as a
> > reviewer, co-author, implementer, or someone who would like to
> > deploy). It is also useful to know if you think that we shouldn't
> > work on a specific item.
> >
> > b) Are there other items you would like to see the group working on?
> >
> > Note: In case your document is expired please re-submit it.
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes & Barry
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > [e-mail]
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
>
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