Re: [OAUTH-WG] Native clients & 'confidentiality'

Paul Madsen <> Mon, 19 December 2011 19:49 UTC

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Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 14:49:41 -0500
From: Paul Madsen <>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Native clients & 'confidentiality'
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Hi John, the user identity & credentials are definitely fundamental 
(they allow the video content to be personalized), but given the 
valuable nature of the resources being accessed, many Resource Owners 
(that produce the video content) will expect that the clients be able to 
authenticate with its own credentials as well.

Wrt storing the user's credentials on the device, we are profiling the 
authz code grant type - we don't want passwords on the device , or even 
traded via RO creds grant type. But was that the question?



On 12/19/11 1:21 PM, John Kemp wrote:
> Hi Paul,
> On Dec 19, 2011, at 12:50 PM, Paul Madsen wrote:
>> Hi Mike, to some extent I think my question is not about specific security characteristics, but rather whether its realistic for our group to mandate that both server&  native clients have the *same* security characteristics - particularly the ability to 'securely' authenticate to the AS on the token endpoint.
> Well… from your description of your case (e.g. "based on a user's subscriptions"), I'm not sure whether the client (software) designation makes much difference. Am I correct in thinking that the credentials which really need to be protected are those assigned to a user, rather than those assigned to a client? In which case, wouldn't it be possible for even a 'public' OAuth client to acquire them from the user dynamically (rather than storing them on the device) and pass them encrypted or hashed to the server?
> Cheers,
> - John
>> thanks
>> paul
>> On 12/19/11 12:18 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>>> On 12/19/2011 04:19 AM, Paul Madsen wrote:
>>>> Hi, the Online Media Authorization Protocol (OMAP) is a (as yet unreleased) profile of OAuth 2.0 for online delivery of video content based on a user's subscriptions (the TV Everywhere use case)
>>>> We want to support both server&  native mobile clients. It is for the second class of clients that I'd appreciate some clarification of 'confidentiality' as defined in OAuth 2.
>>>> OAuth 2 distinguishes confidential&  public clients based on their ability to secure the credentials they'd use to authenticate to an AS - confidential clients can protect those credentials, public clients can't.
>>>> Notwithstanding the above definition, the spec gives a degree of discretion to the AS
>>>>     The client type designation is based on the authorization server's
>>>>     definition of secure authentication and its acceptable exposure
>>>>     levels of client credentials.
>>>> Give this discretion, is it practical for the OMAP spec to stipulate that 'All Clients (both server&  native mobile), MUST be confidential', ie let each individual OMAP AS specify its own requirements of clients and their ability to securely authenticate?
>>> Hi,
>>> Can you say exactly what your security requirements are before trying to determine which
>>> (if either) is the right answer? I've got some concerns in this area that I'm trying to understand
>>> and am not sure if they're related to your concern or not. Part of this is that I really don't
>>> understand what the difference is between a "public" client and a "confidential client" and
>>> rereading the draft isn't helping me. In particular, can a iPhone app with a UIWebView *ever*
>>> be a "confidential" client, and if so how?
>>> Mike
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