[OAUTH-WG] Re: Call for adoption - PIKA

Rohan Mahy <rohan.mahy@gmail.com> Wed, 12 June 2024 10:16 UTC

Return-Path: <rohan.mahy@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BA60C1E8E0E for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 12 Jun 2024 03:16:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -7.105
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.105 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id koH_JPgW99eR for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 12 Jun 2024 03:16:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ed1-x52a.google.com (mail-ed1-x52a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52a]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 674BDC151080 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 12 Jun 2024 03:16:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ed1-x52a.google.com with SMTP id 4fb4d7f45d1cf-57ca578ce8dso1281989a12.2 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 12 Jun 2024 03:16:13 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1718187371; x=1718792171; darn=ietf.org; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=6agFFzDbyhbMQJ9bs0d/MsieEgg4Pie4FAMZoqbc470=; b=IejajlXRAB7OhMc0VfvJNpASEAXGAL77uZBBWB1kathaTd90vLxdiXDmbHS3F5QA3C N21z9j3bkTqSWJBcejJ+F9Ce0HrinkgbokuHY/rITsx35BHKdwFYbSQqVxwSbpaUZu8E opzHk6A3Ifd5A1wO620WJKh/uJOX3hauJWnXZd0AclzWOIbKsjPdca5+hN1exlcK43xt Eu69P3idBoigVex7TzctGumpVwFLqix1ww42FyDVajTOlHKgPjyHrAc/i2J+7TlvE4xS /THTfsqPK0UPgOa7/uCXklV+W7s38MKdvH+yHnIzUCEh1j2f6+GazSCq2SAlvctepeBJ TuJg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1718187371; x=1718792171; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=6agFFzDbyhbMQJ9bs0d/MsieEgg4Pie4FAMZoqbc470=; b=K99aFH7FyBSDtsR5KFONCOolNI2oiVCBKMjygo6nydfAe/bvPJ81gb29RLC5WVh7m1 862ne2X6yT1aEmOD+gYHOcE3sRSwaCTQRf0fxYOpqEEDOHvkVz9O8Cbm5SxwSFyeL8l1 ui0FXUa+ZA+YOUJFEhnmAdTQ1UfCYd0cXo4YbM7hZ9LXKEqrloa+snOR8YIwsEHqwd3Z CmgUXlKViNfOf0I+DavNPfUxDM2+czRSo87+FM2K4BzGDS+D1hQdqeTkwHb8ymTeWVEs lFMolz2aUBl5+5jUFrC55DIXwZtU1TmoXRYwJPCUToDMJvT+djwhGEitStDb2OXE4eZ9 59Ng==
X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCU2MrWHqOpJ95K/YDpn5T2hM1ADF+kmwgq+Qw2Kaatyuygcs7hsGRHHXBrSYZ3KpLWOFAxnDjq4HHhmL8yP1Q==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yyu8mX0lM2W98fmRoVkeLNZ8bPcr3RHf48weaSH8pTznBzK6372 0oWRdicBtXfeNzeuqpw5uYg9V5z/X+yKlSd9u1l1qNQbykvXwsdkHvv9BwIfQIkGLCgRGuhAjW4 8GRTPDHZZhCx42hnEp9w1LaGs2ak=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHYSxjylwN9xqDh3VQxTlbXr2n8kP7iurP3j3A6aavLWzkSf5vQlRDlpaTWudkZpXiI3I0+gfdzAyPeq7VW5tA=
X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:40c7:b0:a6f:1025:8dd6 with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-a6f47f804c3mr89746866b.71.1718187370916; Wed, 12 Jun 2024 03:16:10 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CADNypP9GmF4vp1uzLXK0YYZAHUDjK7RHbhEb4MCXkB7N3Oq4+w@mail.gmail.com> <SJ0PR02MB743941C99DEAA144AC6298D5B7C62@SJ0PR02MB7439.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
In-Reply-To: <SJ0PR02MB743941C99DEAA144AC6298D5B7C62@SJ0PR02MB7439.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
From: Rohan Mahy <rohan.mahy@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 06:15:59 -0400
Message-ID: <CAKoiRuaggiX=JnKmSefJFV+ymq0oVn8HgPT5+mennJghRhoH5Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: Michael Jones <michael_b_jones@hotmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000e6b436061aaeab0a"
Message-ID-Hash: RQEU2ZN2TRLHC4OTG47UXXMXJWOWQ7S3
X-Message-ID-Hash: RQEU2ZN2TRLHC4OTG47UXXMXJWOWQ7S3
X-MailFrom: rohan.mahy@gmail.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-oauth.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc4
Precedence: list
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Call for adoption - PIKA
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/QATvAxarp52Nn18mCZcQ1hoGmnc>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:oauth-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:oauth-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:oauth-leave@ietf.org>

Hi Mike,
Richard already made my comment for me that the current TLS validation
doesn't use the path. I want to focus on this comment of yours:
"it’s odd to *require* an X.509 certificate to secure them" (emphasis mine).

The point of this document is to provide a *choice*. You can continue to do
the thing relying parties do now by online validating with TLS, *OR* you
can validate offline using a certificate (because that makes sense in
several use cases, including the two mentioned in the draft).
Thanks,
-rohan

On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 12:14 PM Michael Jones <michael_b_jones@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> While I’m generally supportive of the goals of this draft, I have issues
> with the mechanisms proposed.  Therefore, I believe that more working group
> discussion is needed before adoption.
>
>
>
> If I were to do something along these lines, I would not use “x5c”.  Other
> than for TLS certificates, the OAuth and JOSE specs generally steer clear
> of dependence upon X.509 certificates.  Especially for a spec focused on
> JWK Sets, it’s odd to require an X.509 certificate to secure them.
> Instead, I’d do so by validating the signature made by the issuer.
>
>
>
> Also, the spec says:
>
>    *  The JOSE Header of the PIKA MUST contain an x5c field.  The
>
>       contents of this field MUST represent a certificate chain that
>
>       authenticates the domain name in the iss field.  The domain name
>
>       MUST appear as a dNSName entry in the subjectAltName extension of
>
>       the end-entity certificate.
>
>
>
> This talks about the domain name of the issuer, but not the path within
> the issuer.  In multi-tenant systems, issuers typically include path
> components.  When the issuer is https://example.com/tenant/123, what
> would the DNSName entry be?  The spec doesn’t say.
>
>
>
> Conclusion: Not ready for adoption
>
>
>
>                                                                 -- Mike
>
>
>
> *From:* Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, June 10, 2024 4:47 AM
> *To:* oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - PIKA
>
>
>
> All,
>
> This is an official call for adoption for the *Proof of Issuer Key
> Authority (PIKA)* draft:
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-oauth-pika/
>
>
> Please, reply *on the mailing list* and let us know if you are in favor
> or against adopting this draft as WG document, by *June 24th*.
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-leave@ietf.org
>