Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06.txt

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

The changes work for me, thanks.

On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:

> That’s much better. I would also suggest that a few edits to hammer home
> that this is an example
>
>  A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the content
>    of the token, for example using a digital signature or a keyed
>    message digest.  Alternatively, the content of the token could be
>    passed by reference rather than by value (requiring a separate
>    message exchange to resolve the reference to the token content).  To
>    simplify *discussion in the following example* we assume
>    that the token itself *[…**]*
>    cannot be modified by the client, either due to cryptographic
>    protection (such as signature or encryption) or use of a reference
>    value with sufficient entropy and associated secure lookup.  *The token remains opaque to the client.*
>
> These
>    are characteristics shared with bearer tokens and more information on
>    best practices can be found in [RFC6819] and in the security
>    considerations section of [RFC6750].
>
>
> That’s really what’s going on by my read. Thoughts?
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Dec 1, 2015, at 1:08 PM, Phil Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> I’ve reviewed the comments from John, Justin and Kathleen. As suggested, I
> plan to remove the erroneous first paragraph in section 5 (draft 06).
>
> Combining the comments from this thread about sec 6, here is the proposed
> new first paragraph:
>
>  A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the content
>    of the token, for example using a digital signature or a keyed
>    message digest.  Alternatively, the content of the token could be
>    passed by reference rather than by value (requiring a separate
>    message exchange to resolve the reference to the token content).  To
>    simplify the subsequent description we assume in the PoP architecture
>    that the token itself is integrity protected by the authorization
>    server and the token remains opaque to the client.  The token itself
>    cannot be modified by the client, either due to cryptographic
>    protection (such as signature or encryption) or use of a reference
>    value with sufficient entropy and associated secure lookup.  These
>    are characteristics shared with bearer tokens and more information on
>    best practices can be found in [RFC6819] and in the security
>    considerations section of [RFC6750].
>
> If this looks good to the group, I’ll post draft 7 this afternoon
> (pacific).
>
> Thanks,
>
> Phil
>
> @independentid
> www.independentid.com
> [e-mail]
>
> On Nov 25, 2015, at 2:19 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 3:58 PM, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> I am fine with that, however saying integrity protected, may be better
>> than signed.  May people will argue that HMAC or encryption with sender
>> verification is not signature.
>>
>
> Good point, I also prefer integrity protected.  Are we all good with this
> now?  I'd like to look at a diff to make sure after following the thread.
>
> Thanks!
> Kathleen
>
>
>
>> However they are perfectly valid.
>>
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 5:53 PM, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> The requirement is not that signed JWTs be used, it’s that unsigned JWTs
>> not be used on their own. Reference tokens and encrypted JWTs are also
>> valid, as are other signed formats like SAML assertions or even a COSE
>> Token (if it’s encoded to HTTP friendliness).
>>
>> My recommendation:
>>
>> Remove the erroneous requirement text from section 5 and restore to
>> previous version.
>>
>> Amend the text in section 6 from:
>>
>>    To
>>    simplify the subsequent description we assume in the PoP architecture
>>
>>    that the token itself is digitally signed by the authorization server
>>    and therefore cannot be modified.
>>
>>
>>
>> To:
>>
>>    In all such cases, the token remains opaque to the client. To
>>    simplify the subsequent example and description we assume in the PoP architecture
>>
>>    that the token itself cannot be modified by the client, either due to
>>
>>    cryptographic protection (such as signature or encryption) or use of
>>
>>    a reference value with sufficient entropy and associated secure lookup.
>>
>>    These are characteristics shared with bearer tokens and more information
>>
>>    on best practices can be found in [[RFC6819]] and in the security
>>
>>    considerations section of [[RFC6750]].
>>
>>
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 3:39 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <
>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 3:20 PM, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Tokens are signed or the information is otherwise integrity protected
>> between the AS and the RS.
>>
>> I suspect Kathleen is concerned about the key getting modified in
>> transit.
>> That needs to be protected against, but there is more than one way to do
>> that.
>>
>>
>> Phil is correct.  I was looking for consistency between the sections
>> since they related to each other.  If there is a security risk or
>> consideration, that needs to be explicitly called out as a concern such as
>> a key being modified in transit.  If there are options to protect against
>> that, those would ideally be required or would have warnings.
>>
>>
>> So sending the public key in a unsigned JWT access token would be
>> immensely stupid,  not just for PoP but for scopes and everything else.
>>
>>
>> Good, easy to require then.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kathleen
>>
>>
>> In OAuth 2 all tokens need to be integrity protected between the AS and
>> RS.
>> That can be via signature,  by having a reference with sufficient entropy
>> and secure introspection or database lookup.
>>
>> I think that is a OAuth 2 security consideration.   We are adding a
>> additional confirmation claim to the existing information that needs to be
>> protected the same as the rest.
>>
>> John B.
>>
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 4:38 PM, Phil Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> <editors hat>
>> If there is agreement that tokens are opaque then the requirement that
>> tokens be signed must be removed from the threat mitigation requirements.
>>
>> And the paragraph in sec 5 that brian was concerned about be restored.
>>
>> Phil
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 11:24, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> It is still end to end authentication with opaque tokens — since all
>> OAuth tokens, including PoP tokens, have always been intended to be opaque
>> to the client. That hasn’t changed and that isn’t the intent of this
>> document. If that’s how people are reading it then we need to pull it back
>> and rewrite it so that’s not the case.
>>
>> The client gets a token that has two parts: the token and the key. The
>> token is analogous to the access_token we have today and would come out of
>> the server in the same field. The key is handed to the client alongside the
>> token or registered by the client during the token request. Either way
>> there’s an association between the two but it’s not the same association as
>> a public/private keypair.
>>
>> It’s possible to sign the token itself, but the client doesn’t care. It
>> sends the token and signs the HTTP request to the RS whether the token is
>> signed, unsigned, hex blob, encrypted, or anything else. The same series of
>> options are available as with bearer tokens. PoP tokens have never, ever
>> been intended to be anything but opaque to the client.
>>
>> The token can’t be opaque to the RS, which has to figure out what key to
>> use to check the message signature. But we’ve got options there, like the
>> embedded key in a JWT from Mike’s draft, or doing introspection to get the
>> key (from an extension that hasn’t been written yet), or simply looking it
>> up in the same database because the RS and the AS are in the same box. Does
>> this structure/service/database choice sound familiar? It should, it’s the
>> same as bearer tokens. This is also how the RS gets information like which
>> scopes are associated with the token, if it’s expired, and all that.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> So here’s how I see it going on the wire:
>>
>>
>>
>> [image:
>> http://www.websequencediagrams.com/cgi-bin/cdraw?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgQ2xpZW50IGFzIEMKAAwMUmVzb3VyY2UgT3duZXIgYXMgUk8AFA1BdXRob3JpemF0aW9uIFNlcnYAIQZBUwA7DVByb3RlY3RlZABICmFzIFJTCgoKClJPLS0-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&s=modern-blue]
>>
>>
>>
>> (I just wrote this up so there are probably holes. Here’s the source if
>> anyone wants to tweak it:
>> http://www.websequencediagrams.com/?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgQ2xpZW50IGFzIEMKAAwMUmVzb3VyY2UgT3duZXIgYXMgUk8AFA1BdXRob3JpemF0aW9uIFNlcnYAIQZBUwA7DVByb3RlY3RlZABICmFzIFJTCgoKClJPLS0-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&s=modern-blue
>> )
>>
>> The client is oblivious to the token just like always. This is
>> intentional. The RS has the same options to figure out how to process the
>> token.
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 2:03 PM, Phil Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Folks,
>>
>> <editor hat>
>> I did not want to go here either. :-)
>>
>> I don’t read sec 6 as examples.  I believe this may stem from the
>> pop-architecture documents having a dual role as both “architecture” and
>> “use-case”.  Maybe we should clarify the purpose of the document?
>>
>> I believe section 6 is talking about threat mitigation assumptions based
>> on the examples that need to be implemented.  I am assuming these are
>> requirements that the other specifications SHOULD implement.
>>
>> <personal hat>
>> I do not believe we have discussed Opaque PoP tokens and any inherent
>> risks because the client is not or is unable to validate the authenticity
>> of the token.  Does this introduce the possibility of a MITM attack where a
>> client can be convinced to sign requests for an attacker?
>>
>> If we want to include opaque PoP, I think we need to take a pause and
>> consider / discuss any threats here.
>>
>> I find the desire for opaque PoP tokens to be a bit contradictory. If
>> we’re saying we don’t want to trust TLS alone (e.g. because of
>> load-balancer termination), why would we then say, but we are perfectly
>> willing to accept it worked for the OAuth AS exchanges?  Maybe I was very
>> wrong here, but my assumption all along is that for PoP we’re talking about
>> end-to-end authentication of all parties except in the case of 3.3 where we
>> simply want to protect an access token over a non-TLS HTTP connection.
>>
>>
>> Phil
>>
>> @independentid
>> www.independentid.com
>> [e-mail]
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 10:48 AM, Brian Campbell <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>
>> While I can't say I disagree with the deeper existential questions about
>> the draft that Justin raises, I was trying not to go there and rather just
>> point out concerns with the newly added text.
>>
>> The text Phil cites from Sec 6 doesn't say the client must be able to
>> parse and verify the token. It's an assumption to simplify the examples
>> that follow and still the token is opaque to the client. I reread the whole
>> draft (reluctantly) and there's nothing that says the token has to be
>> non-opaque to the client. And it does talk about reference style tokens and
>> encrypted tokens, both of which rely on the opaqueness to the client.
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 11:27 AM, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> Right, I read that as text for describing the examples and not for
>>> describing requirements.
>>>
>>> The token itself doesn’t have to be signed at all.
>>>
>>>  — Justin
>>>
>>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 1:05 PM, Phil Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Ok. Well this was requested by Kathleen because of this paragraph in Sec
>>> 6.…
>>>
>>>
>>>    To simplify the subsequent description we assume in the PoP architecture
>>>
>>>    that the token itself is digitally signed by the authorization server
>>>
>>>    and therefore cannot be modified.
>>>
>>>
>>> Please
>>> Phil
>>>
>>> @independentid
>>> www.independentid.com
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
>>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 9:33 AM, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> The token doesn’t have to be signed and the client doesn’t have to
>>> verify the signature on the token. That’s not PoP. The request has to be
>>> signed in a way that includes the token. The token itself can still be
>>> opaque. The *key* material can’t be opaque to the client, but the *token*
>>> material still is.
>>>
>>> I agree with Brian that this statement is misleading.
>>>
>>> The examples use a signed token but that is absolutely not a
>>> requirement. Maybe the examples shouldn’t all use one style.
>>>
>>> What’s most difficult about this particular spec is that it’s very
>>> hand-wavy, saying “this is kinda a thing that kinda works like this”
>>> without saying how to actually do it. I’m honestly not sure it’s worth
>>> publishing as an RFC in its own right but I’m not going to stand in its way.
>>>
>>>  — Justin
>>>
>>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 12:14 PM, Brian Campbell <[e-mail]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Where does it say that?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Phil Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Except that later on we require the token be signed and the client
>>>> verify that signed token. IOW mutual pop.
>>>>
>>>> Phil
>>>>
>>>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 07:30, Brian Campbell <[e-mail]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Looking at the diff I noticed the following new text, which seems to
>>>> conflate bearer/PoP and opaqueness to the client. A client demonstrating
>>>> proof-of-possession of some key is orthogonal to the client being able to
>>>> parse and understand the access token itself.
>>>>
>>>> "In contrast to bearer tokens [RFC6750] which call for tokens that are
>>>> opaque to OAuth 2.0 clients, this specification defines the requirements
>>>> for proof-of-possession ("PoP") tokens that may be parsed and verified by
>>>> OAuth 2.0 clients and relying parties."
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:07 PM, Phil Hunt <[e-mail]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> This draft addresses review comments from Kathleen and Erik raised
>>>>> since the last draft.
>>>>>
>>>>> It may not include some of the discussion from yesterday/today.  I
>>>>> will add that as the group decides.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>
>>>>> Phil
>>>>>
>>>>> @independentid
>>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>
>>>>> > On Nov 24, 2015, at 12:05 PM, [e-mail] wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>>>>> directories.
>>>>> > This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol Working
>>>>> Group of the IETF.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >        Title           : OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP)
>>>>> Security Architecture
>>>>> >        Authors         : Phil Hunt
>>>>> >                          Justin Richer
>>>>> >                          William Mills
>>>>> >                          Prateek Mishra
>>>>> >                          Hannes Tschofenig
>>>>> >       Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06.txt
>>>>> >       Pages           : 23
>>>>> >       Date            : 2015-11-24
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Abstract:
>>>>> >   The OAuth 2.0 bearer token specification, as defined in RFC 6750,
>>>>> >   allows any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") to
>>>>> get
>>>>> >   access to the associated resources (without demonstrating
>>>>> possession
>>>>> >   of a cryptographic key).  To prevent misuse, bearer tokens must be
>>>>> >   protected from disclosure in transit and at rest.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   Some scenarios demand additional security protection whereby a
>>>>> client
>>>>> >   needs to demonstrate possession of cryptographic keying material
>>>>> when
>>>>> >   accessing a protected resource.  This document motivates the
>>>>> >   development of the OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession security
>>>>> mechanism.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>>>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture/
>>>>> >
>>>>> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>>>> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06
>>>>> >
>>>>> > A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>>>> >
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>>>> submission
>>>>> > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>>>> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>>> >
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>>>> > [e-mail]
>>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> [image: Ping Identity logo] <https://www.pingidentity.com/>
>>>> Brian Campbell
>>>> Distinguished Engineer
>>>> Ping Identity
>>>> @ [e-mail] [image: phone] +1 720.317.2061 [image:
>>>> twitter] @pingidentity Connect with us!
>>>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>[image: pingidentity.com]
>>>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>
>>>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>[image:
>>>> pingidentity.com]
>>>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>
>>>> [image: twitter logo]
>>>> <http://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Ping-Identity-EI_IE380907.11,24.htm> [image:
>>>> twitter logo] <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> [image: youtube logo]
>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> [image: LinkedIn logo]
>>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> [image: Facebook logo]
>>>> <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> [image: Google+ logo]
>>>> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> [image: slideshare
>>>> logo] <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> [image: flipboard logo]
>>>> <http://flip.it/vjBF7> [image: rss feed icon]
>>>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> [image: Ping Identity logo] <https://www.pingidentity.com/>
>>> Brian Campbell
>>> Distinguished Engineer
>>> Ping Identity
>>> @ [e-mail] [image: phone] +1 720.317.2061 [image:
>>> twitter] @pingidentity Connect with us!
>>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>[image: pingidentity.com]
>>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>
>>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>[image:
>>> pingidentity.com]
>>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>
>>> [image: twitter logo]
>>> <http://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Ping-Identity-EI_IE380907.11,24.htm> [image:
>>> twitter logo] <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> [image: youtube logo]
>>> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> [image: LinkedIn logo]
>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> [image: Facebook logo]
>>> <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> [image: Google+ logo]
>>> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> [image: slideshare
>>> logo] <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> [image: flipboard logo]
>>> <http://flip.it/vjBF7> [image: rss feed icon]
>>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> [e-mail]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> [image: Ping Identity logo] <https://www.pingidentity.com/>
>> Brian Campbell
>> Distinguished Engineer
>> Ping Identity
>> @ [e-mail] [image: phone] +1 720.317.2061 [image:
>> twitter] @pingidentity Connect with us!
>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>[image: pingidentity.com]
>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>
>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>[image:
>> pingidentity.com]
>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>
>> [image: twitter logo]
>> <http://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Ping-Identity-EI_IE380907.11,24.htm> [image:
>> twitter logo] <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> [image: youtube logo]
>> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> [image: LinkedIn logo]
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> [image: Facebook logo]
>> <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> [image: Google+ logo]
>> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> [image: slideshare
>> logo] <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> [image: flipboard logo]
>> <http://flip.it/vjBF7> [image: rss feed icon]
>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> [e-mail]
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> [e-mail]
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> [e-mail]
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>


-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen