Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00.txt

Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> Thu, 03 November 2016 12:42 UTC

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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>
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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2016 08:41:55 -0400
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Cc: Nat Sakimura via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi@lists.openid.net>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00.txt
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I agree that the client_id is unlikely to be found inside the 
certificate itself. The client_id is issued by the authorization server 
for the client to use at that single AS. The certificate is issued by 
the CA for the client to use on any connection. The AS and CA are not 
likely to be the same system in most deployments. The client will use 
the same cert across multiple connections, possibly multiple AS's, but 
the same isn't true of the client_id.

Additionally, I think we want to allow for a binding of a self-signed 
certificate using dynamic registration, much the way that we already 
allow binding of a client-generated JWK today.

I do think that more examples and guidance are warranted, though, to 
help AS developers.

  -- Justin


On 11/2/2016 5:03 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>
> On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se 
> <mailto:samuel@erdtman.se>> wrote:
>
>
>     I agree it is written so that the connection to the certificate is
>     implicitly required but I think it would be better if it was
>     explicit written since the lack of a connection would result in a
>     potential security hole.
>
>
> That's fair. I agree it can be made more explicit and that it be good 
> to do so.
>
>     When it comes to the client_id I think subject common name or
>     maybe subject serial numbers will be the common location, and I
>     think an example would be valuable.
>
>
> In my experience and the way we built support for mutual TLS OAuth 
> client auth the client_id value does not appear in the certificate 
> anywhere. I'm not saying it can't happen but don't think it's 
> particularly common.
>
> I can look at adding some examples, if there's some consensus that 
> they'd be useful and this document moves forward.
>
>
>     I´m not saying it is a bad Idea just that I would prefer if it was
>     not a MUST.
>     With very limited addition of code it is just as easy to get the
>     certificate attribute for client id as it is to get it from the
>     HTTP request data (at least in java). I also think that with the
>     requirement to match the incoming certificate in some way one has
>     to read out the certificate that was used to establish the
>     connection to do some kind of matching.
>
>
> Getting data out of the certificate isn't a concern. I just believe 
> that the constancy of having the client id parameter is worth the 
> potential small amount duplicate data in some cases. It's just a -00 
> draft though and if the WG wants to proceed with this document, we 
> seek further input and work towards some consensus.
>
>
>
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