Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth & Enteprise federation ... 5 years from now

Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com> Thu, 27 March 2014 21:48 UTC

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From: Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 14:47:45 -0700
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To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth & Enteprise federation ... 5 years from now
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I can’t give names or numbers but yeah, it’s happening. Especially for
Android apps, it’s easy & straightforward to get an ID token, and cheap to
validate on the server side.  Obviously, it only works for Google accounts.


On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:40 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> I don't know what clients are using the play API to get 3rd party tokens.
>
> Perhaps Tim Bray can comment on scale of use if not specific clients.
>
> John B.
>
> On Mar 27, 2014, at 3:36 PM, Lewis Adam-CAL022 <
> Adam.Lewis@motorolasolutions.com> wrote:
>
> I get the idea, but I’m trying to get a feel for whether or not this model
> is being built upon and to what extent.
>
> So if I rephrase … are there known 3rd party AS’s out there in the wild
> that are consuming the Google id_token?
>
> Or any examples of a 3rd-party RS that is directly consuming it?
>
> Looking for actual examples in the wild to point to.
>
> adam
>
> *From:* John Bradley [mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>]
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 27, 2014 1:07 PM
> *To:* Lewis Adam-CAL022
> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth & Enteprise federation ... 5 years from
> now
>
> Handing out a id_token with a 3rd party AS or RS as the audience is the
> standard way that Android apps that rely on Google as the source of
> identity work on Android using the Google Play Services.
>
> This describes the API
> http://android-developers.blogspot.ca/2013/01/verifying-back-end-calls-from-android.html
>
> On Mar 27, 2014, at 2:46 PM, Lewis Adam-CAL022 <
> Adam.Lewis@motorolasolutions.com> wrote:
>
>
>  Hi John,
>
> With respect to Google Play handing out id_tokens, are any there any known
> instances of that being used?  Either to kick of an assertion flow with
> another (non-Google) AS, or to present directly to a non-Google RS?
>
> adam
>
> *From:* John Bradley [mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>]
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 27, 2014 9:07 AM
> *To:* Lewis Adam-CAL022
> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth & Enteprise federation ... 5 years from
> now
>
> Hi Adam,
>
> 3 is the most common today.  In the Salesforce case it has the additional
> benefit that when Domain 1 is federating to SalesForce via OpenID Connect
> it can provide access tokens for it's API to sales force scoped for that
> user for use in the SalesForce custom logic.
>
> 1 and 2 are similar and likely it is more of a deployment choice between
> them.
> We do see examples of this currently with the Android play store providing
> third-party id_tokens/JWT assertions to OAuth clients.
>
> The reason for doing 1 or 2 vs 3 probably comes down to connivence and
> security if  there is an agent for the user's  IdP on the device that can
> act as a confidential client to the IdP for security and provide a more
> consistent UI for the user.   That is what we are working on in the NAPPS
> WG at OIDF.
>
> We have examples of 1/2 now, the problem is that they are not as
> universally applicable as 3 but hopefully with standardization for
> developers we will se more in the next year or so.
>
> John B.
>
> On Mar 27, 2014, at 10:06 AM, Lewis Adam-CAL022 <
> Adam.Lewis@motorolasolutions.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>  I am curious it ping the thoughts of others on the list of how OAuth is
> going to continue to mature, especially with respect to enterprise
> federation scenarios.  This is something that I spend a whole lot of time
> thinking about.  Specifically, consider the following use case:
>
> An end user in domain 1 downloads a native application to access an API
> exposed by domain 2, to access a protected resource in domain 2, under the
> administrative control of the domain 2 enterprise.
>
>
> There are in my mind three basic means by which OAuth can federate, which
> I know I have discussed with some of you in the past:
>
>
>
> 1.       First option … End user in domain 1 requests a JWT-structured
> access_token from the OAuth provider in domain 1, and sends it in the HTTP
> header directly to the RS in domain 2.   The JWT access_token looks a whole
> lot like a OIDC id_token (maybe it even is one?).  The RS in domain 2 is
> able to make attributed-based access control decisions based on the
> contents of the JWT.  This is architecturally the simplest approach, but
> enterprises aren’t exactly setting up OAuth providers these days for the
> intent of accessing protected resources in foreign domains.  Anybody think
> this might be the case 5 years from now?
>
>
>
> 2.       Second option … similar to the first, but the JWT-structured
> access_token from domain 1 is sent to the OAuth provider in domain 2, ala
> the JWT assertion profile.  Domain 1 access token is exchanged for a domain
> 2 access token, and the native client uses the domain 2 access token to
> send to the protected resource in domain 2.  I like this slightly more than
> the first option, because the resources servers in domain 2 only need to
> understand the token format of their own AS.  But it still suffers from the
> same basic challenge of option 1, that enterprises don’t’ setup OAuth
> providers today for the purpose of federating, the way that setup SAML
> providers for WebSSO.
>
>
>
> 3.       Third option.  Native client contacts the OAuth provider in
> domain 2 directly.  The authorization endpoint is federation enabled
> (NASCAR or other) and the user in domain 1 selects their home IdP (SAML or
> OIDC) and does WebSSO to federated into the domain 2 OAuth provider.  I
> believe this is the model that Salesforce supports today, and it the most
> tactical, since enterprise that want to federate today run out and buy a
> SAML provider.
>
> So option 3 is the most obvious approach today.  Does anybody foresee
> enterprises setting up an STS in the future to federate to foreign RS’s
> (the way they setup SAML providers today)?  Anybody think we will see
> options 1 or 2 in the future?
>
>
> adam
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