Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt

[Takahiko Kawasaki <[e-mail]>]

Hi Torsten,

>2.3.1.5.  Request entity too large
>
>   If the request size was beyond the upper bound that the authorization
>   server allows, the authorization server shall return a "413 Request
>   Entity Too Large" HTTP error response.

"413 Request Entity Too Large" should be changed to "413 Payload Too Large".
c.f.
https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/issues/256/pushed-request-object-payload-too-large

>   Depending on client type and authentication method, the request might
>   also include the "client_id" parameter.  The "request_uri"
>   authorization request parameter MUST NOT be provided in this case
>   (see Section 3).

How about changing to:

*the request might also include other request parameters such as the
"client_id" parameter, the "client_secret" parameter, the
"client_assertion" parameter, and so on.*

Taka


On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 3:36 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:

> To be clear, PAR is not the same as XYZ. Both are going to be inputs into
> the conversation under txauth, and there are similarities, but they
> shouldn’t be conflated.
>
> In PAR, the result has to be a URI because that’s what JAR defines as the
> input. With XYZ, you get returned two things: a transaction handle and an
> interaction URI. These are both opaque to the client.
>
> — Justin
>
> On Sep 30, 2019, at 8:33 AM, Dick Hardt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> I can understand the request URI being a URI that the client is providing
> the AS, but why would the client's request URI be at the AS?
>
> As Justin has explained it in the past, the AS is returning a handle to
> the transaction. The only party that understands that handle as far as I
> know is the AS. It is meaningless to the client. Perhaps I am missing
> something else?
> ᐧ
>
> On Mon, Sep 30, 2019 at 2:53 AM Dave Tonge <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>> So although for this spec, request_uri is just an opaque string, it is
>> defined more generally in
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-19#section-2.2 as an:
>>
>> * Absolute URI from which the Request Object (Section 2.1) can be
>>> obtained*
>>
>>
>> And in section 5.2 as:
>>
>>
>>> *The "request_uri" value MUST be either URN as defined in *
>>> *   RFC8141 [RFC8141] or "https" URI, as defined in 2.7.2 of RFC7230 *
>>> *   [RFC7230] .  The "request_uri" value MUST be reachable by the **
>>>  Authorization Server.*
>>
>>
>> So this is why in the spec we have example of a URN and we have an
>> ongoing discussion as to whether we should have a standard urn namespace
>> that we recommend implementers use.
>>
>> In the interest of keeping the specs in sync I think it makes sense to
>> keep it a URN for this spec, but with more of an explanation as to why?
>>
>> Dave
>>
>> On Fri, 27 Sep 2019 at 19:22, Dick Hardt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> If I understand the proposal correctly, the request URI is opaque to the
>>> client. Correct?
>>>
>>> If so, why not just treat it as an opaque string?
>>>
>>> If I were implementing the protocol, I would have the blob be a signed
>>> token so that I could verify the integrity before making a database call.
>>> It much easier to throw compute at a DDOS attack to verify a signature,
>>> than DB capacity.
>>>
>>> ᐧ
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 2:24 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, the request object is JWT-based, but the request URI is not. In
>>>> other words, you can post a JWT but what you get back is a URI, not the JWT
>>>> itself.  The request URI was always meant to be a reference, and originally
>>>> it was explicitly a reference to a signed request object.
>>>>
>>>> — Justin
>>>>
>>>> On Sep 26, 2019, at 10:03 AM, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> The URI is intended to be a reference not a value.. If the client could
>>>> send a JWT it would just send a request object instead of a request URI in
>>>> the first place. So the intent is that it’s random, and maybe we should
>>>> just say that explicitly.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I thought this language was explicitly to allow the use of structured
>>>> values for the request_uri? From the introduction:
>>>>
>>>> but it also allows clients requiring an even
>>>> higher security level, especially cryptographically confirmed non-
>>>> repudiation, to explicitly adopt JWT-based request objects.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Aaron Parecki
>>>> aaronparecki.com
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 6:49 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Aaron, some comments inline.
>>>>
>>>> — Justin
>>>>
>>>> On Sep 26, 2019, at 8:30 AM, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Torsten,
>>>>
>>>> I'm very glad to see this draft, I think it's definitely needed in
>>>> this space. Here are some of my thoughts on the draft.
>>>>
>>>> "request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2"
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Is it acceptable for the AS to return just an opaque string, rather
>>>> than something prefixed with "uri:*"? I don't think anyone would be
>>>> confused about copypasting the exact string from the "request_uri"
>>>> response into the "request_uri" parameter even if it didn't start with
>>>> "urn:". If, for whatever reason, it is required that this value is
>>>> actually a URI, is there some expected namespace to use other than
>>>> "example"? I worry that if all the examples in the spec are just
>>>> "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2" then developers will end up
>>>> using the text "example" because they don't understand why it's there,
>>>> and then it serves no purpose really.’
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This field must be a URI, as per JAR:
>>>>
>>>>   request_uri  The absolute URI as defined by RFC3986 [RFC3986] that
>>>>      points to the Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds
>>>>      authorization request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0
>>>>      [RFC6749].
>>>>
>>>> Somewhat awkwardly, the JAR spec currently states that the AS has to do
>>>> an HTTP GET on the request URI, so that will need to be fixed in JAR before
>>>> it goes forward. I don’t think that was always the case though, and I’m not
>>>> sure how that changed.
>>>>
>>>> As for the namespace, “example” is ok for an example URN. The problem
>>>> with URNs is that nobody really understands how to do domain-safe fully
>>>> compliant URNs. So perhaps we should instead use “urn:fdc:example.com:….”
>>>> Instead (as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4198)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The pushed authorization request endpoint shall be a RESTful API
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I would drop the term RESTful and just say "HTTP API", as this
>>>> description is arguably RESTful at best.
>>>>
>>>> Depending on client type and authentication method, the request might
>>>> also include the "client_id" parameter.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I assume this is hinting at the difference between public clients
>>>> sending only the "client_id" parameter and confidential clients
>>>> sending only the HTTP Basic Authorization header which includes both
>>>> the client ID and secret? It would probably be helpful to call out
>>>> these two common examples if I am understanding this correctly,
>>>> otherwise it seems pretty vague.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not quite, those differences are for the token endpoint, and this is
>>>> capturing things from the authorization endpoint. I don’t quite understand
>>>> the differentiation listed here either, though.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "request_uri" value MUST be generated using a cryptographically
>>>> strong pseudorandom algorithm
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I assume this includes the use of a random number inside of a JWT, in
>>>> case the AS wants to use JWTs as the "request_uri" parameter"? If so,
>>>> it's probably worth spelling that out as it kind of reads like it has
>>>> to be literally a random string at first glance.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The URI is intended to be a reference not a value. If the client could
>>>> send a JWT it would just send a request object instead of a request URI in
>>>> the first place. So the intent is that it’s random, and maybe we should
>>>> just say that explicitly.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's all for now, thanks!
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Aaron Parecki
>>>> aaronparecki.com
>>>> @aaronpk
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Sep 21, 2019 at 1:02 PM Torsten Lodderstedt
>>>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> I just published a new draft that Brian Campbell, Dave Tonge, Filip
>>>> Skokan, Nat Sakimura and I wrote.
>>>>
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00
>>>>
>>>> It proposes a new endpoint, called "pushed authorization request
>>>> endpoint”, that allows the client to push the Authorization Request payload
>>>> with the AS on a backchannel connection instead of a front channel
>>>> interaction. The AS provides the client with a request URI (according to
>>>> draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq) that the client uses in a subsequent authorization
>>>> requests to refer to the pushed request data.
>>>>
>>>> We believe this simple mechanism will significantly increase OAuth
>>>> security and robustness since any application can use it by just sending
>>>> the parameters in the same encoding as used at the authorisation endpoint
>>>> over a HTTPS-protected and (for confidential clients) mutually
>>>> authenticated connection to the AS. It can also be used to push signed and
>>>> encrypted request objects to the AS, i.e. it provides an interoperable way
>>>> to use request objects managed at the AS for use cases requiring an even
>>>> higher security level.
>>>>
>>>> We look forward to getting your feedback.
>>>>
>>>> kind regards,
>>>> Torsten.
>>>>
>>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>>
>>>> From: [e-mail]
>>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
>>>> Date: 21. September 2019 at 12:47:28 CEST
>>>> To: "Nat Sakimura" <[e-mail]>, "Brian Campbell" <
>>>> [e-mail]>, "Torsten Lodderstedt" <
>>>> [e-mail]>, "Dave Tonge" <[e-mail]>, "Filip
>>>> Skokan" <[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A new version of I-D, draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
>>>> has been successfully submitted by Torsten Lodderstedt and posted to the
>>>> IETF repository.
>>>>
>>>> Name: draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par
>>>> Revision: 00
>>>> Title: OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
>>>> Document date: 2019-09-21
>>>> Group: Individual Submission
>>>> Pages: 12
>>>> URL:
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
>>>> Status:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par/
>>>> Htmlized:
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00
>>>> <https://tools.ietf..org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00>
>>>> Htmlized:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Abstract:
>>>> This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
>>>> which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
>>>> authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
>>>> request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
>>>> reference to the data in a subsequent authorization request.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>>> submission
>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>
>>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>>
>>>>
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>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
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