Re: [OAUTH-WG] PAR and client metadata

[Filip Skokan <[e-mail]>]

Alternatively, `require_pushed_authorization_requests`. Since we already
have the `*require_*request_uri_registration` server and `*require_*
auth_time` client metadata properties.

WDYT?

S pozdravem,
*Filip Skokan*


On Sun, 26 Apr 2020 at 16:58, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=
[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> I think this topic has several aspects:
> - Is the client required to use PAR only? Doesn’t this also mean it is
> required to use request_uri only?
> - Is there a need to separate those to questions or shall we treat this as
> the same?
> - Who decides whether PAR and request_uri are required? The client for its
> instances or the AS for the whole deployment?
>
> I’m in favour of coupling enforced PAR use with enforced request_uri use
> even though it means the setting is useful with PAR only, not with all
> JAR-based clients.
> I think both the client as well as the AS should be able to declare forced
> PAR. If the AS is able to basically turn of traditional authorization
> requests, it can consequently utilize the changed protocol properties in
> terms of security and robustness in its deployment. This means, for
> example, the AS no longer needs to require pre-registered redirect URIs for
> confidential clients. It also means, the AS can use voluminous
> claims/authorization details objects without worrying about fragile long
> request URLs.
>
> So here is my proposal:
>
> 1) Add server metadata parameter “pushed_authorization_requests_only” of
> type boolean - It requires any client to use PAR, the AS will refuse to
> process any authorization request containing parameters other than
> request_uri + client_id (as required by
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-21) Extension
> request parameters need to be passed via PAR.
> 2) Add client registration parameter “pushed_authorization_requests_only”
> - It requires this client to use PAR only. The AS won’t accept any
> authorization request containing more than request_uri + client_id for that
> particular client.
>
> What are your thoughts?
>
> best regards,
> Torsten.
>
> > On 19. Apr 2020, at 10:09, Vladimir Dzhuvinov <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> >
> > In a off-list conversation Torsten floated the idea of letting
> confidential PAR-only clients register without a redirect_uris and having
> this "PAR only" parameter will enable that.
> >
> > A "PAR only" parameter will also prevent client developers from
> accidentally making plain authz requests (for clients that rely on PAR for
> the extra security).
> >
> > Vladimir
> >
> > On 16/04/2020 18:39, Brian Campbell wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 1:44 PM Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna=
> [e-mail]> wrote:
> >> As I think through this, I’m struggling to identify the threats this
> actually helps mitigate.
> >>
> >> A client metadata parameter implies that the value may be different for
> different clients, and that any given client won’t already know via other
> means whether or not it needs to use PAR. That means we’re only talking
> about dynamic clients since statically registered clients already have some
> proprietary out-of-band registration mechanism (e.g., a developer console).
> >>
> >> As I tried to articulate in the original email and Filip also mentioned
> in a different fork of this email thread, defining metadata can be
> beneficial even when it's not used dynamically at runtime. So we're not
> only talking about dynamic clients.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> A client metadata parameter also implies that the AS allows some
> clients to make non-PAR requests (otherwise it would be an AS metadata
> parameter).
> >>
> >> A per client setting seems necessary for existing ASs to roll out PAR
> support over time or just generally in support of diverse client
> capabilities and requirements.
> >>
> >>
> >> If that’s the case then presumably a malicious party could register
> their own client that doesn’t use PAR.
> >>
> >> So it seems to me that the only scenario that this parameter would
> protect against is a malicious party impersonating a dynamically registered
> client that uses PAR. That wouldn’t apply to Mix-Up, since in that attack
> the attacker uses its own client.
> >>
> >> This client metadata parameter is meant to be something that would
> prevent a malicious actor from controlling the content of the authz request
> parameters, which could be done by crafting the link and tricking a user
> into following it. I mentioned mix-up as an example because the first
> variant of it desribed at
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15#section-4.4.1
> does something along those lines.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> If a client can do PAR, then it can do authorization code grant and
> PKCE, so we’re further limited to scenarios where the attacker does not
> need to be able to redeem the authorization code themselves. What threats
> fall into this category?
> >>
> >> —
> >> Annabelle Backman (she/her)
> >> AWS Identity
> >>
> >>> On Apr 14, 2020, at 2:44 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=
> [e-mail]> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> 
> >>> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do
> not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and
> know the content is safe.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I was hoping to get to a rough consensus in support of the idea before
> coming up with a name that everyone will hate :)
> >>>
> >>> In the meantime, however, name suggestions are of course welcome.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 2:22 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
> >>> I'm all for that.
> >>>
> >>> I suppose you have already thought of a suitable name? :)
> >>>
> >>> Vladimir
> >>>
> >>> On 14/04/2020 23:08, Brian Campbell wrote:
> >>>> Using PAR can facilitate improved security by giving clients a
> (relatively) simple means for sending a confidential, integrity protected,
> and (for confidential clients anyway) authenticated authorization request.
> >>>>
> >>>> It seems like some of that improved security could be undermined by a
> malicious actor somehow getting a user to navigate to a URL of a regular
> old parameterized authorization request. One variation of the Mix-Up Attack
> does this
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15#section-4.4.1
> for example and email, social media, online forums, etc., are other ways a
> user might be tricked into following a maliciously crafted link.
> >>>>
> >>>> Following from that it seems logical that an authorization server
> might want to restrict some clients from sending a regular parameterized
> authorization request and instead require use of the PAR endpoint to
> initiate an authorization request. Something like this could, of course, be
> implemented as custom policy or configuration in any AS. But I'm thinking
> it might be common enough to warrant adding a client metadata parameter to
> the PAR draft specifically for it. The metadata (and registered extensions)
> defined by Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591] has come to imply a
> general data model and expected associated behaviors for clients that is
> useful for authorization server implementations, even when the Dynamic
> Client Registration Protocol isn't directly in play. This particular
> situation seems like a good potential candidate for a new such client
> metadata parameter that would indicate that the given client can only use a
> request_uri value obtained from the PAR endpoint to initiate an
> authorization request. And that a regular old fashioned authorization
> request from the given client would result in an error.
> >>>>
> >>>> Do the folks of this fine WG think something like this would be a
> worthwhile addition to the PAR draft?
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
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