[OAUTH-WG] Review of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-26.txt

Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> Sat, 01 August 2020 14:44 UTC

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From: Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>
Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2020 10:44:40 -0400
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Review of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-26.txt
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Below is my review of the draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-26.txt:

Section: 1. Introduction : Signed JWT also provides for non repudiation.

Under the section:
Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query parameters has
several advantages:

Therefore I suggest adding this:
...
(e) (non repudiation) the signed JWT request can be archived by the AS as
is and used later in investigation and auditing processes.


Section: 10.5
Text block repeated twice"
<<When the value of it as a server metadata is "true", then the server
   MUST reject the authorization request from any client that does not
   conform to this specification.  It MUST also reject the request if
   the request object uses "alg":"none".  If omitted, the default value
   is "false".>>

Section: 12.1
Must a TFP validate every single authorization request to be sent by Client
to AS?

I thought:
- Certificate issued by TFP is proof that the client abides by trust
framework principles. Certificate can also contain details on resources
accessible to client (e.g. AIS, PIS)
- AS understands the content of the certificate and can use it to validate
adherence of client to TF. Removing the need to have to send each authz
request to the TFP for validation.


Best regards,

-- 
Francis Pouatcha
Co-Founder and Technical Lead
adorsys GmbH & Co. KG
https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/