Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce

Andrii Deinega <> Tue, 09 February 2021 20:38 UTC

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From: Andrii Deinega <>
Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2021 12:38:12 -0800
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To: Neil Madden <>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce
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How can you guarantee that there are always direct TLS connections between
a client and an AS hosted say some cloud provider where you have a little
control on their infrastructure?

Even without all those cloud providers, how can you guarantee the same when
there are a bunch of different (software and hardware) components that
legitimately perform SSL offloading / DPI in front of an AS...  or the
client may just use the proxy server?


On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden <>

> On 9 Feb 2021, at 06:55, Andrii Deinega <> wrote:
> Hi WG,
> I wonder if there are any particular reasons to not make nonce a mandatory
> parameter for the current JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection draft.
> Or, at least, force an AS to include the nonce claim in a JWT response when
> nonce is presented in the introspection request similar to what happens
> with the similar scenario in the OpenID Connect ID Token?
> This will allow to mitigate replay attacks because clients can correlate
> the response with the initial request
> ID tokens involve flows using an insecure channel (the browser). This is
> not the case for introspection requests which happen over a direct TLS
> connection and so are already protected against replay attacks.
> — Neil
> ForgeRock values your Privacy <>