Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture

Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> Wed, 18 November 2015 01:06 UTC

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From: Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture
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Just wanted to let everyone know I intend to respond shortly. 

I just got back from some holidays and just clearing my backlog now. 

Cheers

Phil

> On Nov 16, 2015, at 12:37, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I reviewed draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture and have a few questions.
> 
> 1. Section 6, Threat Mitigation:
> 
> Last sentence of first paragraph, "To
>   simplify the subsequent description we assume that the token itself
>   is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot
>   be modified."
> 
> Since bearer tokens are not signed by default, is this proposing a
> change?  If so, where will that change occur?  To state that "it is
> assumed" without it being required anywhere is not a good assumption.
> I'd still see this as a risk or security consideration.  When OAuth is
> re-used by other protocols, I am seeing that re-use leave off basic
> protections that should be assumed like TLS, let alone digital
> signatures.  If this is required in the defined architecture (Section
> 7 - it does show this, but there are no MUSTs that I can find), just
> state that and refer to the requirement.
> 
> 2. Section 6, Threat Mitigation
> 
> Third paragraph, "As an example, TLS with a ciphersuite
>   that offers confidentiality protection has to be applied (which is
>   currently true for all ciphersuites, except for one).
> 
> Please list a reference so the reader knows which ciphersuites are
> acceptable from the recommended ones in RFC7525.  I don't recall there
> being any MTI ciphersuites for OAuth (I'm pretty sure there aren't and
> that we've discussed that already with previous drafts, so this should
> be spelled out more).
> 
> 3. (Nit) Section 6.2, add a comma to improve readability
> From: "Instead of providing confidentiality protection the authorization
>   server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected
>   token with the following semantic:"
> To: "Instead of providing confidentiality protection, the authorization
>   server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected
>   token with the following semantic:"
> 
> Thank you all for your work on this draft!
> -- 
> 
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
> 
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