Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 base
Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> Fri, 09 December 2011 18:30 UTC
Return-Path: <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C83D721F85FF for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 10:30:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.349
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.349 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.750, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id t9KAs7ty9VGs for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 10:30:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from DB3EHSOBE005.bigfish.com (db3ehsobe005.messaging.microsoft.com [213.199.154.143]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6143021F85BB for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 10:30:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail55-db3-R.bigfish.com (10.3.81.241) by DB3EHSOBE005.bigfish.com (10.3.84.25) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 14.1.225.23; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 18:30:00 +0000
Received: from mail55-db3 (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail55-db3-R.bigfish.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C66594803EB; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 18:30:20 +0000 (UTC)
X-SpamScore: -36
X-BigFish: VS-36(zzbb2dI9371I542M1432N98dKzz1202hzz1033IL8275dhz2fh2a8h668h839h944h)
X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:131.107.125.8; KIP:(null); UIP:(null); IPV:NLI; H:TK5EX14HUBC107.redmond.corp.microsoft.com; RD:none; EFVD:NLI
X-FB-SS: 13,
Received-SPF: pass (mail55-db3: domain of microsoft.com designates 131.107.125.8 as permitted sender) client-ip=131.107.125.8; envelope-from=Michael.Jones@microsoft.com; helo=TK5EX14HUBC107.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ; icrosoft.com ;
Received: from mail55-db3 (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mail55-db3 (MessageSwitch) id 1323455420613587_16952; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 18:30:20 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from DB3EHSMHS017.bigfish.com (unknown [10.3.81.252]) by mail55-db3.bigfish.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F58E4C0050; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 18:30:20 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from TK5EX14HUBC107.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (131.107.125.8) by DB3EHSMHS017.bigfish.com (10.3.87.117) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.1.225.23; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 18:29:59 +0000
Received: from TK5EX14MBXC283.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([169.254.2.220]) by TK5EX14HUBC107.redmond.corp.microsoft.com ([157.54.80.67]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.005; Fri, 9 Dec 2011 10:30:09 -0800
From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 base
Thread-Index: AQHMpQS3rrgWikVnJ0eTUo1lILA6vJXDzSWAgAQ5RwCAAAA4gIAADPgAgAAAoACAC+J6QA==
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 18:30:08 +0000
Message-ID: <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B16804296739435F75C320@TK5EX14MBXC283.redmond.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <CALaySJJcPPSU5PAtk9GNL9iFBXj1HfWjkN32GeHsV_Ry2t+o=A@mail.gmail.com> <CAC4RtVABZSo2VXZ4pTGw9P+fdRrUWQajXm+SngQw6Ng9qK+NNQ@mail.gmail.com> <4ED7DF0C.4000701@cdatazone.org> <4ED7DF3B.5010107@stpeter.im> <4ED7EA1C.1040208@cs.tcd.ie> <4ED7EAA2.40402@stpeter.im>
In-Reply-To: <4ED7EAA2.40402@stpeter.im>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.74]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: microsoft.com
Cc: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>, oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 base
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 18:30:17 -0000
It looks to me like there is consensus for Barry's text (below). Agreed? -- Mike NEW -------------------------------------------- The authorization server MUST implement TLS. Which version(s) ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation. At the time of this writing, TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] is the most recent version, but has very limited actual deployment, and might not be readily available in implementation toolkits. TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246] is the most widely deployed version, and will give the broadest interoperability. Servers MAY also implement additional transport-layer mechanisms that meet their security requirements. -------------------------------------------- -----Original Message----- From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Peter Saint-Andre Sent: Thursday, December 01, 2011 12:59 PM To: Stephen Farrell Cc: Barry Leiba; oauth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 base On 12/1/11 1:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > On 12/01/2011 08:10 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: >> On 12/1/11 1:09 PM, Rob Richards wrote: >>> On 11/28/11 10:39 PM, Barry Leiba wrote: >>>>> The OAuth base doc refers in two places to TLS versions (with the >>>>> same text in both places: >>>>> >>>>> OLD >>>>> The authorization server MUST support TLS 1.0 ([RFC2246]), SHOULD >>>>> support TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246]) and its future replacements, and MAY >>>>> support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security >>>>> requirements. >>>>> >>>>> In both the shepherd review and the AD review, this was called >>>>> into >>>>> question: >>>>> 1. MUST for an old version and SHOULD for the current version >>>>> seems wrong. >>>>> 2. Having specific versions required locks us into those versions >>>>> (for example, all implementations will have to support TLS 1.0, >>>>> even long after it becomes obsolete, unless we rev the spec. >>>> The comments I've gotten on this show a clear consensus against the >>>> change I suggest, and against any attempt to require a version of >>>> TLS other than 1.0. I still, though, am concerned that locking >>>> this spec into TLS 1.0 is limiting. So let me propose an >>>> alternative wording, which again tries to make the version(s) >>>> non-normative, while making it clear which version(s) need to be >>>> implemented to get >>>> interoperability: >>>> >>>> NEW >>>> -------------------------------------------- >>>> The authorization server MUST implement TLS. Which version(s) >>>> ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the >>>> widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the >>>> time of implementation. At the time of this writing, TLS version >>>> 1.2 [RFC5246] is the most recent version, but has very limited >>>> actual deployment, and might not be readily available in >>>> implementation toolkits. TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246] is the most >>>> widely deployed version, and will give the broadest >>>> interoperability. >>>> >>>> Servers MAY also implement additional transport-layer mechanisms >>>> that meet their security requirements. >>>> -------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> Comments on this version? >>>> >>>> Barry >>>> >>> >>> Text is neutral enough for me as it's not mandating anything that >>> isn't readily available. Only comment is whether or not there is a >>> need to even talk about the specific versions or if just the >>> following is >>> enough: >>> >>> The authorization server MUST implement TLS. Which version(s) ought >>> to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread >>> deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of >>> implementation. >>> >>> Servers MAY also implement additional transport-layer mechanisms >>> that meet their security requirements. >> >> That seems fine to me. > > FWIW, I think I'd prefer Barry's as Rob's would be more likely to > generate discusses and we do know that there are some security > advantages to TLS 1.2 vs. 1.0. (BTW, has anyone considered how or if > the BEAST attack might affect oauth? Be good to know if someone's done > that analysis.) > > However, as AD, I could live with either, since lots of other specs > just say TLS. (But you need to point to the latest RFC as normative or > that will I bet generate discusses.) Agreed. Peter -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/ _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
- [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 … Barry Leiba
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Rob Richards
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Anthony Nadalin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Barry Leiba
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Anthony Nadalin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Barry Leiba
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Rob Richards
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Barry Leiba
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Rob Richards
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Rob Richards
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … William Mills
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Barry Leiba
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Eran Hammer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Barry Leiba
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth … Igor Faynberg