Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?

Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> Wed, 06 May 2020 19:22 UTC

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
CC: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXTERNAL] Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?
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Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 19:22:43 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/i9MLM1UlrbocG3cm90Rp6_BSJsw>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?
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Aaron, the section you cited at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15#section-2.1.1 makes it clear that clients can support EITHER PKCE or the OpenID Connect nonce.   The text is:

   Clients MUST prevent injection (replay) of authorization codes into
   the authorization response by attackers.  The use of PKCE [RFC7636<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636>]
   is RECOMMENDED to this end.  The OpenID Connect "nonce" parameter and
   ID Token Claim [OpenID<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15#ref-OpenID>] MAY be used as well.  The PKCE challenge or
   OpenID Connect "nonce" MUST be transaction-specific and securely
   bound to the client and the user agent in which the transaction was
   started.

We should not attempt to change that in OAuth 2.1, as doing so would needlessly break already working and secure clients.

                                                       -- Mike

From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 11:56 AM
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
Cc: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>om>; oauth@ietf.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?

> In particular, authorization servers shouldn’t be required to support PKCE when they already support the OpenID Connect nonce.

The Security BCP already requires that ASs support PKCE: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15#section-2.1.1 Are you suggesting that the Security BCP change that requirement as well? If so, that's a discussion that needs to be had ASAP. If not, then that's an implicit statement that it's okay for OpenID Connect implementations to not be best-practice OAuth implementations. And if that's the case, then I also think it's acceptable that they are not complete OAuth 2.1 implementations either.






On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 11:21 AM Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
The disadvantage of requiring PKCE for OpenID Connect implementations is that you’re trying to add a normative requirement that’s not required of OpenID Connect deployments today, which would bifurcate the ecosystem.  There are hundreds of implementations (including the 141 certified ones at https://openid.net/certification/), none of which have ever been required to support PKCE.  Therefore, most don’t.

Per feedback already provided, I believe that OAuth 2.1 should align with the guidance already in the draft Security BCP, requiring EITHER the use of PKCE or the OpenID Connect nonce.  Trying to retroactively impose unnecessary requirements on existing deployments is unlikely to succeed and will significantly reduce the relevance of the OAuth 2.1 effort.

In particular, authorization servers shouldn’t be required to support PKCE when they already support the OpenID Connect nonce.  And clients shouldn’t reject responses from servers that don’t support PKCE when they do contain the OpenID Connect nonce.  Doing so would unnecessarily break things and create confusion in the marketplace.

                                                          -- Mike

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>> On Behalf Of Dick Hardt
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 10:48 AM
To: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?

Hello!

We would like to have PKCE be a MUST in OAuth 2.1 code flows. This is best practice for OAuth 2.0. It is not common in OpenID Connect servers as the nonce solves some of the issues that PKCE protects against. We think that most OpenID Connect implementations also support OAuth 2.0, and hence have support for PKCE if following best practices.

The advantages or requiring PKCE are:

- a simpler programming model across all OAuth applications and profiles as they all use PKCE

- reduced attack surface when using  S256 as a fingerprint of the verifier is sent through the browser instead of the clear text value

- enforcement by AS not client - makes it easier to handle for client developers and AS can ensure the check is conducted

What are disadvantages besides the potential impact to OpenID Connect deployments? How significant is that impact?

Dick, Aaron, and Torsten

[https://mailfoogae..appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&type=zerocontent&guid=452438ba-d429-4656-ace9-b284744bc171]ᐧ
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