Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt

[Dick Hardt <[e-mail]>]

If I understand the proposal correctly, the request URI is opaque to the
client. Correct?

If so, why not just treat it as an opaque string?

If I were implementing the protocol, I would have the blob be a signed
token so that I could verify the integrity before making a database call.
It much easier to throw compute at a DDOS attack to verify a signature,
than DB capacity.

ᐧ

On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 2:24 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Yes, the request object is JWT-based, but the request URI is not. In other
> words, you can post a JWT but what you get back is a URI, not the JWT
> itself.  The request URI was always meant to be a reference, and originally
> it was explicitly a reference to a signed request object.
>
> — Justin
>
> On Sep 26, 2019, at 10:03 AM, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> The URI is intended to be a reference not a value. If the client could
> send a JWT it would just send a request object instead of a request URI in
> the first place. So the intent is that it’s random, and maybe we should
> just say that explicitly.
>
>
> I thought this language was explicitly to allow the use of structured
> values for the request_uri? From the introduction:
>
> but it also allows clients requiring an even
> higher security level, especially cryptographically confirmed non-
> repudiation, to explicitly adopt JWT-based request objects.
>
>
> ----
> Aaron Parecki
> aaronparecki.com
>
> On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 6:49 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
> Aaron, some comments inline.
>
> — Justin
>
> On Sep 26, 2019, at 8:30 AM, Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hi Torsten,
>
> I'm very glad to see this draft, I think it's definitely needed in
> this space. Here are some of my thoughts on the draft.
>
> "request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2"
>
>
> Is it acceptable for the AS to return just an opaque string, rather
> than something prefixed with "uri:*"? I don't think anyone would be
> confused about copypasting the exact string from the "request_uri"
> response into the "request_uri" parameter even if it didn't start with
> "urn:". If, for whatever reason, it is required that this value is
> actually a URI, is there some expected namespace to use other than
> "example"? I worry that if all the examples in the spec are just
> "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2" then developers will end up
> using the text "example" because they don't understand why it's there,
> and then it serves no purpose really.’
>
>
> This field must be a URI, as per JAR:
>
>   request_uri  The absolute URI as defined by RFC3986 [RFC3986] that
>      points to the Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds
>      authorization request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0
>      [RFC6749].
>
> Somewhat awkwardly, the JAR spec currently states that the AS has to do an
> HTTP GET on the request URI, so that will need to be fixed in JAR before it
> goes forward. I don’t think that was always the case though, and I’m not
> sure how that changed.
>
> As for the namespace, “example” is ok for an example URN. The problem with
> URNs is that nobody really understands how to do domain-safe fully
> compliant URNs. So perhaps we should instead use “urn:fdc:example.com:….”
> Instead (as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4198)
>
>
> The pushed authorization request endpoint shall be a RESTful API
>
>
> I would drop the term RESTful and just say "HTTP API", as this
> description is arguably RESTful at best.
>
> Depending on client type and authentication method, the request might
> also include the "client_id" parameter.
>
>
> I assume this is hinting at the difference between public clients
> sending only the "client_id" parameter and confidential clients
> sending only the HTTP Basic Authorization header which includes both
> the client ID and secret? It would probably be helpful to call out
> these two common examples if I am understanding this correctly,
> otherwise it seems pretty vague.
>
>
> Not quite, those differences are for the token endpoint, and this is
> capturing things from the authorization endpoint. I don’t quite understand
> the differentiation listed here either, though.
>
>
> The "request_uri" value MUST be generated using a cryptographically
> strong pseudorandom algorithm
>
>
> I assume this includes the use of a random number inside of a JWT, in
> case the AS wants to use JWTs as the "request_uri" parameter"? If so,
> it's probably worth spelling that out as it kind of reads like it has
> to be literally a random string at first glance.
>
>
> The URI is intended to be a reference not a value. If the client could
> send a JWT it would just send a request object instead of a request URI in
> the first place. So the intent is that it’s random, and maybe we should
> just say that explicitly.
>
>
> That's all for now, thanks!
>
> ----
> Aaron Parecki
> aaronparecki.com
> @aaronpk
>
> On Sat, Sep 21, 2019 at 1:02 PM Torsten Lodderstedt
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> I just published a new draft that Brian Campbell, Dave Tonge, Filip
> Skokan, Nat Sakimura and I wrote.
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00
>
> It proposes a new endpoint, called "pushed authorization request
> endpoint”, that allows the client to push the Authorization Request payload
> with the AS on a backchannel connection instead of a front channel
> interaction. The AS provides the client with a request URI (according to
> draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq) that the client uses in a subsequent authorization
> requests to refer to the pushed request data.
>
> We believe this simple mechanism will significantly increase OAuth
> security and robustness since any application can use it by just sending
> the parameters in the same encoding as used at the authorisation endpoint
> over a HTTPS-protected and (for confidential clients) mutually
> authenticated connection to the AS. It can also be used to push signed and
> encrypted request objects to the AS, i.e. it provides an interoperable way
> to use request objects managed at the AS for use cases requiring an even
> higher security level.
>
> We look forward to getting your feedback.
>
> kind regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: [e-mail]
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
> Date: 21. September 2019 at 12:47:28 CEST
> To: "Nat Sakimura" <[e-mail]>, "Brian Campbell" <
> [e-mail]>, "Torsten Lodderstedt" <
> [e-mail]>, "Dave Tonge" <[e-mail]>, "Filip Skokan" <
> [e-mail]>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Torsten Lodderstedt and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name: draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par
> Revision: 00
> Title: OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
> Document date: 2019-09-21
> Group: Individual Submission
> Pages: 12
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par/
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par
>
>
> Abstract:
> This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
> which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
> authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
> request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
> reference to the data in a subsequent authorization request.
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
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