Re: [OAUTH-WG] Rotating client secret

Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> Mon, 13 July 2020 20:48 UTC

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 22:48:12 +0200
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To: Amarendra Godbole <ag=40broadcom.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Rotating client secret
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I'm not sure if it is just me, but I'm not sure I'm totally following.

I can see a concrete analogy being that, Tenant application B could be
Google Drive, and Tenant application A being any front end app that wants
to offer a service that saves files in a user's Google Drive. If
application A wants to interact with application B offline then tenant A
needs a service client/secret along with an authorization grant initiated
through application A (currently via UI in OAuth2).

Whether application A cycles the client secret or not seems like a
different problem. But I think I'm missing something. Given the example I
provided, would you be able to provide more insight into the problem you
are seeing?


*Warren Parad*
Secure your user data and complete your authorization architecture.
Implement Authress <https://bit.ly/37SSO1p>.
<https://rhosys.ch>


On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 10:36 PM Amarendra Godbole <ag=
40broadcom.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> First post to the list, and hopefully I am articulate enough to describe
> the problem I am facing — did OAuth ever consider an ability to dynamically
> rotate client secret (part of the “client credentials” authorization
> grant)? I stumbled across rfc7591 (OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
> Protocol), but the OAuth 2.0 implementation I am looking at [1], does not
> support it. I also found some previous reference to client secret rotation
> [2], but it does not discuss my use case.
>
> We operate a SaaS application A, which is supposed to talk with another
> SaaS application B. Our customers subscribe to both, our application A as
> well as application B. However, the teams adminstering A and B are separate
> teams within the same organization, though we cannot assume the level of
> trust between them. Let’s call them Tenant Admin A and Tenant Admin B. In
> our usecase, application A is the client for application B, and application
> B provides OAuth 2.0 authorization workflows. Now, Tenant Admin A has to
> provision the "client credentials” authorization grant — in order to do
> that, Tenant Admin B generates the client_id and client_secret, and sends
> them to Tenant Admin B. There is the problem — as I earlier stated, we
> cannot assume the level of trust between Tenant Admin A and Tenant Admin B,
> and exchanging client_id and client_secret now means the circle of trust
> for application B includes individuals who may or may not be trusted.
>
> One thought that occured to me was a provision in OAuth 2.0’s client
> credentials grant flow was the ability to “bootstrap” a client application
> — basically the client_secret is one-time-use-and-timebound-only, and
> allows the client to exchange it for a different client_secret. In our
> case, this can be handled by the SaaS application backend, thus making sure
> the Tenant Admin A no longer have access to it once they provision the
> client. This can be generalized, such that the authZ server can
> periodically trigger client_secret rotation, and won’t require manual
> intervention [3]. As I stated earlier, rfc7591 talks about this, but but in
> the context of dynamic registration.
>
> Having the client secret rotation a part of the protocol exchange
> messages, maybe a bootstrap, would be the ideal solution for our usecase.
>
> Or the bigger question: Did I misinterpret it all? Looking for guidance
> from this list.
>
> Thanks in advance.
>
> -Amarendra
>
> [1] Microsoft Azure
> https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-app-types
> [2]
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7ICMSRI2tjfXDD1Bk_G-qNpLy-0/
> [3] Auth0 rotate client secret:
> https://auth0.com/docs/dashboard/guides/applications/rotate-client-secret
>
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