[OAUTH-WG] SPOP: Salt & other ideas

Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> Wed, 03 December 2014 12:22 UTC

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Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 13:22:25 +0100
From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] SPOP: Salt & other ideas
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Hi all,

I also wanted to respond to various ideas that were entertained,
including adding salt into the hash function and also for including
other parameters in the hash.

Before adding new functionality we have to talk about the threats we are
trying to address.

For example, adding salt just makes the server do more computation. That
wouldn't be useful as such.

Adding other parameters into the hash function (such as the
client/server identifiers) is indeed a common technique with key
derivation functions. Here I wasn't able to come up with the attack that
we would prevent by doing so.

Ciao
Hannes