Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt
Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> Tue, 17 November 2020 07:56 UTC
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From: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt
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Noting two unrelated comments that came up: 1. The iss value in the example doesn't appear to be URL encoded: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.html#name-example-authorization-respo 2. There was the question from a developer whether error responses should also have the iss. I suggest the spec to be more explicit that iss is added to both success and error responses, and even include a second example, with an error response. Vladimir On 10/11/2020 22:25, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote: > Hi Vladimir, > > Good point. Considering the similarity to JAR (JWT Secured > Authorization Response), if we apply the same logic, our discussion > will eventually reach "response parameters outside the response JWT > are almost meaningless in the context of JARM". For interoperability > and simplicity, it may be good to say "MUST NOT" as you suggested. > > Taka > > On Mon, Nov 9, 2020 at 10:26 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov > <vladimir@connect2id.com <mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com>> wrote: > > Re Case 1: When JARM is used: > > A colleague pointed me to the following statement in the JARMs > spec, so I'd suggest to say the "iss" MUST NOT be included when > JARM is used: > > https://openid.net//specs/openid-financial-api-jarm.html#jwt-based-response-mode > >> All response parameters defined for a given response type are >> conveyed in a JWT > > Now, there isn't a proper normative keyword in this JARM spec > sentence, so I guess some may interpret this as a strong check for > no other query params, while others may not. Hence the MUST NOT to > prevent potential unintended errors. > > What are your thoughts on this? > > Vladimir > > On 06/11/2020 23:34, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote: >> I implemented the draft quickly and found no big hurdle for >> authorization server implementations. The current snapshot of my >> implementation does not add the `iss` parameter when JARM is >> used. However, for interoperability, I feel that the spec should >> describe expected behaviors when a JWT is included in an >> authorization response. The following is an implementer's comment >> for some cases. >> >> Case 1: When JARM is used >> >> An `iss` claim is included in the response JWT as one of >> top-level entries together with response parameters. It is not so >> unnatural to regard the `iss` claim as a response parameter. >> Conclusion would be "When JARM is used, the `iss` parameter is >> not necessary." >> >> Case 2: When an ID token is issued >> >> It is unnatural to regard the `iss` claim in an ID token as a >> response parameter. However, because FAPI Part 2 has already been >> using an ID token as detached signature for integrity protection, >> it would be difficult to find a convincing reason to prohibit >> using the `iss` claim in an ID token as a countermeasure to >> mix-up attacks. Conclusion would be "When an ID token is issued, >> the `iss` parameter is not necessary." >> >> Case 3: When an unencrypted JWT access token is issued >> >> It is technically possible to use the `iss` claim in an >> unencrypted JWT access token as the `iss` parameter. However, >> requiring the client to check the `iss` claim means "The access >> token is no longer opaque to the client." Conclusion would be >> "Even when an access token is issued and its format is JWT, the >> `iss` parameter is necessary." >> >> BTW, I found that a certain system raises an error when an >> unknown response parameter (that is, the `iss` parameter) is >> included in error authorization responses. To ask the >> administrator of the system to regard the `iss` parameter as a >> known one, at least the spec draft needs to be adopted by the >> community as a working draft. I hope that "call for adoption" for >> the draft will be conducted soon. >> >> Best Regards, >> Taka >> >> On Wed, Nov 4, 2020 at 4:46 AM Takahiko Kawasaki >> <taka@authlete.com <mailto:taka@authlete.com>> wrote: >> >> It sounds that the Security Considerations section or >> somewhere appropriate should have a paragraph like below. >> >> When an authorization response includes a JWT whose `iss` >> claim represents the issuer identifier of the authorization >> server, the `iss` claim can be used as a substitute for the >> `iss` parameter. Therefore, such authorization response does >> not have to have the `iss` parameter outside the JWT >> separately. Examples of such JWTs include the value of the >> `id_token` parameter in OIDC and the value of `response` >> parameter in JARM. >> >> Taka >> >> On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 10:46 PM Joseph Heenan >> <joseph@authlete.com <mailto:joseph@authlete.com>> wrote: >> >> I agree, it is in redundant in the JARM case. >> >> I find the text >> in https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.html#name-security-considerations >> (the 4th paragraph where JARM & JWTs) are mentioned a bit >> confusing - I think it would be good to say something >> along the lines of: >> >> Although integrity protection is not necessary to prevent >> mixup, any authorization response method that includes a >> JWT with an ‘iss' (for example, JARM or OIDC hybrid flow) >> will prevent the attack (assuming the client is >> validating the iss). >> >> >> I’m not entirely sure I understand what "MUST NOT allow >> multiple authorization servers to return the same issuer >> identifier during registration” means as I don’t think >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7591 returns the issuer? >> >> It might be clearer to say something like “When >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8414 is used the client >> MUST implement the validation described in >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8414#section-3.3. When >> authorization server details can be manually configured >> in the client, the client must verify that all issuer >> values are unique.” (Or at least something along those >> lines, I’m sure my wording can be improved. But if the >> client is correctly implementing rfc8414 or OIDC >> discovery [and does not have any manually configured >> authorization servers] then there’s no requirement for >> any further checks that the issuer is unique.) >> >> Joseph >> >> >>> On 3 Nov 2020, at 07:01, Vladimir Dzhuvinov >>> <vladimir@connect2id.com >>> <mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com>> wrote: >>> >>> This can potentially occur. If JARM is used "iss" >>> becomes redundant. To me JARM is an "enhanced" iss. >>> >>> If both are included a sensible client should make sure >>> the iss and the JARM iss match. >>> >>> My suggestion is to not require iss when a JARM is >>> present, but in case both do occur to have the client >>> check both. >>> >>> Vladimir >>> >>> On 02/11/2020 22:34, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote: >>>> Hi Karsten, >>>> >>>> The specification mentions JARM. Does this >>>> specification require the iss response parameter even >>>> when JARM is used? That is, should an authorization >>>> response look like below? >>>> >>>> HTTP/1.1 302 Found >>>> Location: >>>> https://client.example.com/cb?response={JWT}&iss={ISSUER} >>>> <https://client.example.com/cb?response=%7BJWT%7D&iss=%7BISSUER%7D> >>>> >>>> Or, can the iss response parameter be omitted when JARM >>>> is used? >>>> >>>> A small feedback for the 3rd paragraph in Section 4: >>>> s/identifes/identifies/ >>>> >>>> Best Regards, >>>> Taka >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 3:13 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov >>>> <vladimir@connect2id.com >>>> <mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks Karsten, looks good to me now, no further >>>> comments. >>>> >>>> Vladimir >>>> >>>> On 02/11/2020 09:54, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> Daniel and I published a new version of the "iss" >>>>> response parameter draft to address the feedback >>>>> from the WG. >>>>> >>>>> Changes in -01: >>>>> >>>>> * Incorporated first WG feedback >>>>> * Clarifications for use with OIDC >>>>> * Added note that clients supporting just one AS >>>>> are not vulnerable >>>>> * Renamed metadata parameter >>>>> * Various editorial changes >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We would like to ask you for further feedback and >>>>> comments on the new draft version. >>>>> >>>>> Best regards, >>>>> Karsten >>>>> >>>>> -------- Forwarded Message -------- >>>>> Subject: New Version Notification for >>>>> draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt >>>>> Date: Sun, 01 Nov 2020 23:31:42 -0800 >>>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org >>>>> <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org> >>>>> To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen >>>>> <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> >>>>> <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>, >>>>> Karsten zu Selhausen >>>>> <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> >>>>> <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>, >>>>> Daniel Fett <mail@danielfett.de> >>>>> <mailto:mail@danielfett.de> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A new version of I-D, >>>>> draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt >>>>> has been successfully submitted by Karsten Meyer >>>>> zu Selhausen and posted to the >>>>> IETF repository. >>>>> >>>>> Name: draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp >>>>> Revision: 01 >>>>> Title: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer >>>>> Identifier in Authorization Response >>>>> Document date: 2020-11-01 >>>>> Group: Individual Submission >>>>> Pages: 10 >>>>> URL: >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt >>>>> Status: >>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp/ >>>>> Html: >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.html >>>>> Htmlized: >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01 >>>>> Diff: >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01 >>>>> >>>>> Abstract: >>>>> This document specifies a new parameter "iss" that >>>>> is used to >>>>> explicitly include the issuer identifier of the >>>>> authorization server >>>>> in the authorization response of an OAuth >>>>> authorization flow. If >>>>> implemented correctly, the "iss" parameter serves >>>>> as an effective >>>>> countermeasure to "mix-up attacks". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes >>>>> from the time of submission >>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available >>>>> at tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org/>. >>>>> >>>>> The IETF Secretariat >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen >>>>> IT Security Consultant >>>>> Phone: +49 (0)234 / 54456499 >>>>> Web: https://hackmanit.de <https://hackmanit.de/> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training >>>>> >>>>> Does your OAuth or OpenID Connect implementation use PKCE to strengthen the security? Learn more about the procetion PKCE provides and its limitations in our new blog post: >>>>> https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/123-when-pkce-cannot-protect-your-confidential-oauth-client >>>>> >>>>> Hackmanit GmbH >>>>> Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus) >>>>> 44789 Bochum >>>>> >>>>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896 >>>>> Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > -- > Vladimir Dzhuvinov > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
- [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draf… Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for … Pretty Little Wife
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft… Daniel Fett