Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement

Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> Sun, 09 May 2010 17:56 UTC

Return-Path: <eran@hueniverse.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B36863A6987 for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 9 May 2010 10:56:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.273
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.273 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.088, BAYES_40=-0.185]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XPmX59xe7QJs for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 9 May 2010 10:56:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from p3plex1out02.prod.phx3.secureserver.net (p3plex1out02.prod.phx3.secureserver.net [72.167.180.18]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id D30113A688F for <oauth@ietf.org>; Sun, 9 May 2010 10:56:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 4206 invoked from network); 9 May 2010 17:56:17 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO smtp.ex1.secureserver.net) (72.167.180.21) by p3plex1out02.prod.phx3.secureserver.net with SMTP; 9 May 2010 17:56:17 -0000
Received: from P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET ([10.6.135.20]) by P3PW5EX1HT003.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET ([72.167.180.21]) with mapi; Sun, 9 May 2010 10:56:17 -0700
From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Sun, 9 May 2010 10:56:17 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
Thread-Index: AcrsiSECQXrU3wXQS9OAemKwU2hEUwDF8gAA
Message-ID: <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E72343B3AB46E0F@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET>
References: <C8044E24.2DAD6%atom@yahoo-inc.com> <4BE06831.60105@lodderstedt.net> <AANLkTinfr0-DlgB5rTZYnBhslolxfniVGvhoPY_N6y4Y@mail.gmail.com> <4BE1C6D0.6010600@lodderstedt.net>
In-Reply-To: <4BE1C6D0.6010600@lodderstedt.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 May 2010 17:56:32 -0000

Draft -02 made this possible already.

I added the following text:

        The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token in which case the client MUST NOT
        use the previous refresh token and replace it with the newly issued refresh token.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Torsten Lodderstedt
> Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2010 12:28 PM
> To: Marius Scurtescu
> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
> 
> Am 04.05.2010 21:44, schrieb Marius Scurtescu:
> > On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 11:32 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> > <torsten@lodderstedt.net>  wrote:
> >
> >> Am 03.05.2010 18:55, schrieb Allen Tom:
> >>
> >>> Invalidating the Refresh Token (and presumably also invalidating any
> >>> outstanding Access Tokens) would make sense as an option for
> >>> applications that require a high level of security. However, I do
> >>> not think that invalidating the Refresh Token on every Refresh
> >>> request should be required in the spec - it should be an implementation
> specific detail.
> >>>
> >>>
> >> It could be an optional feature of the spec (as many other features).
> >>
> > Torsten, can you please have a look a the "explicit request for
> > refresh token" thread?
> >
> > Would a "refresh_token_type=single" parameter solve the above?
> >
> >
> > Marius
> >
> 
> Hi Marius,
> 
> I expected the authorization server to decide which kind of token to use.
> Your proposal makes sense as well.
> So the client can act according to its security requirements. If the
> authorization server would like to enforce its own policy, it can detect any
> mismatch during token issuance.
> 
> Nevertheless, support for the optional "refresh_token" response parameter
> of the "refresh" request is the prerequisite.
> 
> regards,
> Torsten.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth