Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 base

Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org> Sun, 18 December 2011 18:55 UTC

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From: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TLS version requirements in OAuth 2.0 base
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To close out this issue:
There's disagreement about whether this proposed text is "necessary",
but no one thinks it's *bad*, and I see consensus to use it.  Eran,
please make the following change in two places in the base document:

> OLD
> The authorization server MUST support TLS 1.0 ([RFC2246]), SHOULD
> support TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246]) and its future replacements, and MAY
> support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
> requirements.

> NEW
> The authorization server MUST implement TLS.  Which version(s)
> ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on
> the widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at
> the time of implementation.  At the time of this writing, TLS version
> 1.2 [RFC5246] is the most recent version, but has very limited
> actual deployment, and might not be readily available in
> implementation toolkits.  TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246] is the
> most widely deployed version, and will give the broadest
> interoperability.
>
> Servers MAY also implement additional transport-layer
> mechanisms that meet their security requirements.

Barry, as chair