Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation
"Phil Hunt (IDM)" <phil.hunt@oracle.com> Tue, 26 January 2016 03:29 UTC
Return-Path: <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C8FEE1B2D5E for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:29:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s2Jj8jKgmVh8 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:29:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from userp1040.oracle.com (userp1040.oracle.com [156.151.31.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CC7481B2D5C for <oauth@ietf.org>; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:29:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from aserv0022.oracle.com (aserv0022.oracle.com [141.146.126.234]) by userp1040.oracle.com (Sentrion-MTA-4.3.2/Sentrion-MTA-4.3.2) with ESMTP id u0Q3TgxC013580 (version=TLSv1 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 26 Jan 2016 03:29:43 GMT
Received: from aserv0121.oracle.com (aserv0121.oracle.com [141.146.126.235]) by aserv0022.oracle.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id u0Q3Tgvd008983 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 26 Jan 2016 03:29:42 GMT
Received: from abhmp0006.oracle.com (abhmp0006.oracle.com [141.146.116.12]) by aserv0121.oracle.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id u0Q3TgJZ023220; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 03:29:42 GMT
Received: from [192.168.1.23] (/174.7.250.104) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:29:42 -0800
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail-DC5E1E7D-A198-4A21-83F3-04F9B90A360E"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0)
From: "Phil Hunt (IDM)" <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (13D15)
In-Reply-To: <DDFE7F75-46BB-4868-8548-CF449452EB69@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 19:29:40 -0800
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <222CF07B-5AA7-4789-8AC8-7C32377C5AE6@oracle.com>
References: <809D2C8D-F76B-42AD-93D1-E6AF487487AA@oracle.com> <362D654D-BC33-45AE-9F64-0A131A9EBC5E@oracle.com> <7BA5A647-5BBB-4C5E-95C7-0D6F295F96A6@gmail.com> <87971FDB-B51A-48B6-8311-6E55322960FC@oracle.com> <DDFE7F75-46BB-4868-8548-CF449452EB69@gmail.com>
To: Nov Matake <matake@gmail.com>
X-Source-IP: aserv0022.oracle.com [141.146.126.234]
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/VlKZFPU3GlAypGfZbMW3g2aoyYY>
Cc: "oauth@ietf.org WG" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 03:29:49 -0000
When the RP acting as the client issues a authorize redirect to the UA it has to make it with TLS Phil > On Jan 25, 2016, at 17:53, Nov Matake <matake@gmail.com> wrote: > > It doen't say anything about the first request which initiate the login flow. > It is still a reasonable assumption that RP puts a "login with FB" button on a non TLS-protected page. > > nov > >> On Jan 26, 2016, at 10:45, Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> wrote: >> >> I would find it hard to believe that is true. >> >> From 6749 Sec 3.1 >> Since requests to the authorization endpoint result in user >> authentication and the transmission of clear-text credentials (in the >> HTTP response), the authorization server MUST require the use of TLS >> as described in Section 1.6 when sending requests to the >> authorization endpoint. >> >> Sec 3.1.2.1 >> The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described >> in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token", >> or when the redirection request will result in the transmission of >> sensitive credentials over an open network. This specification does >> not mandate the use of TLS because at the time of this writing, >> requiring clients to deploy TLS is a significant hurdle for many >> client developers. If TLS is not available, the authorization server >> SHOULD warn the resource owner about the insecure endpoint prior to >> redirection (e.g., display a message during the authorization >> request). >> >> Lack of transport-layer security can have a severe impact on the >> security of the client and the protected resources it is authorized >> to access. The use of transport-layer security is particularly >> critical when the authorization process is used as a form of >> delegated end-user authentication by the client (e.g., third-party >> sign-in service). >> >> Section 10.5 talks about transmission of authorization codes in connection with redirects. >> >> Also see 6819, Sec 4.4.1.1 regarding eavesdropping or leaking of authz codes. >> >> >> Phil >> >> @independentid >> www.independentid.com >> phil.hunt@oracle.com >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 4:52 PM, nov matake <matake@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> The first assumption is coming from the original security report at http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229. >>> RFC 6749 requires TLS between RS and AS, and also between UA and AS, but not between UA and RS. >>> >>> The blog post is based on my Japanese post, and it describes multi-AS case. >>> Nat's another post describes the case which can affect single-AS case too. >>> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/22/code-phishing-attack-on-oauth-2-0-rfc6749/ >>> >>> nov >>> >>>> On Jan 26, 2016, at 08:22, Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Sorry, meant to reply-all. >>>> >>>> Phil >>>> >>>> @independentid >>>> www.independentid.com >>>> phil.hunt@oracle.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Begin forwarded message: >>>>> >>>>> From: Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> >>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation >>>>> Date: January 25, 2016 at 3:20:19 PM PST >>>>> To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> >>>>> >>>>> I am having trouble with the very first assumption. The user-agent sets up a non TLS protected connection to the RP? That’s a fundamental violation of 6749. >>>>> >>>>> Also, the second statement says the RP (assuming it acts as OAuth client) is talking to two IDPs. That’s still a multi-AS case is it not? >>>>> >>>>> Phil >>>>> >>>>> @independentid >>>>> www.independentid.com >>>>> phil.hunt@oracle.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 2:58 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Phil, >>>>>> >>>>>> Since I was not in Darmstadt, I really do not know what was discussed there, but with the compromised developer documentation described in http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/15/idp-mix-up-attack-on-oauth-rfc6749/, all RFC6749 clients with a naive implementer will be affected. The client does not need to be talking to multiple IdPs. >>>>>> >>>>>> Nat >>>>>> >>>>>> 2016年1月26日(火) 3:58 Phil Hunt (IDM) <phil.hunt@oracle.com>: >>>>>>> I recall making this point in Germany. 99% of existing use is fine. OIDC is probably the largest community that *might* have an issue. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I recall proposing a new security document that covers oauth security for dynamic scenarios. "Dynamic" being broadly defined to mean: >>>>>>> * clients who have configured at runtime or install time (including clients that do discovery) >>>>>>> * clients that communicate with more than one endpoint >>>>>>> * clients that are deployed in large volume and may update frequently (more discussion of "public" cases) >>>>>>> * clients that are script based (loaded into browser on the fly) >>>>>>> * others? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Phil >>>>>>> >>>>>>> > On Jan 25, 2016, at 10:39, George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com> wrote: >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > would >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>
- [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mi… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt (IDM)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Anthony Nadalin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Antonio Sanso
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Roland Hedberg
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Josh Mandel
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Josh Mandel
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… nov matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Hans Zandbelt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… nov matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt (IDM)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… nov matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nov Matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt (IDM)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt (IDM)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… nov matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt (IDM)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Hans Zandbelt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Hans Zandbelt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Phil Hunt (IDM)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-U… Mike Jones