Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.txt

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Wed, 06 October 2021 19:54 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.txt
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Overall I think thus is good, but I have a few comments/suggestions:

I think the stateful handling of server-supplied nonces (ie the client reuses the same nonce until the server sends a new one) perhaps needs to be clarified with respect to clients making concurrent requests. Especially clients using multiple access tokens and/or DPoP keys (eg for different users). Is the nonce specific to a particular access token? 

And we also need to consider a client that is itself a cluster of servers - does such a client need to synchronise nonces across instances? Does the AS/RS need to? (I can imagine this getting quite complex with different requests from different client machines hitting different AS/RS servers). 

I think probably any use of the DPoP-Nonce response header should also be accompanied by Cache-Control: private (or no-store) and this should be a MUST. I think we’ve also missed that the DPoP header on requests should also have Cache-Control: no-store added, at least when not sending the access token in an Authorization header. 

It seems slightly odd that the WWW-Authenticate challenge for RS server-supplied nonces isn’t self-contained, but I don’t see anything that says it should be so that is probably ok. (And I can see the consistency argument for using the header). 

It does seem a shame to pay the cost of a challenge-response roundtrip and not to do a key exchange to speed up subsequent requests, but never mind. 

— Neil

> On 6 Oct 2021, at 17:37, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> FYI, I wrote about the nonce support at https://self-issued.info/?p=2194 and https://twitter.com/selfissued/status/1445789505902899206.
>  
>                                                        -- Mike
>  
> From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
> Sent: Monday, October 4, 2021 3:11 PM
> To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.txt
>  
>  
> WG,
>  
> The collective DPoP co-authors are pleased to announce that a new -04 revision of DPoP has been published. The doc history snippet is copied below for quick/easy reference. The main change here is the addition of an option for a server-provided nonce in the DPoP proof.
> 
>    -04
>    *  Added the option for a server-provided nonce in the DPoP proof.
>    *  Registered the invalid_dpop_proof and use_dpop_nonce error codes.
>    *  Removed fictitious uses of realm from the examples, as they added
>       no value.
>    *  State that if the introspection response has a token_type, it has
>       to be DPoP.
>    *  Mention that RFC7235 allows multiple authentication schemes in
>       WWW-Authenticate with a 401.
>    *  Editorial fixes.
> 
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 4:05 PM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.txt
> To: ...
> 
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Brian Campbell and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> 
> Name:           draft-ietf-oauth-dpop
> Revision:       04
> Title:          OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)
> Document date:  2021-10-04
> Group:          oauth
> Pages:          37
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop/
> Html:           https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04.html
> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop
> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04
> 
> Abstract:
>    This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0
>    tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level.
>    This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access
>    and refresh tokens.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The IETF Secretariat
> 
> 
> 
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