[OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Fri, 09 May 2014 20:51 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 09 May 2014 14:51:01 -0600
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Cc: John Bradley <jbradley@pingidentity.com>, Naveen Agarwal <naa@google.com>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03
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I notice that code_verifier is defined as "high entropy cryptographic
random string of length less than 128 bytes"  [1], which brought a few
questions and comments to mind. So here goes:

Talking about the length of a string in terms of bytes is always
potentially confusing. Maybe characters would be an easier unit for people
like me to wrap their little brains around?

Why are we putting a length restriction on the code_verifier anyway? It
seems like it'd be more appropriate to restrict the length of the
code_challenge because that's the thing the AS will have to maintain
somehow (store in a DB or memory or encrypt into the code). Am I missing
something here?

Let me also say that I hadn't looked at this document since its early days
in draft -00 or -01 last summer but I like the changes and how it's been
kept pretty simple for the common use-case while still allowing for crypto
agility/extension. Nice work!

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03#section-3.3