Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint

Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com> Tue, 06 October 2020 21:25 UTC

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From: Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 14:25:24 -0700
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To: vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org, oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint
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Vittorio and WG,

Would it be possible to include something like the following to
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10

In case the authorization server exposes the introspection, revocation, and
OpenID Connect userinfo endpoints they MUST act in the same way as it
happens with a regular access token. That allows the AS to change the type
of an access token on the fly and that won’t lead to interoperate issues.
Plus, the consumers of these endpoints use them regardless of the type of
access token.

The way how the AS can notify RSs that the token revocation event happened
(if it decides to do so) is completely left to implementers.

?

Another minor editorial thing from me is it would possible to change and
refer to "JWT access tokens" as AJWT. Thus, this document won't repeat the
token word twice.

Regards,
Andrii

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 2:22 PM <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
wrote:

> Hey Jim, regarding
> > Every logout event should trigger token revocation
> That isn’t necessarily the case. An access token represents the ability of
> a client to access a given resource; the fact that it requires an
> authentication transaction/session establishment to be issued to the client
> does not mean that the AT lifetime is tied to the lifetime of that session.
> Say that I allow LinkedIn to tweet on my behalf. Once I have done that, it
> doesn’t matter whether I stay logged in their web app or otherwise. Even if
> I log out of the session in which context I got my twitter AT, I can still
> post on LinkedIn from my native LinkedIn app and the corresponding post
> will show up on twitter as well.
> Now, one might choose to *explicitly* tie tokens lifetime to originating
> sessions lifetime, see the discussion on the OpenID Connect group about a
> possible online_access scope for influencing RTs and Ats (in particular, in
> the context of SPAs) but that's additional semantic that isn’t defined
> today.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Jim Manico
> Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 5:17 PM
> To: Nicolas Mora <nicolas@babelouest.org>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint
>
> > In this model, considering that token revocations don't happen a lot...
>
> Just a brief note, a secure piece of software makes the logout feature
> prominent. Every logout event should trigger token revocation.
>
> I’m mentioning this because a lot of OAuth solutions in the mobile space
> literally ignore the logout event, such as Facebook’s mobile OAuth
> solution.
>
> - Jim
>
> > On Oct 4, 2020, at 6:55 AM, Nicolas Mora <nicolas@babelouest.org> wrote:
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> >> Le 20-10-04 à 11 h 27, Thomas Broyer a écrit :
> >>
> >>    There might be some kind of pushed events between the AS and the RS
> when
> >>    a JWT AT is revoked, to allow the RS not to introspect a JWT AT at
> all.
> >>    Like this, the RS knows if a JWT AT has been revoked or not.
> >>
> >>
> >> If there are some kind of pushed events between the AS and the RS,
> >> then it could push the revoked (and/or expired) opaque AT too, giving
> >> almost no advantage to JWT ATs.
> >>
> > Not necessarily, let's say the AS informs the RS only of the revoked
> > ATs, when a RS checks an AT, it verifies the signature first, then the
> > claims, then checks if the AT has been revoked by checking its
> > internal list filled by the AS pushed events.
> >
> > In this model, considering that token revocations don't happen a lot,
> > the ratio revoked AT/valid AT is very low, so the advantage of a JWT
> > is important, because it means not so much communication between the
> > AS and the RSs, and a very reliable AT.
> >
> > But this means a communication mechanism that isn't standardized yet.
> >
> > /Nicolas
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
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