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To: Antonio Sanso <asanso@adobe.com>
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From: Daniel Fett <fett@uni-trier.de>
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Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 15:15:32 +0200
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Cc: Guido Schmitz <gschmitz@informatik.uni-trier.de>,
 "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>, Ralf Kuesters <kuesters@uni-trier.de>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] State Leakage Attack
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Am 25.04.2016 um 15:11 schrieb Antonio Sanso:
>>> Checking referrer is a weak protection at best, as that is easily faked in many circumstances.
>>
>> Note that we do not propose checking the referrer as a mitigation; we
>> propose using the referrer policy (at the client) to suppress the
>> referrer (just as in the open redirector draft where it is used at the
>> AS). So the recommendation here is to use the referrer policy also at
>> the client.
> 
> and just as a corollary Internet Explorer doesn’t seem to support the referrer policy. Maybe Edge…

Edge does, yes :)

(And this is why having the referrer policy in place is just one part of
our mitigation.)


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