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Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement

Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> Sun, 09 May 2010 21:59 UTC

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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Date: Sun, 09 May 2010 14:59:10 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
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Cc: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
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The text is in -04. -02 made the refresh token available in token refresh.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net]
> Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2010 2:57 PM
> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
> 
> Hi Eran,
> 
> I cannot find this text in -02 or -03. Would you please refer my to the
> respective page/section?
> 
> regads,
> Torsten.
> 
> Am 09.05.2010 19:56, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav:
> > Draft -02 made this possible already.
> >
> > I added the following text:
> >
> >          The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token in which case
> the client MUST NOT
> >          use the previous refresh token and replace it with the newly issued
> refresh token.
> >
> > EHL
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >> Behalf Of Torsten Lodderstedt
> >> Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2010 12:28 PM
> >> To: Marius Scurtescu
> >> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
> >>
> >> Am 04.05.2010 21:44, schrieb Marius Scurtescu:
> >>
> >>> On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 11:32 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> >>> <torsten@lodderstedt.net>   wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Am 03.05.2010 18:55, schrieb Allen Tom:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Invalidating the Refresh Token (and presumably also invalidating
> >>>>> any outstanding Access Tokens) would make sense as an option for
> >>>>> applications that require a high level of security. However, I do
> >>>>> not think that invalidating the Refresh Token on every Refresh
> >>>>> request should be required in the spec - it should be an
> >>>>> implementation
> >>>>>
> >> specific detail.
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> It could be an optional feature of the spec (as many other features).
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> Torsten, can you please have a look a the "explicit request for
> >>> refresh token" thread?
> >>>
> >>> Would a "refresh_token_type=single" parameter solve the above?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Marius
> >>>
> >>>
> >> Hi Marius,
> >>
> >> I expected the authorization server to decide which kind of token to use.
> >> Your proposal makes sense as well.
> >> So the client can act according to its security requirements. If the
> >> authorization server would like to enforce its own policy, it can
> >> detect any mismatch during token issuance.
> >>
> >> Nevertheless, support for the optional "refresh_token" response
> >> parameter of the "refresh" request is the prerequisite.
> >>
> >> regards,
> >> Torsten.
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>

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