Re: [OAUTH-WG] treatment of client_id for authentication and identification

"Lu, Hui-Lan (Huilan)" <huilan.lu@alcatel-lucent.com> Thu, 18 August 2011 21:46 UTC

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From: "Lu, Hui-Lan (Huilan)" <huilan.lu@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: 'Eran Hammer-Lahav' <eran@hueniverse.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 16:47:10 -0500
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] treatment of client_id for authentication and identification
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Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] treatment of client_id for authentication and identification
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> > It is difficult to parse the last sentence of 3.2.1: "The security ramifications of
> > allowing unauthenticated access by public clients to the token endpoint
> > MUST be considered, as well as the issuance of refresh tokens to public
> > clients, their scope, and lifetime."
> >
> > I think it should be rewritten and reference relevant parts of security
> > considerations.
> 
> Text?
> 
> EHL

Here is my stab:
Allowing unauthenticated access by public clients has security ramifications. So does the issuance of refresh tokens to public clients. Such security ramifications MUST be considered. See section 10 for further details.

Huilan