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From: Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
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Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2015 16:03:04 -0800
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of Draft-ietf-dyn-reg
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I=92m not sure if this is what Kathleen is after. I think part of the =
background in the current spec is that we were trying to differentiate =
from the large scale success stories OAuth has had in the past like =
Facebook and Google.  When you are a developer trying to build a client =
for IMAP, a standards based protocol, you can=92t predict what the =
endpoints are in advance, so obviously an IMAP developer can=92t obtain =
client_ids since they can=92t predict the future. Nor would it be =
reasonable to pre-register with every possible email deployment in the =
world.

NOTE:   We might want to change the terminology from =93API=94 to =
application service or application protocol.  I know some an IETF see =
the word API and associate that exclusively with programming libraries.

deployment organization
      An administrative security domain under which a software API =
(service) is
      deployed and protected by an OAuth 2.0 framework. In early OAuth
      scenarios, the deploying organization was often the same =
organization=20
      that published the API. In these cases the deploying organization =
can have=20
     a close relationship with client software developers.  In many =
other cases,
     the definer of the service may be an independent third-party =
publisher or
     a standards organization. The client software developer while =
working to
     a published specification for an API is unable to have a prior =
relationship=20
     with the organization deploying the software API (service).

software api publisher
      The organization that defines a particular web accessible API that
      may be deployed in one or more deployment environments.  A =
publisher
      may be any standards body, commercial, public, private, or open =
source
      organization that is responsible for publishing and distributing
      software that may be protected via OAuth 2.0.  In some cases a
      software API publisher and a client developer may be the same
      organization. At the time of publication of a web accessible API, =
the software
     publisher often does not have a prior relationship with deploying =
organizations.

 Client Developer
      The person or organization that builds a client software package
      and prepares it for distribution. At the time of building the =
client, the developer
      is often not aware of who the deploying service provider =
organizations will be.=20
      Except when the software API publisher and the deploying =
organization are=20
      the same, client developers will need to use dynamic registration =
when they are
      unable to predict the deployment URLs at =93compile time=94.

Phil

@independentid
www.independentid.com
phil.hunt@oracle.com

> On Feb 16, 2015, at 4:43 PM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> To Mike's last question below: I'd like Phil (and others if desired) =
to propose a clarified version of the "deployment organization", =
"software api publisher", and "client developer" if possible. With some =
text for that in hand I can tackle the rest given the feedback below.
>=20
> -- Justin
>=20
> On 2/16/2015 6:42 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
>> A few responses and comments are inline below...
>>=20
>>> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Phil Hunt
>>> Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 11:47 AM
>>> To: Justin Richer
>>> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD review of Draft-ietf-dyn-reg
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Phil
>>>=20
>>> @independentid
>>> www.independentid.com
>>> phil.hunt@oracle.com
>>>=20
>>> On Feb 11, 2015, at 8:31 PM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Kathleen, thanks for the review. Responses inline, though I'm going =
to let the other authors talk about their sections (deployment org, =
software version, etc) directly.
>>>=20
>>> On 2/11/2015 6:06 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
>>> Thank you for your work on this draft and sorry for the delay in my =
review.  Before we progress to IETF last call, I'd like to see what we =
can resolve from the list below.   I am looking at the IPR issues to see =
if we can resolve the outstanding questions as well.
>>>=20
>>> The Shepherd report says the following:
>>>    The document shepherd has raised concerns regarding the fuzzy =
description
>>>    of the actors (deployment organization, software API publisher, =
client
>>>    developer) and their impact on the protocol execution. The =
working
>>>    group did not seem to worry about these aspects though.
>>>=20
>>> I can see the point after reading the draft.  The interactions are =
written much more clearly in the security considerations section than =
where the flows are described.  Can something be done to address these =
concerns?
>>>=20
>>> Section 1.2
>>> Deployment Organization definition:
>>> I highly recommend replacing the phrase "simple cloud deployment" =
with a description that accurately reflects what is intended.  If that's =
within a single service provider's network, a single data center, or a =
single hosted data center, I think it would be more clear.
>>>=20
>>> Section 1.2 nit:
>>> Add the word "be" into the following term definition after "may":
>>>   Software API Publisher
>>>       The organization that defines a particular web accessible API =
that
>>>       may deployed in one or more deployment environments.
>>>=20
>>> [deferred to original author of this text Phil et. al for better =
wording]
>>>=20
>>> [Phil] Agreed with Kathleen's suggestion.
>> I also agree that the wording of the definitions could be clarified.  =
Justin, do you want to take a first pass at this or would you like to =
take lead on this, Phil?
>>=20
>>> Section 2:
>>>=20
>>> Why isn't a more secure option offered and set as the default for =
authentication types? I know I've asked this before and the answer was =
just that you can add something to the registry, but setting HTTP Basic =
as the default seems like a really bad choice. HOBA is on it's way to =
becoming an RFC from the HTTPAuth working group.  HTTPAuth also has an =
updated version of Basic that is in IETF last call, but I know you are =
pointing to the OAuth 2.0 document, so it would be that document that =
gets updated and not this draft.  The new version of HTTP Basic fixes =
some internationalization problems and spells out the security issues =
much more clearly, so it probably doesn't matter too much to update the =
reference, but maybe makes it more clear that basic is not a secure form =
of authentication.
>>>=20
>>> Can you provide some justification as to why this is okay to set =
basic as the default and add that to the draft?  Section 2.3.1 of OAuth =
2.0 just says this MUST be implemented, but that any HTTP schemes can be =
used.  Why not register another method and use that instead as the =
default?  You could use digest and there is library support.  It's not a =
great answer, but slightly better than passwords with basic.  You could =
register HOBA and use that instead, the only downside is limited library =
support at the moment.
>>>=20
>>> It was our intent to document the methods already defined for use =
with OAuth and provide a registration mechanism for distinguishing =
between them, not to create new client authentication mechanisms. Digest =
and HOBA simply aren't defined for use with OAuth clients yet. It would =
be simple to do: put the client id in the "username" field and the =
client secret in the "password" field of both algorithms. However, I =
don't believe it's a good idea to conflate those two goals in a single =
specification. We actually had other, more secure definitions in an =
earlier draft of this document (using a JWT signed with a private key or =
a JWT signed with a shared key, specifically), but those were removed in =
order to focus on solving just the client registration problem. I agree =
with that decision of the WG.
>>>=20
>>> As other methods of client authentication are defined in the OAuth =
ecosystem, they can register as valid values in the registry. I think it =
would be a valuable output of this WG to define other client =
authentication mechanisms as a separate draft or an eventual update to =
RFC6749 (or both?).
>> HTTP Basic is set to the default because that's the default in RFC =
6749 and this specification is about registering clients for use with =
RFC 6749.  Trying to change the RFC 6749 default really isn't within the =
scope of this work.  (If that's done, it should probably be done in an =
http6749-bis spec.)  However, the spec does define a registry that new =
methods like HOBA can be registered in when people want to use them.  =
(And if HOBA finishes before Dynamic Registration, I'm fine adding a =
registry entry for it in this spec.)
>>=20
>> If you're interested in the client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt =
client authentication methods that Justin alluded to, these are defined =
in Section 9 of OpenID Connect Core =
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClientAuthentication.=

>>=20
>> In relation to your internationalization comments Kathleen, note that =
Section 2.3.1 of RFC 6749 explicitly provides a mechanism for encoding =
international strings for use with HTTP Basic.  This was added under the =
supervision of Julian Reschke, I believe as a result of his WGLC =
comments.  So whether this is the same as what the new version of HTTP =
Basic does or not, OAuth 2.0 already does provide a standard way to use =
internationalized strings with HTTP Basic for OAuth client =
authentication.
>>=20
>>> Section 2: Contacts:
>>>=20
>>> I noticed privacy is not dealt with until you get to the security =
considerations section.  I'd prefer to see it with the definition, =
stating the address should be a general help address at the domain =
rather than directly to an identifiable individual.  It may be good to =
set a default for what this should be for consistency or give an example =
(think back to abuse@domain.com)?
>>>=20
>>> The problem that I see with putting it inside the definition is that =
it makes the definition text very long, as the definition sits in a list =
of other metadata items. We could add a forward pointer and an example =
easily enough, though. Or we could move the privacy considerations =
section up as a subsection here, though I don't know if that runs afoul =
of the RFC style guidelines for this new section.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Software_id and software_version:
>>> Are there any guidelines as to how these should be represented?  =
There are several specifications on software_id (and platform).  Does =
consistency here matter or is this just meant to be human readable?
>>> Section 2.2 specifies some metadata values that are to be human =
readable, should the above be in the list?  I would expect this list to =
be comprehensive for clarity, rather than just examples since there =
aren't too many defined here.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> [mostly deferred to Phil et. al, but note that software_id and =
software_version are not intended to be human readable and don't need =
the multi-language support]
>> We should probably say that in the draft then.
>>=20
>>> [Phil]
>>> I've added some more explanatory text. Note...some of this may be =
better put elsewhere.
>>>=20
>>> As to whether the values are human readable, I have no opinion. What =
matters most is unique matching.
>>>=20
>>>    software_id
>>>       A unique identifier (e.g. UUID) assigned by the developer or =
software publisher
>>>       used by registration endpoints to identify client software to =
be dynamically registered.
>>>       Unlike "client_id", which is issued by the authorization =
server and varies between
>>>       instances of software, the "software_id" SHOULD remain the =
same for all client software
>>>       instances. The "software_id" SHOULD remain the same across =
multiple software updates
>>>       or versions.
>> I'd revise the last two sentences of this as follows:
>>=20
>>       Unlike "client_id", which is issued by the authorization server =
and may vary between
>>       instances of a piece of software, the "software_id" SHOULD =
remain the same for all instances
>>       of a piece of software. The "software_id" SHOULD remain the =
same across multiple software updates
>>       or versions of the same piece of software.
>>=20
>>> software_version
>>>       A version identifier for the software identified by =
"software_id".  The
>>>       value of this field is a string that is intended to be =
compared
>>>       using string equality matching. Unlike "software_id", the =
value of the
>>>       "software_version" SHOULD change on any update to the client
>>>       software. A service provider MAY use "software_id" and =
"software_version" to
>>>       recognize approved software and version combinations approved =
for dynamic registration.
>>>=20
>>> Let me know if you want more background.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Section 3.2.1 & Privacy section
>>> For client_name and client_id and associated information, how is =
user privacy affected and what can be done to mitigate concerns?  The =
definition should state that this is a public value and that it is =
specific to the software, not a person.  You have to get to the security =
consideration section before that is clear.  References are fine too, =
but some more information is needed in the privacy section.  I'm left =
with a bunch of questions:
>>>   Can the client_name and client_id be tied to a person?
>>> The client name is common across all copies of the software =
(usually), so no worries there. The ID represents an individual piece of =
software, not a person, though if that person is the sole user of the =
instance of software then I believe you're right that there are some =
privacy considerations that we should point that out. However, dynamic =
registration can actually help mitigate this as well, since in the =
normal case (with no software statements) there's no way to correlate =
instances of clients with each other.
>>>=20
>>>   Can the person be tracked by this?
>>>   Can other information be gathered about a system (and it's user) =
during this process?
>>> Nothing gathered about the user during registration, as this happens =
in the back channel outside the user's purview.
>>>=20
>>>   The information is used to dynamically register clients, what is =
logged?
>>>   What data is aggregated?
>>>   What can you tell about a client (time, location, travel, other =
personal details that may be considered sensitive)?  I don't think this =
was covered in the OAuth 2.0 RFC.
>>>   How is this addressed at the authorization server and other =
points?
>>>   The Security considerations talks about client_id as being short =
lived, so they expire, but are these event logged or is that prohibited?
>>>=20
>>> Many of these questions seem to be completely dependent on the =
implementation of the authorization server, and I'm not really sure how =
(or if) to address them in this draft. Any suggestions would be welcomed =
here.
>>>=20
>>> The client_id *could* be short lived, but they usually aren't. I =
don't see any particular logging or tracking concerns using a dynamic =
OAuth client above using any other piece of software, ever. As such, I =
don't think it requires special calling out here.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> 5. Security considerations
>>> The first paragraph is a repeat of text.  Can this just be in one =
place and use a pointer to the full text?  I like the requirement, but =
reading it once is enough.
>>>=20
>>> I think it was less onerous of a repeat when both simply said "use =
TLS", so some refactoring after the expansion of the text makes sense to =
me. Would it be better to have it upfront in the endpoint definition, or =
in the security considerations?
>> Justin, do you want to make specific rewording proposals for this and =
the other editorial issues that were identified?
>>=20
>>> --
>>>=20
>>> Best regards,
>>> Kathleen
>>>=20
>>> Thanks again for your review!
>>>=20
>>>  -- Justin
>> 				Thanks all,
>> 				-- Mike
>>=20
>=20

