Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object
Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> Mon, 06 January 2020 11:00 UTC
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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 20:00:15 +0900
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To: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Cc: n-sakimura <n-sakimura@nri.co.jp>, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Nat Sakimura <nat.sakimura@oidf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object
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Apparently, the description in the JAR spec has made some AS implementers, at least Vladimir - Connect2id and Filip - node-oidc-provider, decide to devise a workaround, and the approach (preparing a configuration switch) is attracting Taka (me) - Authlete, too. This may be a typical answer by AS implementers who face compatibility-breaking and interoperability-breaking issues, although I personally prefer to modify the specification itself to allow old/new RPs and ASes to coexist seamlessly. If the current draft is not modified any more, I will probably prepare per-AS and per-RP configuration switches. Anyway, this is feedback from AS implementers. If preparing a configuration switch is a typical answer by AS implementers, it might be good to define a new IdP metadata about JAR support (e.g. strict, lax, whitelist, as Filip showed). Rather, the existence of such metadata might be a must for the automated regular tests <https://gitlab.com/openid/conformance-suite/-/wikis/Users/How-to-be-added-to-the-regular-automated-tests-run> of conformance suite, but I'm not sure and want to consult Joseph Heenan regarding this. Best, Taka On Mon, Jan 6, 2020 at 6:43 PM Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote: > I don't think we have the separation of OAuth and non-OAuth parameters and > let's please not. Even OIDC parameters are part of the OAuth parameters > registry > <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#parameters> and > I cannot imagine the hardship if we were to explain that to developers. > > With passing time I believe it should be up to the profile or application > of JAR to define how to treat *recognized* parameters outside of the > request object. In my personal OSS project the AS can be configured to be > *strict* (jar), *lax* (oidc merge all) or *whitelist* (merge only > whitelisted - code_challenge, nonce, state, ...) similar to what Vladimir > is describing. > > S pozdravem, > *Filip Skokan* > > > On Mon, 6 Jan 2020 at 07:05, n-sakimura <n-sakimura@nri.co.jp> wrote: > >> Up until -12 (Feb 13, 2017), it was using merge + JAR precedence if >> duplicated. >> >> As of -13 (Mar 30, 2017), it was changed that the server does not have to >> do the merge, at least for OAuth Authorization request parameters. It says >> nothing about other parameters. >> >> As of -14 (Jul 21, 2017), the wording was further strengthened by adding >> >> >> >> The Authorization Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request >> Object even if the same parameter is provided in the query parameter. >> >> >> >> So, the entire 6.3 now became >> 6.3 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-20#section-6.3>. >> Request Parameter Assembly and Validation >> >> The Authorization Server MUST extract the set of Authorization >> >> Request parameters from the Request Object value. The Authorization >> >> Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request Object even if the >> >> same parameter is provided in the query parameter. The Authorization >> >> Server then validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 >> >> [RFC6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>]. >> >> >> >> It says nothing on the non-OAuth parameters that came with the >> authorization request. >> >> My take on the text is that all OAuth Authorization Request parameters >> MUST be in the request object. >> >> Behaviors towards other parameters that happens to have come together >> with the authorization request outside of request object will be treated as >> non-OAuth parameters. >> >> >> >> Nat Sakimura >> >> Research Fellow, Nomura Research Institute >> >> E: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp >> >> T: +81(90)60136276 >> >> --------------------------------------------------------- >> >> PLEASE READ:This e-mail is confidential and intended for the named >> recipient only. >> >> If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete >> this e-mail. >> >> >> >> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Justin Richer >> *Sent:* Friday, January 3, 2020 2:35 AM >> *To:* Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> >> *Cc:* Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; >> oauth <oauth@ietf.org>; Nat Sakimura <nat.sakimura@oidf.org> >> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs >> OIDC request object >> >> >> >> For solution [2], this is the behavior that’s required for OIDC today, so >> I would say that’s the New Client behaving like an Old Client in order to >> talk to an Old Server. So in reality, (2) causes the request to be >> rejected, and that’s OK. >> >> >> >> I don’t think it’s viable to require parameters to exist inside the >> request object at all times. Nor should we try to enumerate which >> parameters go inside and outside at all times — at least from the JAR/OAuth >> level of things. I think there are too many things that are application and >> deployment specific for us to make this call. The very nature of the >> request object changes for people — some have a static object that’s >> deployed with clients and some have something that the client creates at >> runtime for each request. >> >> >> >> If the instead the New Server requires that any parameters duplicated >> between the two places have to match (the OIDC method) or that in a >> conflict the request object values take precedence (the merge method), then >> problems 3-1 and 3-2 go away. >> >> >> >> With the merge-and-precedence behavior, which is what I thought that JAR >> had during WGLC, [3-1] is well-defined. The request is processed the same >> way every time because this is a New Server. The client is going to do >> OIDC’s “duplicate” method, so “merge with precedence” is effectively a >> no-op. >> >> >> >> With the merge-and-precedence behavior, [3-2] doesn’t happen because the >> required parameters aren’t required to be in the request object itself. As >> long as the request object is valid, it protects all parameters within it. >> I don’t think it’s up to us to determine what makes sense to put in that >> object. Security guidance is probably a good idea here. >> >> >> >> Solution [3] is what Old Clients already do in OIDC today, so that’s what >> already happens and why problem space (3) isn’t a problem. >> >> >> >> — Justin >> >> >> >> On Jan 2, 2020, at 12:24 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> Thank you, Justin. Actually, I wanted to see someone write a summary >> about what happens in each combination from a viewpoint of both RP and AS >> with regard to backward compatibility (as I told you in other channel just >> before you posted your email ^_^). >> >> So, >> >> *(1) New Client + New Server* >> No problem will happen. >> >> *(2) New Client + Old Server* >> *[Problem 2-1]* If an authorization request contains 'request' or >> 'request_uri' but doesn't have old mandatory request parameters >> ('client_id' and 'response_type') outside the request object, the request >> is rejected. >> >> *[Solution 2]* New Client should include the old mandatory request >> parameters duplicately outside the request object. This means that New >> Client should always send old mandatory request parameters duplicately >> outside the request object if it wants to get maximum compatibility. >> >> *(3) Old Client + New Server* >> *[Problem 3-1]* If an authorization request contains 'request' or >> 'request_uri' and some "optional" request parameters are not included in >> the request object, AS will interpret the request differently. Imagine what >> happens when optional parameters such as 'scope', 'state', 'nonce', >> 'redirect_uri', 'response_mode', 'max_age', 'acr_values', 'code_challenge', >> 'code_challenge_method' and 'prompt' are not included in the request object >> but present outside the request object. >> >> *[Problem 3-2]* If an authorization request contains 'request' or >> 'request_uri' and some "mandatory" request parameters ('client_id' and >> 'response_type') are not included in the request object, the request is >> rejected. >> >> *[Solution 3]* Old Client should include all request parameters >> duplicately in the request object. This means that Old Client should always >> include all request parameters duplicately in the request object if it >> wants to get maximum compatibility. >> >> *(4) Old Client + Old Server* >> No problem will happen. >> >> - - - >> >> >> From a Client's point of view, for maximum compatibility, both Old and >> New Clients should put mandatory request parameters outside the request >> object and put all request parameters duplicately inside the request object. >> >> [Problem 3-1] is difficult to detect because the authorization request is >> not rejected. But, if New Server requires that all request parameters >> outside the request object be put inside the request object duplicately, >> [Problem 3-1] is handled as an error and thus client developers can detect >> the problem. >> >> Consequently, introducing the following requirement in "FAPI Part 2, >> 5.2.2 >> <https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-part-2-ID2.html#authorization-server>, >> 10" to JAR seems a good compromise (as I told before) >> >> shall require that all parameters are present inside the signed request >> object passed in the request or request_uri parameter; >> >> >> instead of just saying "the authorization server supporting this >> specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request object." >> which will bring about [Problem 3-1]. That is, how about adding a rule like >> "if request parameters exist outside the request object, they must exist >> inside the request object, too."? >> >> Any thoughts? >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Taka >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 3, 2020 at 12:48 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >> I think the nature of the backwards incompatibility is important here. >> The way that things are now, using merge-with-precedence, you have the >> following matrix of compatibility: >> >> >> >> >> >> New Server | Old Server | >> >> -----------+-------------+--------------+ >> >> New Client | YES | NO | >> >> Old Client | YES | YES | >> >> >> >> >> >> If you ask me, this is the right balance for a breaking change. Old >> clients, where the vast majority of the code is, don’t have to change. New >> clients can only talk to servers with the new features, which is the >> ability to drop parameters from the external request. This would apply to >> both OIDC and plain OAuth. >> >> >> >> I think we should follow this kind of pattern in the discussions on OAuth >> 2.1, which I think JAR should be a part of/ >> >> >> >> — Justin >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jan 2, 2020, at 3:40 AM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> Breaking backward compatibility in this part would mean that OpenID >> Certification given to AS implementations with request_uri support will be >> invalidated once they support JAR. It also would mean that test cases in >> the official conformance suite need to be changed in a >> backward-incompatible manner, which would implicitly encourage that all >> certified implementations should re-try to get certification. >> >> Changing the spec now might need more three to six months, but it would >> be worth considering what we get and lose by saving the months and breaking >> backward compatibility. >> >> Best Regards, >> Taka >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 4:14 PM Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> So, no change is OK? >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 10:01 PM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote: >> >> I also slightly prefer the merge approach. >> >> >> >> There are plusses and minuses to both. >> >> >> >> Changing again now that it is past ISEG review and backing out a Discuss >> will add another three to six months at this point, if we can get them to >> agree to the change. >> >> >> >> John B. >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019, 11:29 PM Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Correct. The WG supported the precedence approach and even merge just >> like OIDC as it is very useful from the implementation point of view and >> helps with a bunch of deployment patter. >> >> >> >> The push back came in from the Ben Campbell’s DISCUSS. >> >> See >> >> >> https://bitbucket.org/Nat/oauth-jwsreq/issues/70/bc-the-current-text-actually-specifies-the >> >> >> >> I am willing to go either way as long as people agree. My slight >> preference is to the original approach. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Nat Sakimura >> >> >> >> 2019年8月29日(木) 6:56 Brian Campbell <bcampbell= >> 40pingidentity..com@dmarc.ietf.org <40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>: >> >> FWIW, as best I can remember the change in question came as I result of >> directorate/IESG review rather than a WG decision/discussion. Which is >> likely why you can't find the "why" anywhere in the mailing list archive. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 3:23 PM Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Well it kind of blows, doesn't it? I wasn't able to find the "why" >> anywhere in the mailing list archive around the time this was changed. >> >> >> >> My take on satisfying both worlds looks like this >> >> >> >> - allow just JAR - no other params when possible. >> >> (which btw isn't possible to do with request_uri when enforcing >> client based uri whitelist and the jwsreq 5.2.2 shows as much) >> >> - enforce the "dupe behaviours" defined in OIDC (if response_type or >> client_id is in request object it must either be missing or the same in >> regular request). >> >> - allows merging request object and regular parameters with request >> object taking precedence since it is a very useful feature when having >> pre-signed request object that's not one time use and clients using it wish >> to vary state/nonce per-request. >> >> >> >> I wish the group reconsidered making this breaking change from OIDC's >> take on request objects - allow combination of parameters from the request >> object with ones from regular parameters (if not present in request object). >> >> >> S pozdravem, >> *Filip Skokan* >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, 28 Aug 2019 at 23:02, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> >> wrote: >> >> Filip, for better or worse, I believe your assessment of the situation is >> correct. I know of one AS that didn't choose which of the two to follow but >> rather implemented a bit of a hybrid where it basically ignores everything >> outside of the request object per JAR but also checks for and enforces the >> presence and value of the few regular parameters (client_id, response_type) >> that OIDC mandates. >> >> >> >> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 5:47 AM Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hello everyone, >> >> >> >> in an earlier thread I've posed the following question that might have >> gotten missed, this might have consequences for the existing >> implementations of Request Objects in OIDC implementations - its making >> pure JAR requests incompatible with OIDC Core implementations. >> >> >> >> draft 14 of jwsreq (JAR) introduced this language >> >> >> >> The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object >> duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward >> compatibility etc. >> >> *However, the authorization server supporting this specification MUST >> only use the parameters included in the request object. * >> >> >> >> Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request Object even if the >> same parameter is provided in the query parameter. The Authorization >> >> >> >> The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object >> duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward >> compatibility etc. >> >> *However, the authorization server supporting this specification MUST >> only use the parameters included in the request object.. * >> >> >> >> Nat, John, everyone - *does this mean a JAR compliant AS ignores >> everything outside of the request object while OIDC Request Object one >> merges the two with the ones in the request object being used over ones >> that are sent in clear?* The OIDC language also includes sections which >> make sure that some required arguments are still passed outside of the >> request object with the same value to make sure the request is "valid" >> OAuth 2.0 request (client_id, response_type), something which an example in >> the JAR spec does not do. Not having this language means that existing >> authorization request pipelines can't simply be extended with e.g. a >> middleware, they need to branch their codepaths. >> >> >> >> Is an AS required to choose which of the two it follows? >> >> >> >> Thank you for clarifying this in advance. I think if either the behaviour >> is the same as in OIDC or different this should be called out in the >> language to avoid confusion, especially since this already exists in OIDC >> and likely isn't going to be read in isolation, especially because the >> Request Object is even called out to be already in place in OIDC in the JAR >> draft. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> *Filip* >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and >> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s)... Any >> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. >> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender >> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from >> your computer. Thank you.* >> >> >> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and >> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any >> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.. >> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender >> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from >> your computer. Thank you.*_______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> -- >> >> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >> >> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >> http://nat.sakimura.org/ >> @_nat_en >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >> >> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >> http://nat.sakimura.org/ >> @_nat_en >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Jim Manico
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Author… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Au… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Au… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Rob Otto