Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the token endpoint

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Mon, 07 January 2019 17:22 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2019 10:21:51 -0700
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the token endpoint
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I don't honestly know for sure but I suspect that employees of big
corporations will likely have keys/certs on their devices/machines that are
issued by some internal CA and provisioned to them automatically (and in
many cases without the user knowing and/or understanding that they are
there and why). Those users would likely be prompted when TLS handshaking
with a server that presents an empty list of CAs in the
certificate_authorities of the CertificateRequest.

I dunno. Maybe I was too quick to retract the proposal for the MTLS
supporting secondary token endpoint?

What do folks (including Ben & Neil) think?

On Fri, Jan 4, 2019 at 2:55 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 03:55:15PM -0700, Brian Campbell wrote:
> > I
> > suspect that not having client certs set up is the situation for the vast
> > majority of users and their browsers. And for those that do have client
>
> Is this still true when we limit to the set of users/browsers that are
> employees of big corporations?
>
> -Ben
>
> > certs set up, I think they are more likely to be the kind of user that is
> > able to deal with the UI prompt okay.
>

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