Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the token endpoint
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 04 January 2019 21:55 UTC
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Date: Fri, 04 Jan 2019 15:55:40 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20190104215540.GL86936@kduck.kaduk.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the token endpoint
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On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 03:55:15PM -0700, Brian Campbell wrote: > > The observed behavior of the browsers surveyed seems logical and rather > reasonable (and better than the last time I futzed with it). Importantly it > means that for the situation described in the email that started this > thread (a javascript client making a fetch/XHR request to an MTLS token > endpoint), users using browsers that are not configured with, or have > access to, any client keys/certs will not see any UI prompt at all. I > suspect that not having client certs set up is the situation for the vast > majority of users and their browsers. And for those that do have client Is this still true when we limit to the set of users/browsers that are employees of big corporations? -Ben > certs set up, I think they are more likely to be the kind of user that is > able to deal with the UI prompt okay.
- [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using the … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Dave Tonge
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS and in-browser clients using … Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS and i… Brian Campbell
- [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] MTLS token endoint & discovery Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: MTLS token… Brian Campbell