Re: [OAUTH-WG] Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs spec addressing final shepherd comment

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

This draft was tossed over the fence to me, but it seems that there
may be a few open questions that remain.  Use of HSM and TPMwere
raised in this tread and not addressed in the current draft version.

Is guidance needed for nested JWTs?  If not, why?

In a separate thread, JWK is mentioned, but I'm okay with that text as
there is a reference.

I'd like to get this moving, os if we can wrap up these questions and
if anything will be done about them, it would be helpful.

Thank you,
Kathleen

On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 3:07 PM, Chuck Mortimore
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> The spec is very clear for most cases, but I think it could use some
> guidance on nested JWTs.    (Or perhaps I've got the approach wrong.)
>
> Here's the use-case:
> We have devices that are self-issuing keys.    Via token exchange, we're
> going to except a self-signed JWT from the device that includes a "cnf"
> claim of the key they generated.    Assuming the signature checks out on
> that JWT, we'll then bind that key into a "cnf" claim in a new token that we
> issue and sign with a tenant key.
>
> When the device goes to use that token, the device would sign it,
> constructing a nested JWT.  The outer signature is the proof of possession
> of the device's private key.   The inner signature is our signature that
> binds the public key used to validate the outer token.
>
> Does this sound correct?   The processing order is a bit odd since you first
> need to unpack and validate the inner token before you can validate the
> outer token.   Is there some other way this is intended to work?
>
> thanks
>
> -cmort
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 4, 2015 at 8:58 PM, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Good to know.   So the AS needs to expose a public key for the TPM to use
>> for encryption.   I am guessing you are not using a encrypted JWK for that.
>> What is the format the TPM produces the wrapped key in?
>>
>> John B.
>> > On Nov 5, 2015, at 1:55 PM, Anthony Nadalin <[e-mail]>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > I can say on all windows based devices (pc, xbox, phone, etc) with only
>> > TPM 1.1 this will be the approach so it will be commonly used
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: John Bradley [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> > Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2015 8:52 PM
>> > To: Anthony Nadalin <[e-mail]>
>> > Cc: Justin Richer <[e-mail]>; <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
>> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs spec
>> > addressing final shepherd comment
>> >
>> > OK, no good reason unless the client is using a HSM that can do HMAC and
>> > can export a symmetric key wrapped in a asymmetric key provided by the AS.
>> >
>> > We don’t currently cover that use case of sending a wrapped symmetric
>> > key to the AS in POP key distribution.
>> > I don’t know how common that is going to be, but it is worth thinking
>> > about defining.
>> >
>> > John B.
>> >
>> >> On Nov 5, 2015, at 1:45 PM, Anthony Nadalin <[e-mail]>
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Not sure why you think its weaker as it would be a wrapped key that
>> >> the hardware produces
>> >>
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: OAuth [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of John Bradley
>> >> Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2015 8:43 PM
>> >> To: Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
>> >> Cc: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
>> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs
>> >> spec addressing final shepherd comment
>> >>
>> >> In the asymmetric case the use of a HSM or secure element is the
>> >> argument for the client selecting the public key.   In those cases the
>> >> client is doing the key gen in hardware so one hopes it is OK.   In the
>> >> symetric case the client generating the key is weaker (as in I can’t think
>> >> of any really good reason).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>> On Nov 5, 2015, at 1:35 PM, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> I’d argue that it’s best practice, and in line with other parts of
>> >>> OAuth, if we assume the server generates it in the normal case (issuer ->
>> >>> presenter). Client generated token keys should be an exception, especially
>> >>> in the asymmetric case.
>> >>>
>> >>> — Justin
>> >>>
>> >>>> On Nov 5, 2015, at 1:32 PM, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Agreed the only real difference is the quality of the key.  If the
>> >>>> server generates it, then it knows that the client is not using the fixed
>> >>>> hex value of DEADBEEF for everything.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> John B.
>> >>>>> On Nov 5, 2015, at 9:25 AM, Hannes Tschofenig
>> >>>>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> I agree that the effect is the same. From a security point of view
>> >>>>> there is only an impact if one of the two parties is in a better
>> >>>>> position to generate random numbers, which is the basis for
>> >>>>> generating a high entropy symmetric key.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> On 11/04/2015 11:51 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
>> >>>>>> Thanks for the detailed read, Brian.  You’re right that in the
>> >>>>>> symmetric case, either the issuer or the presenter can create the
>> >>>>>> symmetric PoP key and share it with the other party, since the
>> >>>>>> effect is equivalent.
>> >>>>>> I suspect that both the key distribution draft and this draft
>> >>>>>> should be updated with a sentence or two saying that either
>> >>>>>> approach can be taken.  Do others concur?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>                                                        -- Mike
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> *From:*Brian Campbell [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> >>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 05, 2015 7:48 AM
>> >>>>>> *To:* Mike Jones
>> >>>>>> *Cc:* Kepeng Li; [e-mail]
>> >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for
>> >>>>>> JWTs spec addressing final shepherd comment
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> +1 for the diagrams making the document more understandable.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> One little nit/question, step 1 in both Symmetric and Asymmetric
>> >>>>>> keys shows the Presenter sending the key to the Issuer. It's
>> >>>>>> possible, however, for the key to be sent the other way. Presenter
>> >>>>>> sending it to the Issuer is probably preferred for asymmetric,
>> >>>>>> especially if the client can secure the private keys in hardware.
>> >>>>>> But I don't know if one way or the other is clearly better for
>> >>>>>> symmetric case and PoP key distribution currently has it the other
>> >>>>>> way
>> >>>>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-02%23section-4.2&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40microsoft.com%7c9456670075d04a51f85508d2e59ba294%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=UgZEoqQiaUk9VdYpSQRvUeVVOQgIUg3UmAr18oQ7GtI%3d>.
>> >>>>>> Should the intro text somehow mention the possibility that the
>> >>>>>> Issuer could create the key and send it to the Presenter?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I know it's only the introduction but it was just something that
>> >>>>>> jumped out at me.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> On Wed, Nov 4, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Mike Jones
>> >>>>>> <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>> >>>>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Thanks for suggesting the diagrams, Kepeng. They make the document
>> >>>>>> more understandable.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> -- Mike
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>>>>> -
>> >>>>>> -----
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> *From: *Kepeng Li <mailto:[e-mail]>
>> >>>>>> *Sent: *‎11/‎5/‎2015 12:57 AM
>> >>>>>> *To: *Mike Jones <mailto:[e-mail]>;
>> >>>>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>> >>>>>> *Subject: *Re: Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs spec
>> >>>>>> addressing final shepherd comment
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Thank you Mike.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> The diagrams look good to me.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Kind Regards
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Kepeng
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> *发件人**: *Mike Jones <[e-mail]
>> >>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>> >>>>>> *日期**: *Thursday, 5 November, 2015 12:32 am
>> >>>>>> *至**: *"[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]
>> >>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>> >>>>>> *抄送**: *Li Kepeng <[e-mail]
>> >>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>> >>>>>> *主题**: *Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs spec addressing
>> >>>>>> final shepherd comment
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs draft -06 addresses the
>> >>>>>> remaining document shepherd comment – adding use case diagrams to
>> >>>>>> the introduction.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> The updated specification is available at:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> ·
>> >>>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40microsoft.com%7c9456670075d04a51f85508d2e59ba294%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=6hE6dOO0I1%2ffF005rVknyOFHuB18gdpZg9dftExLtCw%3d
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> An HTML formatted version is also available at:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> ·
>> >>>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fs
>> >>>>>> e
>> >>>>>> lf-issued.info%2fdocs%2fdraft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06.ht
>> >>>>>> m
>> >>>>>> l&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40microsoft.com%7c9456670075d04a51f85508d
>> >>>>>> 2
>> >>>>>> e59ba294%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=EQd4rUcuyqdS
>> >>>>>> P gmibtcfjMpJm6RWWwCZC85%2bCboEs54%3d
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>                                                        -- Mike
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> P.S.  This note was also posted at
>> >>>>>>
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>> >>>>>> and as @selfissued
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>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
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-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen