Re: [OAUTH-WG] XARA vulnerability Paper and PKCE

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Thu, 18 June 2015 17:25 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 14:23:59 -0300
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To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] XARA vulnerability Paper and PKCE
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Passing the FB token between apps on the device is not a real use of the implicit flow, Facebook may be reusing the pattern in an insecure way.

The NAPPS WG at the OIDF recognized that was insecure a long time ago.  We are looking to use the S256 pkce transform to secure similar sorts of on device communication of code between a Oauth proxy on the device and a app.

John B.

> On Jun 18, 2015, at 12:25 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Yup. Obviously, PKCE is for Code Flow and do not deal with Implicit flow. 
> The best bet probably is stop using Implicit flow for passing tokens around among apps, unless token is capable of being sender confirmed. 
> 
> Nat
> 
> 2015-06-18 23:47 GMT+09:00 Bill Mills <wmills_92105@yahoo.com <mailto:wmills_92105@yahoo.com>>:
> PKCE solves a subset of this, but not the general case.  It doesn't solve the FB example in the paper where the FB token is passed between apps locally.
> 
> It is a clear win for the OAuth code flow for example though.
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, June 18, 2015 7:31 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com <mailto:sakimura@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi OAuthers: 
> 
> XARA (Cross App Resource Access) paper was gaining interest here in Japan today because of the Register article[1]. 
> I went over the attack description in the full paper [2]. 
> The paper presents four kinds of vulnerabilities.
> Password Stealing (Keychain)
> Container Cracking (BundleID check bug on the part of Apple App Store)
> IPC Interception (a. WebSocket non-authentication, and b. local oauth redirect) 
> Scheme Hijacking
> Of those, 3.b and 4 are relevant to us, and we kind of knew them all the way through. 
> These are the target attack that PKCE specifically wants to address, and does address, I believe. 
> 
> 
> [1] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/17/apple_hosed_boffins_drop_0day_mac_ios_research_blitzkrieg/ <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/17/apple_hosed_boffins_drop_0day_mac_ios_research_blitzkrieg/>
> [2] https://sites.google.com/site/xaraflaws/ <https://sites.google.com/site/xaraflaws/>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/ <http://nat.sakimura.org/>
> @_nat_en
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/ <http://nat.sakimura.org/>
> @_nat_en
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