Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Thu, 12 March 2020 15:31 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2020 09:31:12 -0600
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To: Joseph Heenan <joseph@authlete.com>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object
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+1 (again) that `client_id` should be allowed/required as a query parameter
outside the request object JWT or URI and that its value has to be the same
as within the request object.

On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 8:20 AM Joseph Heenan <joseph@authlete.com> wrote:

> I agree with that too.
>
> Joseph
>
> On 12 Mar 2020, at 14:18, Mike Jones <
> Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> I agree that we should restore the client_id functionality.  Thanks for
> moving this forward!
>
>                                                        -- Mike
>
> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Nat Sakimura
> *Sent:* Monday, February 24, 2020 6:18 PM
> *To:* John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> *Cc:* oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authorization
> Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object
>
> So, where should we take it to?
> Just add back client_id as it used to be?
>
> On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 6:55 AM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: *John Bradley* <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> Date: Sat, Jan 18, 2020, 9:31 PM
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authorization Request
> (JAR) vs OIDC request object
> To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
>
>
> If you put the iss in the JWE header it is integrity protected, as JWE
> only supports AAD encryption algs.
>
> It is more of a problem when the client is sending a requestURI in that
> case having the clientID in the GET to the Authorization endpoint is useful.
>
> I think there is a argument for explicitly allowing the clientID as long
> as it exactly matches the clientID in the JAR.
>
> John B.
>
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 11:53 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 08:44:18AM -0500, Justin Richer wrote:
> > I don’t agree with this stance from a security or implementation
> perspective.
> >
> > If there’s a clear order of precedence for the information, it’s not
> particularly problematic. Everything inside the request object is to be
> taken over things outside the request object. We have the exact same
> semantics and process with dynamic registration, where the software
> statement is carried alongside plain JSON claims, and the two are mixed
> with a very simple algorithm:
> >
> >  - If a field is inside the signed payload, use that value and ignore
> any copy of it on the outside
> >  - If a field is not inside the signed payload and is outside the signed
> payload, use the outside value
> >
> > Can someone please point out a concrete security issue with this
> algorithm? This is the extent of the “merge” semantics that we need here,
> and it would solve not only the ability to use this for use cases that call
> for a more static request object (perhaps signed by a third party and not
> the client) along side the plain parameters that can vary, but also the
> backwards compatibility issue that’s been discussed. With this algorithm in
> place, you could have OIDC clients actually be compliant with the spec,
> since OIDC requires replication of the values inside the request object on
> the outside with exact matches. An OIDC server wouldn’t be fully compliant
> with the new spec since it would reject some compliant JAR requests that
> are missing the external parameters, but that’s fairly easy logic to add on
> the OIDC side. And in that case you get a matrix of compatibility like:
>
> I agree that the merge algorithm is simple and fairly straightforward to
> implement.  But, as Joseph has been alluding, it's only simple if you've
> already made the decision to use all the parameters, both from inside and
> from outside the signed payload.  The security risk lies about having to
> make the trust decision twice, more than the mundane details of actually
> doing the merge.  (Though there is still some latent risk, given that we've
> seen some really crazy quality of implementation out there.)
>
> It's certainly *possible* that things end up fine in many well-deliniated
> cases where merging can be used.  But it's more complicated to reason
> about, and I don't remmber seeing much previous discussion about the
> specifics of the double trust decision.
>
> -Ben
>
> >
> >               JAR Server | OIDC Server  |
> > ------------+------------+--------------+
> > JAR Client  |     YES    |      NO      |
> > OIDC Client |     YES    |     YES      |
> >
> > Breaking one out of the four possible combinations in a very predictable
> way is, I think, the best way to handle backwards compatibility here.
> >
> > But between this issue and JAR’s problematic call for the value of a
> request_uri to always be a JWT and be fetchable by the AS (neither of which
> are true in the case of PAR) makes me think we need to pull this back and
> rework those things, in a push back to the IESG’s comments.
> >
> >  — Justin
> >
> >
> > > On Jan 16, 2020, at 7:38 PM, Joseph Heenan <joseph@authlete.com>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > I agree with this, particularly the security concerns of merging. If
> we merge, we can much guarantee there will eventually be a security issue
> where an attacker is able to gain an advantage by adding a parameter to the
> url query (which the server would then happily process if that parameter
> isn’t found inside the request object). Ruling out that case makes security
> analysis (particularly when creating new OAuth2 parameters) significantly
> simpler.
> > >
> > > Putting the iss in the JWE header and having the client_id duplicated
> outside the request object seem to address all the concerns I’ve seen
> raised.
> > >
> > > (It seems like it may be unnecessary to have the client_id duplicated
> outside if the request_uri is a PAR one though.)
> > >
> > > Joseph
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >> On 16 Jan 2020, at 22:40, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> I agree with the IESG reasoning that merging is problimatic.  Once we
> > >> allow that given a unknown list of possible paramaters with diffrent
> > >> security properties it would be quite difficult to specify safely.
> > >>
> > >> Query paramaters can still be sent outside the JAR, but if they are in
> > >> the OAuth registry the AS MUST ignore them.
> > >>
> > >> Puting the iss in the JWE headder addresses the encryption issue
> without
> > >> merging.
> > >>
> > >> I understand that some existing servers have dependencys on getting
> the
> > >> clientID as a query paramater.
> > >>
> > >> Is that the only paramater that people have a issue with as oposed to
> a
> > >> nice to have?
> > >>
> > >> Would allowing the AS to not ignore the clientID as a query paramater
> as
> > >> long as it matches the one inside the JAR, basicly the same as Connect
> > >> request object but for just the one paramater make life easier for the
> > >> servers?
> > >>
> > >> I am not promising a change but gathering info before proposing
> something.
> > >>
> > >> John B.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On 1/16/2020 1:53 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > >>> On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 11:02:33PM +0200, Vladimir Dzhuvinov wrote:
> > >>>> On 14/01/2020 19:20, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
> > >>>>> Well, embedding a client_id claim in the JWE header in order to
> > >>>>> achieve "request parameters outside the request object should not
> be
> > >>>>> referred to" is like "putting the cart before the horse". Why do we
> > >>>>> have to avoid using the traditional client_id request parameter so
> > >>>>> stubbornly?
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> The last paragraph of Section 3.2.1
> > >>>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Frfc6749%23section-3.2.1&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7C35a13327b6124e254aa708d7b998f935%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637181938986096572&sdata=m6%2BaTTp1bBtLcoJ883HIFFg5OPqcqW9Mo%2B8ennoFgaM%3D&reserved=0>>
> of RFC 6749 says
> > >>>>> as follows.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>   /A client MAY use the "client_id" request parameter to identify
> > >>>>>   itself when sending requests to the token endpoint.  In the
> > >>>>>   "authorization_code" "grant_type" request to the token endpoint,
> > >>>>>   *an unauthenticated client MUST send its "client_id" to prevent
> > >>>>>   itself from inadvertently accepting a code intended for a client
> > >>>>>   with a different "client_id".*  This protects the client from
> > >>>>>   substitution of the authentication code.  (It provides no
> > >>>>>   additional security for the protected resource.)/
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> If the same reasoning applies, a client_id must always be sent with
> > >>>>> request / request_uri because client authentication is not
> performed
> > >>>>> at the authorization endpoint. In other words, */an unauthenticated
> > >>>>> client (every client is unauthenticated at the authorization
> endpoint)
> > >>>>> MUST send its "client_id" to prevent itself from inadvertently
> > >>>>> accepting a request object for a client with a different
> "client_id"./*
> > >>>>>
> > >>>> Identifying the client in JAR request_uri requests can be really
> useful
> > >>>> so that an AS which requires request_uri registration to prevent
> DDoS
> > >>>> attacks and other checks can do those without having to index all
> > >>>> request_uris individually. I mentioned this before.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> I really wonder what the reasoning of the IESG reviewers was to
> insist
> > >>>> on no params outside the JAR JWT / request_uri.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> I'm beginning to realise this step of the review process isn't
> > >>>> particularly transparent to WG members.
> > >>> Could you expand on that a bit more?  My understanding is that the
> IESG
> > >>> ballot mail gets copied to the WG precisely so that there is
> transparency,
> > >>> e.g., the thread starting at
> > >>>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/lkOhwiDj_hCI55BQRdiR9R0JwgI
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmailarchive.ietf.org%2Farch%2Fmsg%2Foauth%2FlkOhwiDj_hCI55BQRdiR9R0JwgI&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7C35a13327b6124e254aa708d7b998f935%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637181938986106566&sdata=lkS8YioL8fTeiuLU%2F2MzebzCB%2FA%2FPPy%2Fl1Wi%2BLFKCFE%3D&reserved=0>
> > >>> Which admittely is from almost three years ago, but that's the
> earliest
> > >>> that I found that could be seen as the source of this behavior.
> > >>>
> > >>> -Ben
> > >>>
> > >>> P.S. some other discussion at
> > >>>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/-tUrNY1X9eI_tQGI8T-IGx4xHy8
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmailarchive.ietf.org%2Farch%2Fmsg%2Foauth%2F-tUrNY1X9eI_tQGI8T-IGx4xHy8&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7C35a13327b6124e254aa708d7b998f935%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637181938986106566&sdata=QNpyHqv10Dfu9MQzkhVs%2By23ShloRw9GIbn8%2B6pvigo%3D&reserved=0>
>  and
> > >>>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/Uke1nxRlgx62EJLevZgpWCz_UwY
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmailarchive.ietf.org%2Farch%2Fmsg%2Foauth%2FUke1nxRlgx62EJLevZgpWCz_UwY&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7C35a13327b6124e254aa708d7b998f935%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637181938986116568&sdata=JTvXisbbmnXSpNRFJQkEKvO%2BkXiLdtEr%2FoH8obLtlo8%3D&reserved=0>
>  and
> > >>> so on.
> > >>>
> > >>> _______________________________________________
> > >>> OAuth mailing list
> > >>> OAuth@ietf.org
> > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Foauth&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7C35a13327b6124e254aa708d7b998f935%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637181938986126557&sdata=I5KDQT%2BdT0lapMOr71odsiCRrZ7csVZMuaYnMzsWwhM%3D&reserved=0>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> OAuth mailing list
> > >> OAuth@ietf.org
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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> > >
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> >
>
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> --
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
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