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Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Wed, 24 March 2010 06:17 UTC

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Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 07:17:48 +0100
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Hi Brian,

thanks for the clarification. Should the WG document this kind of 
security design decisions somewhere?

regards,
Torsten.
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon<recordond@gmail.com>  wrote:
>    
>>> ยง3
>>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing access
>>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (possess) a
>>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens? I
>>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>>>        
>> It shouldn't be required.  Fixed!
>> http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dcfec0127a11fe00
>>      
> It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
> server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised.  You rotate the
> client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.
>
> Please add it back. =)
>

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