Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object
Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> Mon, 06 January 2020 09:43 UTC
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From: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 10:43:19 +0100
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To: n-sakimura <n-sakimura@nri.co.jp>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Nat Sakimura <nat.sakimura@oidf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object
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I don't think we have the separation of OAuth and non-OAuth parameters and let's please not. Even OIDC parameters are part of the OAuth parameters registry <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#parameters> and I cannot imagine the hardship if we were to explain that to developers. With passing time I believe it should be up to the profile or application of JAR to define how to treat *recognized* parameters outside of the request object. In my personal OSS project the AS can be configured to be *strict* (jar), *lax* (oidc merge all) or *whitelist* (merge only whitelisted - code_challenge, nonce, state, ...) similar to what Vladimir is describing. S pozdravem, *Filip Skokan* On Mon, 6 Jan 2020 at 07:05, n-sakimura <n-sakimura@nri.co.jp> wrote: > Up until -12 (Feb 13, 2017), it was using merge + JAR precedence if > duplicated. > > As of -13 (Mar 30, 2017), it was changed that the server does not have to > do the merge, at least for OAuth Authorization request parameters. It says > nothing about other parameters. > > As of -14 (Jul 21, 2017), the wording was further strengthened by adding > > > > The Authorization Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request > Object even if the same parameter is provided in the query parameter. > > > > So, the entire 6.3 now became > 6.3 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-20#section-6.3>. > Request Parameter Assembly and Validation > > The Authorization Server MUST extract the set of Authorization > > Request parameters from the Request Object value. The Authorization > > Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request Object even if the > > same parameter is provided in the query parameter. The Authorization > > Server then validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 > > [RFC6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>]. > > > > It says nothing on the non-OAuth parameters that came with the > authorization request. > > My take on the text is that all OAuth Authorization Request parameters > MUST be in the request object. > > Behaviors towards other parameters that happens to have come together with > the authorization request outside of request object will be treated as > non-OAuth parameters. > > > > Nat Sakimura > > Research Fellow, Nomura Research Institute > > E: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp > > T: +81(90)60136276 > > --------------------------------------------------------- > > PLEASE READ:This e-mail is confidential and intended for the named > recipient only. > > If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete > this e-mail. > > > > *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Justin Richer > *Sent:* Friday, January 3, 2020 2:35 AM > *To:* Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> > *Cc:* Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; oauth > <oauth@ietf.org>; Nat Sakimura <nat.sakimura@oidf.org> > *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC > request object > > > > For solution [2], this is the behavior that’s required for OIDC today, so > I would say that’s the New Client behaving like an Old Client in order to > talk to an Old Server. So in reality, (2) causes the request to be > rejected, and that’s OK. > > > > I don’t think it’s viable to require parameters to exist inside the > request object at all times. Nor should we try to enumerate which > parameters go inside and outside at all times — at least from the JAR/OAuth > level of things. I think there are too many things that are application and > deployment specific for us to make this call. The very nature of the > request object changes for people — some have a static object that’s > deployed with clients and some have something that the client creates at > runtime for each request. > > > > If the instead the New Server requires that any parameters duplicated > between the two places have to match (the OIDC method) or that in a > conflict the request object values take precedence (the merge method), then > problems 3-1 and 3-2 go away. > > > > With the merge-and-precedence behavior, which is what I thought that JAR > had during WGLC, [3-1] is well-defined. The request is processed the same > way every time because this is a New Server. The client is going to do > OIDC’s “duplicate” method, so “merge with precedence” is effectively a > no-op. > > > > With the merge-and-precedence behavior, [3-2] doesn’t happen because the > required parameters aren’t required to be in the request object itself. As > long as the request object is valid, it protects all parameters within it. > I don’t think it’s up to us to determine what makes sense to put in that > object. Security guidance is probably a good idea here. > > > > Solution [3] is what Old Clients already do in OIDC today, so that’s what > already happens and why problem space (3) isn’t a problem. > > > > — Justin > > > > On Jan 2, 2020, at 12:24 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> wrote: > > > > Thank you, Justin. Actually, I wanted to see someone write a summary about > what happens in each combination from a viewpoint of both RP and AS with > regard to backward compatibility (as I told you in other channel just > before you posted your email ^_^). > > So, > > *(1) New Client + New Server* > No problem will happen. > > *(2) New Client + Old Server* > *[Problem 2-1]* If an authorization request contains 'request' or > 'request_uri' but doesn't have old mandatory request parameters > ('client_id' and 'response_type') outside the request object, the request > is rejected. > > *[Solution 2]* New Client should include the old mandatory request > parameters duplicately outside the request object. This means that New > Client should always send old mandatory request parameters duplicately > outside the request object if it wants to get maximum compatibility. > > *(3) Old Client + New Server* > *[Problem 3-1]* If an authorization request contains 'request' or > 'request_uri' and some "optional" request parameters are not included in > the request object, AS will interpret the request differently. Imagine what > happens when optional parameters such as 'scope', 'state', 'nonce', > 'redirect_uri', 'response_mode', 'max_age', 'acr_values', 'code_challenge', > 'code_challenge_method' and 'prompt' are not included in the request object > but present outside the request object. > > *[Problem 3-2]* If an authorization request contains 'request' or > 'request_uri' and some "mandatory" request parameters ('client_id' and > 'response_type') are not included in the request object, the request is > rejected. > > *[Solution 3]* Old Client should include all request parameters > duplicately in the request object. This means that Old Client should always > include all request parameters duplicately in the request object if it > wants to get maximum compatibility. > > *(4) Old Client + Old Server* > No problem will happen. > > - - - > > > From a Client's point of view, for maximum compatibility, both Old and New > Clients should put mandatory request parameters outside the request object > and put all request parameters duplicately inside the request object. > > [Problem 3-1] is difficult to detect because the authorization request is > not rejected. But, if New Server requires that all request parameters > outside the request object be put inside the request object duplicately, > [Problem 3-1] is handled as an error and thus client developers can detect > the problem. > > Consequently, introducing the following requirement in "FAPI Part 2, 5.2.2 > <https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-part-2-ID2.html#authorization-server>, > 10" to JAR seems a good compromise (as I told before) > > shall require that all parameters are present inside the signed request > object passed in the request or request_uri parameter; > > > instead of just saying "the authorization server supporting this > specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request object." > which will bring about [Problem 3-1]. That is, how about adding a rule like > "if request parameters exist outside the request object, they must exist > inside the request object, too."? > > Any thoughts? > > > > Best, > > Taka > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 3, 2020 at 12:48 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: > > I think the nature of the backwards incompatibility is important here. The > way that things are now, using merge-with-precedence, you have the > following matrix of compatibility: > > > > > > New Server | Old Server | > > -----------+-------------+--------------+ > > New Client | YES | NO | > > Old Client | YES | YES | > > > > > > If you ask me, this is the right balance for a breaking change. Old > clients, where the vast majority of the code is, don’t have to change. New > clients can only talk to servers with the new features, which is the > ability to drop parameters from the external request. This would apply to > both OIDC and plain OAuth. > > > > I think we should follow this kind of pattern in the discussions on OAuth > 2.1, which I think JAR should be a part of/ > > > > — Justin > > > > > > > > On Jan 2, 2020, at 3:40 AM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> wrote: > > > > Breaking backward compatibility in this part would mean that OpenID > Certification given to AS implementations with request_uri support will be > invalidated once they support JAR. It also would mean that test cases in > the official conformance suite need to be changed in a > backward-incompatible manner, which would implicitly encourage that all > certified implementations should re-try to get certification. > > Changing the spec now might need more three to six months, but it would be > worth considering what we get and lose by saving the months and breaking > backward compatibility. > > Best Regards, > Taka > > > > On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 4:14 PM Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote: > > So, no change is OK? > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 10:01 PM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote: > > I also slightly prefer the merge approach. > > > > There are plusses and minuses to both. > > > > Changing again now that it is past ISEG review and backing out a Discuss > will add another three to six months at this point, if we can get them to > agree to the change. > > > > John B. > > > > On Tue, Dec 10, 2019, 11:29 PM Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote: > > Correct. The WG supported the precedence approach and even merge just like > OIDC as it is very useful from the implementation point of view and helps > with a bunch of deployment patter. > > > > The push back came in from the Ben Campbell’s DISCUSS. > > See > > > https://bitbucket.org/Nat/oauth-jwsreq/issues/70/bc-the-current-text-actually-specifies-the > > > > I am willing to go either way as long as people agree. My slight > preference is to the original approach. > > > > Best, > > > > Nat Sakimura > > > > 2019年8月29日(木) 6:56 Brian Campbell <bcampbell= > 40pingidentity..com@dmarc.ietf.org <40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>: > > FWIW, as best I can remember the change in question came as I result of > directorate/IESG review rather than a WG decision/discussion. Which is > likely why you can't find the "why" anywhere in the mailing list archive. > > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 3:23 PM Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote: > > Well it kind of blows, doesn't it? I wasn't able to find the "why" > anywhere in the mailing list archive around the time this was changed. > > > > My take on satisfying both worlds looks like this > > > > - allow just JAR - no other params when possible. > > (which btw isn't possible to do with request_uri when enforcing client > based uri whitelist and the jwsreq 5.2.2 shows as much) > > - enforce the "dupe behaviours" defined in OIDC (if response_type or > client_id is in request object it must either be missing or the same in > regular request). > > - allows merging request object and regular parameters with request object > taking precedence since it is a very useful feature when having pre-signed > request object that's not one time use and clients using it wish to vary > state/nonce per-request. > > > > I wish the group reconsidered making this breaking change from OIDC's take > on request objects - allow combination of parameters from the request > object with ones from regular parameters (if not present in request object). > > > S pozdravem, > *Filip Skokan* > > > > > > On Wed, 28 Aug 2019 at 23:02, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> > wrote: > > Filip, for better or worse, I believe your assessment of the situation is > correct. I know of one AS that didn't choose which of the two to follow but > rather implemented a bit of a hybrid where it basically ignores everything > outside of the request object per JAR but also checks for and enforces the > presence and value of the few regular parameters (client_id, response_type) > that OIDC mandates. > > > > On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 5:47 AM Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hello everyone, > > > > in an earlier thread I've posed the following question that might have > gotten missed, this might have consequences for the existing > implementations of Request Objects in OIDC implementations - its making > pure JAR requests incompatible with OIDC Core implementations. > > > > draft 14 of jwsreq (JAR) introduced this language > > > > The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object > duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward > compatibility etc. > > *However, the authorization server supporting this specification MUST only > use the parameters included in the request object. * > > > > Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request Object even if the > same parameter is provided in the query parameter. The Authorization > > > > The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object > duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward > compatibility etc. > > *However, the authorization server supporting this specification MUST only > use the parameters included in the request object.. * > > > > Nat, John, everyone - *does this mean a JAR compliant AS ignores > everything outside of the request object while OIDC Request Object one > merges the two with the ones in the request object being used over ones > that are sent in clear?* The OIDC language also includes sections which > make sure that some required arguments are still passed outside of the > request object with the same value to make sure the request is "valid" > OAuth 2.0 request (client_id, response_type), something which an example in > the JAR spec does not do. Not having this language means that existing > authorization request pipelines can't simply be extended with e.g. a > middleware, they need to branch their codepaths. > > > > Is an AS required to choose which of the two it follows? > > > > Thank you for clarifying this in advance. I think if either the behaviour > is the same as in OIDC or different this should be called out in the > language to avoid confusion, especially since this already exists in OIDC > and likely isn't going to be read in isolation, especially because the > Request Object is even called out to be already in place in OIDC in the JAR > draft. > > > > Best, > > *Filip* > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and > privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s)... Any > review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. > If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender > immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from > your computer. Thank you.* > > > *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and > privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any > review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.. > If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender > immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from > your computer. Thank you.*_______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > -- > > Nat Sakimura (=nat) > > Chairman, OpenID Foundation > http://nat.sakimura.org/ > @_nat_en > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > > -- > > Nat Sakimura (=nat) > > Chairman, OpenID Foundation > http://nat.sakimura.org/ > @_nat_en > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Takahiko Kawasaki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Jim Manico
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authori… Neil Madden
- [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Author… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Au… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Joseph Heenan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Au… Filip Skokan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request … Rob Otto