[OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on verifiable human mandates for autonomous agent actions
Mohamad Khalil Yossif <mohamad@yuthent.com> Wed, 22 July 2026 13:05 UTC
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From: Mohamad Khalil Yossif <mohamad@yuthent.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 16:02:06 +0300
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To: george@practicalidentity.com
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on verifiable human mandates for autonomous agent actions
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George, Thanks - that was the right pointer. I have now read the "Power of Attorney" series and the Mission-Bound OAuth notes. Karl is working the same gap the problem statement describes, and the framing there is farther along than any single artifact I had cited. -01 will treat that line of work as primary related work. That said, the problem this draft is scoped to is a narrower and distinct one, and I think worth separating on the list rather than folding in. The angle here is regulated action authorization: environments where an auditor, regulator, or dispute process needs to verify, after the fact and without trusting the runtime that executed, that a specific human authorized this specific action with these specific parameters at the moment it happened. Payments under PSD2 SCA dynamic linking is the canonical case. Agentic transactions and high-consequence AI agent actions inherit the same requirement. Two properties define that scope and are load-bearing for it: First, the constraint set is signed directly by the human with a hardware-bound key gated by user verification, not issued by an authority service that references the human in a claim. The principal is the signer, not a subject of issuance. That is what makes the artifact meet an evidence bar rather than a governance bar. Second, each authorized action produces a signed evidence artifact bound to the exact payload that executed and to the mandate it was verified against, independently verifiable by a third party without access to server logs. This is what draft-yossif-psea profiles at T1. The mandate draft is the T0 counterpart against which that evidence is verified. Mission-Bound OAuth is solving the enterprise IAM lifecycle problem - should this execution still be running - and doing so at the governance layer. This draft is solving the regulated evidence-of-authorization problem - can a third party later verify that this action was authorized by this human. Different trust root, different output artifact, different consumer. Complementary, not competing. - Mohamad > On 22 Jul 2026, at 15:41, george@practicalidentity.com wrote: > > I would highly recommend looking at Karl McGuinness’s mission bound authorization work as it addresses this problem space. > > https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization > > > -- > George Fletcher > Practical Identity LLC > >> On Jul 22, 2026, at 2:32 PM, Mohamad Khalil Yossif <mohamad=40yuthent.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >> >> Hi all, >> >> I have submitted draft-yossif-agent-mandate-problem-00, a short >> problem statement. No protocol, no mechanism. >> >> The problem: a human authorizes intent at T0, an autonomous agent >> executes a specific parameterized action at T1, and nothing >> cryptographically binds the executed parameters to the constraints >> the human actually signed. OAuth scopes are static and session-bound, >> audit logs are self-asserted after the fact, and existing >> mandate-style work is payments-scoped. The draft states the gap and >> the requirements any general solution would need to meet. >> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yossif-agent-mandate-problem/ >> >> Given the WG charter now covers authorization for automated agents, >> I would welcome feedback on the problem definition itself: is it >> stated at the right level, and is anything missing from the >> requirements? >> >> Mohamad Khalil Yossif >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-leave@ietf.org
- [OAUTH-WG] New I-D: Problem statement on verifiab… Mohamad Khalil Yossif
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… george
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Mohamad Khalil Yossif
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Blake Morrison
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Mohamad Khalil Yossif
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Blake Morrison
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Mohamad Khalil Yossif
- [OAUTH-WG] New I-D: Problem statement on verifiab… Blake Morrison
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… morganLR
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Blake Morrison
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Brian Vicente
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Blake Morrison
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Mohamad Khalil Yossif
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… morganLR
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: Problem statement on veri… Kieran Sweeney