Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection
torsten@lodderstedt.net Mon, 09 May 2016 05:46 UTC
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Date: Mon, 09 May 2016 07:45:51 +0200
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From: torsten@lodderstedt.net
To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection
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Are you suggesting OAuth should defeat maleware? So far, this was considered to be handled by OS/Anti-Virus/other measures. -------- Originalnachricht -------- Betreff: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Von: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> An: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>,"<oauth@ietf.org>" <oauth@ietf.org> >Yes, and unfortunately, that is a rather common attack these days. >Infesting a user device with a malware is probably easier than having the >client developer register its client to unknown server. > >2016年5月1日(日) 16:54 Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>: > >> Hi Nat, >> >> please explain the attack. I assume the attacker would need to control >> network transmission or client device. >> >> kind regards, >> Torsten. >> >> Am 01.05.2016 um 07:36 schrieb Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>: >> >> It actually depends on what risk level the transaction is at. For low risk >> transactions, just having separate redirection endpoint may be adequate. On >> the other hand, I can easily think of an attack that replaces iss on the >> authz response making the control invalid posing questions on whether it is >> worth introducing it. >> On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 14:21 Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> I agree that we’re getting dangerously close to recommending signed >>> assertions at every step of the process, thereby bypassing HTTP. This was >>> the same mistake that WS-* and SOAP made, let’s not repeat it if we can. >>> >>> — Justin >>> >>> On Apr 30, 2016, at 10:57 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt < >>> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Nat, >>> >>> sure, one could also authenticate and cryptographically protect the >>> redirect response. Leveraging OIDC concepts is an idea worth considering >>> but they should be adopted to the OAuth philosophy. The id token as used in >>> the hybrid flows mixes an identity assertion with elements of transport >>> security measures. A OAuth AS does not provide identity data to clients, so >>> we only need the transport security part. >>> >>> I personally would prefer a OAuth response object (similar to request >>> object you have proposed) over the id token. Such a response object could >>> contain (and directly protect) state, code and other response values. I >>> consider this the more elegant design and it is easier to implement then >>> having detached signatures over hash values of codes or access tokens. >>> Moreover, it would allow to encrypt the response as well. >>> >>> Generally, our threat analysis so far does not have provided >>> justification for cryptographically protected redirect responses. All >>> proposals currently on the table stop mix up and code injection using >>> simpler mechanisms. >>> >>> I think OAuth 2.0 is a huge success due to its balance of versatility, >>> security and _simplicity_. We definitely need to keep it secure, but we >>> should also keep it as simple as possible. >>> >>> kind regards, >>> Torsten. >>> Am 29.04.2016 um 10:08 schrieb Nat Sakimura: >>> >>> As I look at it more and more, it started to look like the problem of >>> accepting tainted values without message authentication. To fix the root >>> cause, we would have to authenticate response. ID Token was designed to >>> also serve as a solution anticipating it. >>> >>> Any concrete ideas? >>> >>> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 04:47 Torsten Lodderstedt < >>> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi all, >>>> >>>> discussion about Mix-Up and CnP seems to have stopped after the session >>>> in BA - at least in the OAuth WG. There is a discussion about >>>> mitigations in OpenId Connect going on at the OpenId Connect mailing >>>> list. >>>> >>>> I'm very much interested to find a solution within the OAuth realm as >>>> I'm not interested to either implement two solutions (for OpenId Connect >>>> and OAuth) or adopt a OpenId-specific solution to OAuth (use id! tokens >>>> in the front channel). I therefore would like to see progress and >>>> propose to continue the discussion regarding mitigations for both >>>> threats. >>>> >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00 >>>> proposes reasonable mitigations for both attacks. There are alternatives >>>> as well: >>>> - mix up: >>>> -- AS specific redirect uris >>>> -- Meta data/turi >>>> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-07#section-5) >>>> - CnP: >>>> -- use of the nonce parameter (as a distinct mitigation beside state for >>>> counter XSRF) >>>> >>>> Anyone having an opinion? >>>> >>>> best regards, >>>> Torsten. >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> >>> -- >Nat Sakimura >Chairman of the Board, OpenID Foundation >Trustee, Kantara Initiative >
- [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection torsten
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection torsten
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection torsten
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Antonio Sanso
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Nat Sakimura