Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> Thu, 16 January 2020 16:55 UTC
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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 11:55:05 -0500
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References: <CAD9ie-vRsL9ey2LDNoaWkapRUewS_c1S0r3QCcqJLmJ5KqKsGw@mail.gmail.com> <5F7A3816-AC9B-4BA2-9D91-CF89109B6788@forgerock.com> <CAD9ie-uebUCw5vxELPXQvQSY3Z3T2dNJGOpzEQ8cMgZcCOu+tg@mail.gmail.com> <79DF80DA-6682-4F25-A02A-B4137053FD8A@mit.edu> <6fab97c9-e9bb-58f8-ba14-22307e35bfcf@connect2id.com>
To: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
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Well that’s what I’m saying — we could have had restrictions within JWK (and maybe even a different syntax) that would guarantee a unique key ID, as well as ways to talk about it from the outside. — Justin > On Jan 15, 2020, at 3:53 PM, Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote: > > On 14/01/2020 04:25, Justin Richer wrote: >> It would’ve been nice if JWK could’ve agreed on a URL-based addressing >> format for individual keys within the set, but that ship’s sailed. > > For querying / selecting JWKs from a set this would have been a useful > addition to the spec. > > But I don't see how such an URL can help us to identify a single JWK in > a set, given the possibility to have multiple JWKs with the same "kid". > > I.e. if we do "https://example.com/jwks.json?kid=xyz", there is no > guarantee for a single key. Even if we add additional query params, like > use, alg, etc, none of them guarantees a unique JWK identification. > > I like the utility of that though. > > Vladimir > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [UNVERIFIE… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [UNVERIFIE… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Manger, James
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… John Bradley