Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice"

Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu> Fri, 08 November 2019 13:37 UTC

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From: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
Date: Fri, 08 Nov 2019 14:37:18 +0100
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To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice"
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screenshot...

Hans.

On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 2:13 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:

> Hello Hans,
>
> You wrote:
>
> one client can always share the protected data with another client once
> retrieved, regardless of pop or secure elements
>
> No, there exist means that prevent a client to share the protected data
> with another client , simply because the client cannot access to it.
> The protected data is placed inside the secure element and thus a client
> has no way to extract it for the benefit of another client.
>
> The protected data is used by the secure element in such a way so that it
> cannot be used for the benefit of another user.
>
> But we are already in the field of the solutions and no more in the field
> of the requirements.
>
> Denis
>
>
> Hans.
>
> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:38 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
>
>> Daniel,
>>
>> No. It is not a correct summary. One client can allow another client to
>> get an access token that belongs to it.
>> The key point is that a software only solution can't prevent this
>> collaborative attack and since, at this time,
>> the OAuth WG is not considering the use of secure elements, the attack
>> cannot be countered.
>>
>> Please have a look at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg16767.html
>>
>> Denis
>>
>>
>> Hi Denis,
>>
>> Am 07.11.19 um 09:16 schrieb Denis:
>>
>>
>>        *Whatever kind of cryptographic is being used, when two users
>> collaborate, a software-only solution will be unable to prevent the
>> transmission *
>> *       of an attribute of a user that possess it to another user that
>> does not possess it. *
>>
>> To stay in OAuth lingo, what you are saying is: Two collaborating clients
>> can exchange their access tokens and use them.
>>
>> Is that a correct summary of your attack?
>>
>> -Daniel
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
> --
> hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu
> ZmartZone IAM - www.zmartzone.eu
>
>
>

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