[OAUTH-WG] Review draft-ietf-oauth-spop-00

[Eduardo Gueiros <[e-mail]>]

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Review of draft-ietf-oauth-spop-00

Gentleman, here are some notes on the OAuth SPOP Draft.


Review Summary

A few grammar errors, no major flaws, some suggestions that could
possibly make some passages clearer. Some questions as well.
Also, providing a flow diagram would help clarify some of the
interactions.

Abstract

> The OAuth 2.0 public client utilizing authorization code grant is 
> susceptible to the code interception attack.

Suggestion for clearer reading:
OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing Authorization Code Grant (RFC 6749
- - 4.1) are susceptible to an interception attack.

Introduction

Suggestion for clearer reading:
> Public clients in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] is susceptible to the "code" 
> interception attack.  The "code" interception attack is an attack 
> that a malicious client intercepts the "code" returned from the 
> authorization endpoint and uses it to obtain the access token.

Public clients utilizing OAuth 2.0 are susceptible to authorization
code interception attack. A malicious client intercepts the
authorization code returned from the authorization endpoint and uses
it to obtain the access token.

Suggestion for clearer reading:
> This is especially true on some smartphone platform in which the
"code" is
> returned to a redirect URI with a custom scheme as there can be 
> multiple apps that can register the same scheme.

This is especially true on smartphones applications where the
authorization code can be returned
through custom URL Schemes where the same scheme can be registered by
multiple applications.

Insert article before ‘dynamic’
> To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes dynamically
> created cryptographically random key called 'code verifier'.

To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes a dynamically created
cryptographically random key called 'code verifier'.

Missing commas for context
> The code verifier is created for every authorization request and
> its transformed value called code challenge is sent to the
> authorization server to obtain the authorization code.

The code verifier is created for every authorization request and its
transformed value, called code challenge, is sent to the authorization
server to obtain the authorization code.

2 Terminology
2.1
Question
Random String: What constitutes ‘big enough entropy’? Shouldn’t
minimum length be specified (e.g. 32 characters)?

3 Protocol
3.1
Question
This paragraph states that the client must, through some mechanism,
verify if the server supports this specification. Shouldn’t this
mechanism be part of OAuth and therefore have an specification
document on how to implement and perform the aforementioned verification?

Suggestion: Change MUST to SHOULD
> The client that wishes to use this specification MUST stop
> proceeding if the server does not support this extension.

I think a client can use this mechanism to implement a more secure
transaction, but by verifying it, the client can be configured to
continue performing the regular authorization grant if it chooses so.
Hence, SHOULD instead of MUST.


3.3
Question
Goes with question on 2.1, why less than 128 bytes?

Suggestion
> string of length less than 128 bytes
string of length no less than 128 bytes


Eduardo Gueiros
Software Developer | Jive.com
Jive Communications, Inc | egueiros at jive.com
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