Re: [OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Thu, 12 March 2020 19:39 UTC

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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2020 20:39:20 +0100
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Cc: Vittorio Bertocci <Vittorio=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
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To: Pedro Igor Silva <psilva@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1
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Is that a public client?

> Am 12.03.2020 um 20:32 schrieb Pedro Igor Silva <psilva@redhat.com>om>:
> 
> 
> I agree with you and recently, we had to deal with an issue where a `web application` using rotation (as defined by the draft) was having issues to refresh tokens due to multiple concurrent requests at the moment a token is about to expire or already expired. We had to add some controls to deal with concurrency and additional complexity + performance penalties. And for such clients, I was not sure whether or not rotation makes sense.
> 
>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 4:05 PM Vittorio Bertocci <Vittorio=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> Thanks for the clarification, Torsten.
>> I believe it's the first time I see use of client credentials positioned as sender constraint; if the intent is saying that confidential clients should use their credentials when redeeming refresh tokens, I am of course in agreement but I think the language should be clearer and state the above explicitly.
>> 
>> Re: failure frequency, I know of scenarios were the designers added rotation by default, and after a while it was turned to opt in because of the frequency of errors and impact on user experience/call center.
>> I really believe that putting this as a MUST is justified only for exceedingly vulnerable situations, like SPAs.
>> Native/desktop clients should be free to decide whether they want to opt in without loosing compliance. Just my 2 C
>> 
>>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 11:58 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>> 
>>> sender constraining refresh tokens for confidential client means client authentication + check the binding of the refresh token with the respective client id. I don’t think this is new as RFC6759 already required ASs to check this binding. Assuming backends are generally confidential clients also means no rotation and no cache synchronization needed.
>>> 
>>> Rotation should be used for frontends, e.g. native apps and only if there is there no other option. If a refresh fails, the app must go through the authorization process again. That’s inconvenient so the question is how often this happens. What I can say, I have never seen customer complaining in several years of operation of ASs with refresh token rotation (including replay detection) for native apps with millions of users.
>>> 
>>> best regards,
>>> Torsten.
>>> 
>>>>> Am 12.03..2020 um 19:24 schrieb Vittorio Bertocci <Vittorio=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>rg>:
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Hey guys,
>>>> thanks for putting this together.
>>>> I am concerned with the real world impact of imposing sender constraint | rotation as a MUST on refresh tokens in every scenario.
>>>> Sender constraint isn't immediately actionable - we just had the discussion for dPOP, hence I won't go in the details here.
>>>> Rotation isn't something that can be added without significant impact on development and runtime experiences:
>>>> on distributed scenarios, it introduces the need to serialize access to shared caches
>>>> network failures can lead to impact on experience- stranding clients which fail to receive RTn+1 during RTn redemption in a limbo where user interaction might become necessary, disrupting experience or functionality for scenarios where the user isn't available to respond.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 5:28 PM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki..com> wrote:
>>>>> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first
>>>>> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on
>>>>> the list and incorporated that into the draft.
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01
>>>>> 
>>>>> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be
>>>>> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below.
>>>>> 
>>>>> > This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749),
>>>>> > OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange
>>>>> > (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
>>>>> > (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current
>>>>> > Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage
>>>>> > (RFC6750).
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the
>>>>> >   original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with
>>>>> >   the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed
>>>>> >   entirely.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   *  The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality
>>>>> >      from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the
>>>>> >      authorization code grant according to this specification requires
>>>>> >      the addition of the PKCE mechanism
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   *  Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per
>>>>> >      Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   *  The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this
>>>>> >      specification as per Section 2.1.2 of
>>>>> >      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   *  The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this
>>>>> >      specification as per Section 2.4 of
>>>>> >      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   *  Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query
>>>>> >      string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of
>>>>> >      [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   *  Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use
>>>>> >      as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a
>>>>> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that
>>>>> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future
>>>>> discussions!
>>>>> 
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Aaron Parecki
>>>>> aaronparecki.com
>>>>> @aaronpk
>>>>> 
>>>>> P.S. This notice was also posted at
>>>>> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1
>>>>> 
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